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**AN ANALYSIS ON SECURITY PERCEPTIONS
OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS**

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CENTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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Özsağlam worked at the Department of International Relations-Near East University since 2003 until 2016. He also became guest lecturer at the St. Petersburg State University for a while in spring 2010.

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I. ABSTRACT

This policy paper analyses the security perceptions of Turkish Cypriots since 1963 to nowadays. The analysis is based on the security theories of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, that analysis shows the securitization processes within the Turkish Cypriot society and political life by referring to historical tangible facts.

II. INTRODUCTION

Turkish Cypriot identity is present in Cyprus for a long time, that identity has been constructed under the social and economic policies in the island. We may say that Ottoman and British rules played crucial role for shaping of Turkish Cypriot identity.

In this study, the current security perceptions of Turkish Cypriots are going to be discussed by referring to recent history as well, in which the study is going to be on the theoretical perspective of Copenhagen School.

Copenhagen School is known with its studies regarding the meaning and scope of security. Some of the scholars criticize the studies of Copenhagen due to lack of gender dimension on their studies. However, on the other hand some other scholars put their critics differently and evaluated the security perception of Copenhagen school as being exaggerated, who believed that Copenhagen School expanded the scope of security more than enough.

The aim of this study is not to criticize or trying to defend the security scope and perspective of Copenhagen School, the aim is to combine the security perceptions of Turkish Cypriots by referring to the analysis of Bary Buzan and Ole Waever. Therefore that study will give an opinion regarding the security perceptions of Turkish Cypriots.

It is not possible to say that all Turkish Cypriots is connected strongly with the state and its policies, therefore there are various different perceptions among the individuals. In this study, these various different perceptions will be evaluated by emphasizing on historical background too. In spite of the existence of various security perceptions within the society, we may discuss them under two main groups.

Buzan has underlined the difficulty on describing the security perception of the individual and he just emphasized on the significance of health, status, wealth freedom, which are complicated issues.¹ Buzan also refers to the argument of Waltz who claims that "states, like people are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted".² This argument can be transferred some skeptical thoughts of Turkish Cypriots in this paper to understand why they put the limits for their freedoms.

According to traditional perspectives, states are seen as being instrument by the people to preserve themselves from the threats. However, sometimes the states can be perceived as being the source of the threats. Therefore, individuals join to the militant groups to provide their own security. Basques, Bretons, Kurds Turkish Cypriots can be identified within

¹ Barry Buzan, *People, State and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983, p. 18.

² Ibid, p. 20.

such groups. According to majority of Turkish Cypriots elites, the Republic of Cyprus could not provide the security of Turkish Cypriots and then TMT (Turkish Defense Organization) had been established.

Waever distinguishes the state and the societal security and defined the state security as being political, economic and environmental. He identifies Societal security on ethnic-religion-language base.³ Buzan has made contribution by adding immigration fact, and immigration is perceived as being threat on the societal level and examines the numbers of immigrants and their treatments as well. That immigration issue also is one of the important factors on the shaping of securitization themes of Turkish Cypriots, which affected them during the 1960s and after 1974 as well with different dimensions.⁴

³ Ole Waever (Ed), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Routledge, 1993. p. 25-26.

⁴ Securitization is used to define the issues and actors which are perceived as threats on the studies of Buzan (1983) and Waever (1993).

III. INTER COMMUNAL CONFLICTS AND SECURITIZATION OF GREEK CYPRIOTS BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS (1963-1974)

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have become the two founder communities of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. The Republic of Cyprus has not been defined as being a federal entity, however it has been founded on the basis of ethnic diversity and two languages became the official languages of new republic. Such things are the evidences to prove the functional federative characteristics of the republic. This federative structure of the republic has suffered from the inter-communal conflicts due to the disagreements among the communities regarding the proposed amendments in the constitution of Republic of Cyprus.

Therefore, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) deployed in 1964 under the resolution 186 of UN Security Council. Turkish Cypriot leadership has withdrawn from the parliament (House of Representatives) by showing security reasons.

In 1960-70s, Turkish Cypriot leadership has begun to securitize Greek Cypriot leadership politically and militarily as well. Turkish Cypriot leadership also has emphasized on economic issues and continued to "from Turk to Turk campaign" in economic area. Turkish authorities was not allowing to Turkish shop keepers to buy the products from Greek Cypriot importers and enforcing them to buy from Turkish importers or using Turkish Cypriot products. That was the economic dimension of securitization through as ethno politics.

After the coup d'état on 15th July 1974, Turkey has interfered to the island as being one of the guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus and its constitutional order. However, the intervention resulted with the division of the island (*de facto*) and created new economic, social and political situation in the island.

The new situation has affected the all communities in Cyprus dramatically, they have been displaced and began to live in different cities, villages. Greek Cypriots lost their economic investments too, Turkish Cypriots plus to these they faced with new social changes, such as flowing of the immigration from Turkey.

After 1974, various-different political thoughts opinions have developed within Turkish Cypriot community, so their security perceptions also have showing differences as well.

Buzan's arguments regarding to the immigration and societal security relations are valid for the case Turkish Cypriots' societal security perceptions.

Nationalist Turkish Cypriots politicians have continued to securitize the Greek Cypriots by referring to 1960s incidents and showing Greek Cypriots as being threat for the existence of Turkish Cypriots and also Republic of Cyprus was identified as Hellenized state. Even though, some moderate political environments have focused on different issues rather than dispute with Greek Cypriots. Republic of Cyprus was not seen as being the state which preserves the rights of Turkish Cypriots, hence Turkish Cypriot nationalists continued to justify the activities of Turkish Defense Organization in the (TMT) by this way. After 1974, Turkish Cypriot nationalists have emphasized such arguments and criticize the institutions of Republic of Cyprus which failed to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots and "TMT", "Kahraman Mücahid", "Mehmetçik" and "Thanks to Motherland-Turkey", discourses and slogans became on the center of right wing political parties' policies.⁵ Instead of state security, such discourses, slogans were more close to societal security perception and so focusing on the protection of ethnic identity by securitizing Greek Cypriots and Republic of Cyprus.

Immigrants have been brought from Turkey to the northern part of the island in where Greek Cypriots were displaced. Some of the Turkish immigrants have lived with Turkish Cypriots in same neighborhood and some of them separately. Turkish Cypriots had skeptical thoughts and saw cultural differences relating to the Turkish immigrants.⁶ However, they did not see them in 1980s as being threat to their cultural heritage in the island on societal level. However, especially the left wing parties, their supporters and trade unions have begun to give an attention to changing on the population structure and giving of new citizenships in the northern part of the island in the mid of 1990s. On the other hand, nationalist environments continued to refer to inter-communal conflicts and attacks of EOKA too. Denktaş and National Unity Party also have criticized the policies of Turkish Cypriot left wing political parties {especially Republican Turkish Party (CTP)} on Cyprus issue and their relations with Soviet Union. Even, some of the nationalist environments have implied left wing party members as being "traitors" due to their supports for re-unification of the island on the basis of bi-communal, bi-zonal federation and their critics for the economic, social and economic policies of Turkey in the island.⁷ The right wing-nationalist environments always reminded the

⁵ Denktaş had continued to use the same arguments and similar slogans in 2000s. Denktaş also criticized Talat and Turkish officials, who accepted one representation and sovereignty of Cyprus in a solution within the international relations system. See, <http://www.starkibris.net/index.asp?haberID=12575> , *Star newspaper*, 17.07.2008.

⁶ Many of Immigrants from Turkey have adopted themselves life style of Turkish Cypriots and integrated with the society, especially who live close to the centers of the cities.

⁷ Such accusations have peaked after the declaration of TRNC and during the conversations on new constitution draft in 1985, in 1990 elections and during the Annan Plan process

immigration of Turkish Cypriots from some villages during the inter-communal conflicts and were enforced for living in the tents.⁸

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been declared on 15 November, 1983 under the shadow of military junta administration in Turkey. Although, the opposition left wing parties had question marks for this separatist attitude, they voted "yes" for the declaration of TRNC in the parliament due to the authoritarian political atmosphere.

⁸ This argument is supported with academic studies as well by referring to the documents of 1963-1974, For more details see, Ulvi Keser, *Kızılay Belgeleri Işığında Kıbrıs 1963-1974*, Pulat Basımevi, Ankara, 2013.

IV. GENESIS OF REACTIONS TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENTS

In 1985-86, National Unity Party (UBP) and Communal Salvation Party (TKP) were in coalition and Turgut Özal government has tried to impose economic and financial program to UBP-TKP coalition government. Özal's liberal policies were refused by the TKP and the coalition was collapsed. That was a first tangible conflict between Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot political parties.⁹

After wards, Özker Özgür former leader of CTP, had criticized strongly Turkey's (Turkish State) social-identity and economic policies in the island, who stated that Turkey's policies for Turkish Cypriots are similar with the policies of Bulgarian State for Turks. After this statement, his Turkish travel document-passport was cancelled by Turkish state.¹⁰ Such incidents was increasing the tension between Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot oppositions.

In 1990, the parliamentary and presidential elections have been interfered by some wings of the Turkish state. Even, TRT, television and radio channel of Turkey had broadcastings on TV to support Denktas and UBP. Prof. Dr. Mumtaz Soysal, advisor of Denktas, had obviously stated his support and solidarity to Denktas, UBP and he criticized opposition alliance, DMP (Democratic Struggle Party). Eventually, DMP had lost the elections, which was formed by CTP, TDP and YDP (New Revival Party). CTP and TKP showed their reactions to undemocratic election and interventions of Turkey's bureaucratic elites by boycotting the parliament. Turkish Cypriot opposition political parties and non-governmental organizations have securitized Turkey (Turkish State) regarding to their own political and societal rights.

Turkey has entered a "democratization process" in the beginning of 1990s with the reforms of Turgut Özal. Therefore, its impacts were seen in northern part of Cyprus too. The early parliamentary elections were held in 1993 and CTP has become the small partner of the coalition government, which was a historical thing for CTP to be part of the "political power". CTP was a pro Soviet party in the past, however, it changed its political orientation after the collapse of Soviet Union and has taken steps towards Euro Socialist-Social Democratic stance. CTP has continued to support the federal solution in Cyprus and also having good relations with Social Democratic People Party (SHP) in Turkey, small coalition partner of the government in Turkey. However, CTP has faced some problems with Tansu Çiller, Prime Minister of Turkey regarding the economic protocol between TRNC and Turkey. Although, CTP had moderated its political stance, even though it could not be the pioneer of neo-liberal policies on economic sphere which were prepared and tried to be imposed by Turkey. Therefore, the government was dissolved, here

⁹ Özdemir Tokel, UBP-TKP Koalisyonu, Kıbrıs Postası, 13.10.2016, <http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/173562> , (11.06.2016).

¹⁰ Akay Cemal, Özgür'e Misilleme, Milliyet, 14.06.1989, p. 12.

significant point was the securitization of economic policies of Turkey by CTP, which were perceived as being ultra liberal policies. That economic securitization can be combined certainly with political stance of CTP as well.

The economic-financial protocols have been getting the usual imposition by Turkish governments over Turkish Cypriot governments. The right wing Turkish Cypriot political parties generally accepts the inducements of Turkish governments, however Turkish Cypriot left wing parties, especially CTP always have tried to resist such inducements and imposes. Left wing political parties and syndicates see such economic and financial protocols as being threats for the existence-presence of Turkish Cypriot identity in the island, we will explain such securitizations in economic and social sectors in followings parts.

In 1998 elections, CTP has lost its support due to its internal problems and its government performance badly, so it disappointed the masses, afterward, UBP and TKP established coalition government, which continued until 2001. During the UBP-TKP government period, Turkish Cypriot Community had faced most heavy economic and financial crisis.

First of all, the financial crisis emerged with the bankruptcy of the banks, which were mostly established with very small capital amounts. Following the banking crisis, Turkish Lira was devaluated in Turkey and its impacts were destructive over Turkish Cypriots, suddenly people lost almost half of their incomes and people who were paying their loans in foreign currency remained in a very difficult situation. Therefore, people who suffered from the increasing of foreign currency rates immediately organized a platform and massive rallies. CTP and trade unions were the leaders of massive demonstrations. The trade unions securitized the Turkey economically and politically as well. Their critics were more tough, while CTP articulated more smoothly on similar issues.

KTÖS (Turkish Cypriot Teacher Syndicate) was criticizing Turkey more strictly, giving advertisements to newspapers and using such words; *"Ankara, we don't want your money, your programme, your clients and we just want to govern ourselves."*¹¹

The political atmosphere was getting more complicated, Denktas and the government were moving an authoritarian stance, BMBP (Platform this country own to us) was established to combat against policies of Turkish government and Denktas in northern part of the island.

¹¹ See for more details, http://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/hamambocu/authors/svg/svg6_11_2001.html (10,3.2016).

Turkish government was insisting to impose its economic and fiscal policies through UBP-DP coalition government in N. Cyprus. At the same period, the authoritarian policies have been implemented by Denktas and UBP-DP coalition government. The journalists and left wing intellectuals were blamed as being traitors on the newspapers, (These newspapers had close ties with the government and military elites) and crossing of many peace activists to buffer zone was prevented. While Turkish Cypriots were suffering form economic crisis in Turkey and also from bankruptcy of the banks in N. Cyprus, they were oppressed by the government and Denktas too.

Therefore, left wing political parties and trade unions have organized massive demonstrations against the government and Turkish policies in Cyprus. While the left wing parties were organizing such demonstrations, the preliminary meetings of Cyprus peace talks have been prepared.

V. EMERGENCE OF ANNAN PLAN AND TOWARDS A VELVET REVOLUTION

Denktas and Kleridis had two important visits to each other by crossing the check points in December 2001. Following these visits and meetings, United Nations (UN) has focused on formation of a solution plan in Cyprus on the basis of bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. Therefore, Alvaro De Soto, special envoy of the UN Secretary General presented comprehensive plan that was called as Annan Plan. Turkish Cypriot peace activists, political parties and trade unions have focused on mobilizing the masses to support the plan. Hence, they organized massive demonstrations to support the Annan Plan and protesting the separatist attitudes in Cyprus and Turkey as well.

We can say that it was the first time those masses were following left wing political parties and trade unions and have begun to separate themselves from TRNC state and having different security perceptions with Denktas.

Denktas, UBP, DP and UHH (National People Movement-Nationalist Right wing organization) have continued to securitize Greek Cypriots, EU and even rest of the international community.

On the other hand, the left wing and supporters of some right wing parties (including some former TMT members, former Mücahids) had different orientation, who securitized Turkey's economic and political policies and reacted status quo, even the oppositions prepared a song which symbolized the demands and self governance of Turkish Cypriots and they sung this song at the demonstrations. The content of this song implies the societal security priorities of Turkish Cypriots.

The name of the song is "Mevsimi Geldi Artık", and means the coming of the season. The content and words of the song were very impressive over the masses, which refers to the past by making nostalgia and using the jasmine, olive branch as the symbols of the island and accented the longing of the mothers to their children due to the emigration from N. Cyprus to abroad and call attention to lack of self governance in the past and now it is time for self governance.

Denktas, Eroglu, nationalist Turkish politicians and authors were strongly protested during the massive rallies. The demonstrators called the resignation of the government, Denktas and called Turkey not to interfere to internal affairs of Turkish Cypriots. Protestor Turkish Cypriots saw Denktas as one of the responsible persons from the division of the island and isolation of Turkish Cypriots. During the rallies, masses strongly voiced the membership to EU and re-unification of the island.

Left wings and liberal environments securitized traditional Turkish approach and policies, Denktas and Eroğlu also were perceived as being threat to Turkish Cypriot identity due to the status quo.

On the other hand, Denktas and his supporters continued to refer to incidents in 1960s and securitize Greek Cypriots and gratitude to the motherland, Turkey by organizing alternative demonstrations. Denktas was calling the masses to protect the sovereignty and TRNC as being the state of Turkish Cypriots.

Here, we may show the main differences between two main security perceptions within Turkish Cypriot Community in the table with the concepts.

Securitization	Traditionalists, Turkish Nationalists	Left Wing Political Parties, Trade Unions, Liberals
Political	Greek Cypriots, Republic of Cyprus, EU, International Community. Annan Plan.	Turkish governments and Bureaucratic Elites. Sometimes military elites.
Military	Greek Cypriots, Greece	-complicated
Societal	Greek Cypriots	Social Policies of Turkish governments (however, it was not stated strongly during the cooperation with Erdogan on Annan Plan period)
Economic	Greek Cypriots	Unstable Turkish Economy and Currency, Privatization.
Environment	-----	Building of Akkuyu Nuclear Plant was protested by some left wing and environmentalist groups. Protesting the project of Oil Filling Plant in Akatu.
Political Aims-Stance	Protection of Status Quo, TRNC. Having good relations traditional Turkish Military and Bureaucratic elites. Conflict with Erdoğan (AKP) on Annan Plan.	Demolishing of the Status Quo, Cooperation with Erdoğan (AKP government in 2003-2005)

In 2003 elections, CTP came to power as the biggest partner of the coalition government with the Prime Ministry of Mehmet Ali Talat. Talat was not only the prime minister to implement the policies for domestic affairs at the TRNC government, he was also present in Cyprus Peace Talks to bring the Annan Plan for referendum. Talat and Denktas had deeply different views regarding the Annan Plan. Eventually, Denktas

withdraw from the peace talks and so Talat had gone Brgerstock summit to conclude the last version of Annan Plan with Tasos Papadopoulos.¹² Therefore, he agreed with Papadopoulos to go referendum of Annan Plan. Following the Brgerstock summit, Talat has focused to mobilize the people to vote "YES" for Annan Plan, and using the common homeland concept and united Cyprus. On the other hand, Denktas has securitized Annan Plan and showed the expected new united federal Cyprus as the end of Turkish identity in the island by dissolving of TRNC.

Talat, left wing political parties and groups had similar ideas with Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey during the Annan Plan referendum and afterwards. Therefore, during the campaign "yes" for Annan Plan, Denktas and his followers organized anti-Annan plan and securitized plan and AKP as well.

After the Annan Plan referendum, Denktas was glad to Russia and Tassos Papadopoulos due to the refusing of the Annan Plan by Greek Cypriot Community.¹³ Denktas expected to change the orientation of Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus, however Erdođan had insisted to continue federative and constructive policy in Cyprus. Hence, he did not want to see Denktas in the power. Therefore, Denktas had not taken risk and participated presidential election in 2005. Erođlu has entered the election as the candidate of traditionalists-nationalists against Talat, eventually Talat has won the election with 55.6 %. Afterwards, CTP has gone parliamentary elections and got 44.5 of the votes. CTP could not come to power alone, but it became the biggest partner of the coalition strongly and had good relations with Turkey until 2009.

The submission-preparation of new economic protocol in 2009 became a turning point on the breakdown of the relations between AKP-Turkish Cypriot left wing parties and groups.

AKP has begun to change its foreign policy orientation in 2009 and that reasoned the emergence of new problems with its near abroad including North Cyprus. First of all, AKP has tried to persuade CTP to sign the economic protocol between Turkish Cypriot government and Turkey, and then to release the budget contribution-credit for North Cyprus.

CTP had tried to discuss economic and social problems with trade unions and other non-governmental organizations. Trade unions had insisted to increase the salaries and improvement on employee rights. Especially, Teacher's Union reacted strongly against CTP. CTP was trying to imply that there is a recession economically and cutting of all contributions from

¹² Rauf Denktas had different views and he did not want to be person who would agree upon Annan Plan and so he capacitated Talat and Serdar Denktas to pursue the talks in Brgerstock as Alvaro De Soto, Special Envoy of UN Secretary General stated. See., AB Haber, <http://www.ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=34165&l=1>, 25.03.2004, (11.06.2016).

¹³ Muhittin T. Ozsaglam, "Kuzey Kibris'ta Annan Planı Dneminde Federasyonun Anlamı zerine", Kibris Yazıları, No: 7-8-9, Summer-Fall, Winter, 2007,p. 32.

Turkey. However, Trade Unions did not compromise on such issues with CTP and Ferdi Sabit Soyer has decided to go early elections in April, 2009.

UBP had close relations with trade unions before the elections and tried to persuade the people that they can obtain financial aid from Turkey more easily and they got the result of this policy at the elections and came to power. However, UBP has just postponed the regulation of economic-financial program to take the support from the people for Eroglu at the presidential elections. The privatization process was frozen and revision on the employment policy of Cyprus Turkish Airlines (KTHY) was not realized as well.

VI. TENSION AND NEW SECURITIZATION PROCESS

Eroğlu has won the presidential elections in 2010 against Talat, left wing and other peace forces have lost their last castle in the governance institutions. İrsen Küçük has become the prime minister and immediately focused on to implement the so-called privatization policies. We use "so-called" term, because the process was a kind of post Soviet style privatization.

Küçük's government has created its first crisis with KTHY issue. KTHY was in financial crisis due o the several reasons and Küçük government tried to save KTHY by providing a cooperation with a Turkish Private Company, how ever, tender envelopes were lost during the process. That was a political scandal. Even though, Küçük has just made a statement that the government will have a legal inquiry. The KTHY could not be saved from financial crisis and its slots have been cancelled and Atlas Jet (Turkish private company) has taken the responsibility to carry passengers of KTHY, but it could not accomplish its task completely. The KTHY has declared its bankruptcy in October 2010. On the other hand, Küçük has insisted to implement the economic protocol and then he made a joint statement with Tayyip Erdoğan, the prime minister of Turkey who criticized the level of the salaries. During the explanation of their joint statement Erdoğan also asked the salary of Küçük in front of the media and criticized the attitudes of trade unions in N. Cyprus.¹⁴ That joint statement and question of Erdogan was the beginning of the end for Küçük government and his political life too, because many Turkish Cypriots were offended from this question and atmosphere, who believed that Küçük created this atmosphere and gave opportunity to be asked such a question. The reactions of the masses can be defined as being part of societal security. Turkish Cypriots felt have been offended and their dignity was violated.

The Küçük government has focused on the implementation of economic protocol, however the trade unions and left wing political parties reacted strongly to the Küçük's policies and implementations. Therefore, they began to organize the strikes and demonstration against the government. The trade unions had gone to strike at some working places and 13th day of the strike they organized a massive-huge demonstration at the İnonü square and protested the economic and financial policies of Turkey and UBP government in the northern part of Cyprus.¹⁵

There were some reactions to the AKP government since 2009, however these reactions have not emerged strongly as being in this demonstration. Participants of this demonstration protested economic program of the government and also pointed that program was imposed by Turkish Government. The trade unions and left wing political parties have begun

¹⁴ Joint Statement of Erdogan and Küçük, 16 July 2010, Radikal Newspaper; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFrNpFrLi-Y>, (15 June 2016).

¹⁵ Kıbrıs Newspaper, January 28, 2011, <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/?p=172452>.

to securitize the AKP government and its economic and social policies in northern part of Cyprus.

After the demonstration, Erdoğan had defined the protestors as “Orphan” and stated that “***we feed them and they organize demonstration against us***”.¹⁶ That statement increased the tension and reasoned the emergence of new reactions. The left wing political parties and trade unions condemned Erdoğan’s statement.

CTP, as main opposition party declared that “Erdoğan’s statement can not be acceptable and Erdoğan has to know that his strategic location that he wants to be presence is our homeland and first of all, we should be here. Turkey can not be here without Turkish Cypriots. Erdoğan has to understand that his government’s financial measures (which tries to settle through UBP) will consume Turkish Cypriots.”¹⁷

Trade unions reminded to Erdoğan that he was not saying the truths, Erdoğan claimed that minimum salary is 10.000 Turkish Lira (3000 Euro) however, it was almost 500 Euro. 2011 and 2012 years were turning point that trade unions and left wing political parties had securitized AKP’s policies obviously on economic and social issues in northern part of the island.

The Turkish Cypriot opposition has focused on the struggle to stop the privatization of public utilities, which was mentioned on economic program for TRNC by Aid Committee of Embassy, Turkey.¹⁸

The opposition parties and groups organized another demonstration on 2nd March 2011, that demonstration was more crowded and the slogans were more tougher against the AKP government and Erdoğan. In this demonstrations, we witnessed the securitization of Turkey within three level; Societal, economic and political. The masses were from various-different political parties, trade unions and political-cultural associations. Therefore, they used the different symbols and slogans, some left wing groups they used Republic of Cyprus flags, some of the Kemalists used the photos of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and pointed secularism to show that AKP threatens the secular identity of Turkish Cypriots because of organizing Quran courses, opening the religious school and building new mosques etc.

The AKP government was not securitized only by left wing political parties and organizations, Democratic Party (DP) and its leader, Serdar Denktaş participated the massive demonstrations and protested the government

¹⁶ Gazete Vatan, February 5, 2011, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/kktc-de--besleme--krizi--357226-gundem>.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Aid Committee of Embassy, Turkey), http://www.yhb.gov.tr/download/ekonomik_program/2010-2012-donemi-programi.pdf.

and AKP policies in N. Cyprus. He stated that he will participate the demonstration and underlined the importance of Turkish Cypriot identity and its unity, he also referred to Atatürk too.¹⁹

The reactions of these groups were meaningful when we look at the data of 2012 and 2013. For example, Turkey gave 3.466.000 Euro for the building of the new mosques and the renovation of old ones in 2012²⁰ and then allocated 4.000.000 Euro for the building of Hala Sultan Divinity College, while giving 3.660.000 for the renovation of the primary and secondary schools and their equipment in 2013.²¹ The non-governmental organizations were criticizing the trend that Turkey and UBP emphasized on Sunni religious sect and was not emphasizing on the renovation and supplying the equipment for the schools. The discrimination can be seen among the Muslim sects, such as Alevis has got only 26.600 Euro during the CTP government period to build up Cem Evi, which was not sufficient and then they could not get any financial aid from the government or Turkey. Using of such slogans and symbols show the vulnerabilities on societal security, the masses had vulnerability on cultural area and religion belief.

Some of the opposition parties (Radical Left wings) and the trade union have securitized "privatization" process and also they identified the "privatization" process as being "Turkification" and giving rewards to "Green Islamic Capital".²² KTÖS has always securitized the economic and social policies of Turkey and also has given an attention to poor health and education services due to the immigration from Turkey,²³ which was a securitization on societal level by combining it with economic and political sectors.

The demonstrations were getting tough and the "security measures" of the UBP government as well. Hence the strikes and the rallies were getting the part of the daily life. The tension has turned to clashes between demonstrators and police, when the demonstrators protested Erođan's visit to Nicosia.

¹⁹ Kibris Postasi,

http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/48544/PageName/KIBRIS_HABERLERI, 1.3.2011, (11.06.2016). Serdar Denktas and his party sometimes may securitize Greek Cypriots and Turkish government as well, in these rallies they did it.

²⁰ See for more details, Ali Dayıođlu and Mete Hatay, "Cyprus", Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 6, Editor in Chief, Jorgen S. Nielsen, Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing, Leiden, 2014, p.161.

²¹ Ibid. p.173.

²² See for more details, Haber Kibris, http://haberkibris.com/061863ac-2010_10_11.html, Statement of İzzet İzcan, leader of United Cyprus Party. (11.06.2016)

²³ Statement of KTÖS, Star Newspaper, 25.09.2012; Although the left wing and their supporters react the social and economic policies of Turkey in the island, they follow the popular culture of Turkey by supporting Turkish football teams and listening popular songs. Even they organize the tours to watch the matches in İstanbul or listening the special concerts as well. Therefore, we may mention on complicated situation within the society.

Erdoğan has been in Nicosia to participate the anniversary of 20 July 1974 Turkish Military Intervention. The protestors have organized a demonstration in front of the KTHY building, however police used violence to the protestors and clashes emerged, hence 10 protestors were detained and almost 60 protestors were wounded.²⁴ This protest demonstration has gone further of economics, and securitized the violence in terms of political and military security.

The police inspector has expressed his views at the court in 2013 and proclaimed that "demonstration was damaging the public order, illegal and the opening of protest banners also might damage the relations with Turkey, that why we interfered to he demonstrators".²⁵ The statement of the police inspector has obviously showed the differences among two main streams regarding the security and securitization issues.

The privatization of Timbo (Ercan) Airport was another turning point and milestone, the TRNC competition board ratified the giving of the airport to Taş Yapı İnşaat Company to operate for 25 years on 12th October,²⁶ 2012 which increased the reactions of the opposition groups. The government insisted to privatize on other sectors and also promised for the building of oil filling plant in Karpaz Peninsula. However, the government has begun to face with the resistance of environmentalists and the opposition parties regarding the building of oil filling plant in Yedikonuk-Karpaz Peninsula. The oil filling plant was projected by Rixoh International (Switzerland Base) and Cemsa Company (TRNC) have established Rixoh Investment Ltd.²⁷ Such policies and implementations of the government created a securitization on environmental issue smoothly as well and the opposition parties with non-governmental organizations have begun to securitize the oil filling plant as being part of the environmental sector.

The Küçük government could not implement its policies any more due to the reactions of the oppositions and internal problems of UBP (some deputies resigned from UBP). As a result, Küçük government has resigned in June 2013 and Sibel Siber, deputy of CTP, has become the acting Prime Minister until the early elections. Siber has emphasized on environmental security and cancelled the oil filling plant and also tried to have investigation on the "privatization process of Ercan Airport", however, she could not pursue her policies, because she faced other crucial-financial problems, when she tries to inquiry the Ercan case. Turkish government did not allocate the financial aid to TRNC government, so Siber stated that we may pay the 60 percent of the salaries from our own financial

²⁴ <http://sendika10.org/2011/07/kibrista-erdogan-teroru/>

²⁵ <http://haberkibris.com/19-temmuz-davasinda-flas-gelisme-2013-05-22.html>,

22 May 2015 (11.06.2016).

²⁶ See for more details. Decision of TRNC Competition Board, <https://rekabet.gov.ct.tr/Portals/1112/ERCAN%20%C3%B6zelle%C5%9Ftirme%20karar%20.pdf> . 12.10.2012. (11.06.2016)

²⁷ Haber Kıbrıs, <http://haberkibris.com/iste-yedikonuktaki-petrol-dolum-tesisi-projesinin-ayrintilari-2012-03-01.html> . (12.06.2016).

sources.²⁸ Although she faced difficulties to pay the salaries and enforced to loyalty to economic protocol, she created a good perception on the minds of the people.

Finally, CTP has come to power with 38.38 percent of the used votes and established coalition government with DP in the summer of 2013. CTP has faced difficulties at the government to implement its own policies and tried to make amendment on the constitution to improve the political and civil rights, however the amendments were refused at the referendum in June, 2014. At the same time, CTP has also lost three main-major municipalities in the elections (Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia) at the same time. Following these, CTP lost presidential elections and Talat returned to the party by replacing Özkan Yorgancıoğlu.

Talat and new executive committee of CTP decided to establish a coalition government with UBP. That was the beginning of new period and also end of the smooth political atmosphere, which continued from 2013-2015.

Although CTP and UBP agreed on government protocol, UBP has not followed the protocol and differently on substantive matters-issues.

CTP and UBP had different positions regarding the management of water pipeline project, which was built up by Turkey from Alaköprü Damp to Panagra (Geçitköy)-Cyprus. CTP insisted on the operation of water with the management-control of the state authority, however UBP did not give sufficient support to CTP, when CTP disagreed with Turkish government. Eventually, CTP put its reservations regarding the management of water project. The negotiation continued almost 3 months between Turkey and CTP's representatives at the government and ended in March by signing the treaty regarding the operation and management of the water. In spite of solving this issue, other left wing political parties and non-governmental organizations have continued to criticize CTP that the operation of the water project was given to the hands of the private monopoly. While CTP was trying to persuade the public opinion on water issue, the economic and financial protocol has emerged as being new problem, due to insisting on privatization of public utilities by Turkish government. CTP tried to revise the economic protocol in which protocol was covering the privatization of the electricity, sea-ports etc. The resistance of CTP created the difficulties for the government, which reasoned suspension of financial aid from Turkey and the government could not pay all the the salaries of public officers. Following this process, UBP resigned from the government.

²⁸ Yenidüzen,
<http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/haberler/basbakan-siberden-maas-aciklamasi/5092>
(12.06.2016).

Ömer Kalyoncu has criticized UBP due to its conformist stance in the relations with Turkey and showed UBP as an obstacle to implement the government protocol and programme. Kalyoncu also underlined the resistance of CTP on “water management issue”, which disturbed UBP and he proclaimed that UBP does not want “self governance” in this country.²⁹

Sami Özuslu, columnist of Yeniduzen, director of Kanal Sim, defined reports of the bureaucrats and protocol as the instrument to damage to the society. He also identified different perspectives of CTP and UBP regarding the relations with Turkey and showed the conformist character of UBP.³⁰

Dissolution of the government has been understood as an intervention from Turkey in some political environments, for example Sonay Adem, ex-Minister of Labor and Social Security (CTP), argued that CTP-UBP government was dissolved by the intervention of Turkey.³¹ The statements of some CTP’s representatives and columnists can be evaluated as the part of new securitization of Turkish Cypriot left wing environments. Privatization has been securitized as a societal base and economic as well, on the other hand, dissolution of the government was perceived as being intervention from Turkey and here Turkish government was securitized politically too. Right wing environments, especially UBP’s representatives accused CTP as the breaker of the relations with Turkey.

Eventually, UBP has taken task for the foundation of new government from Mustafa Akıncı and established a coalition government with DP by supplying the support of the independent deputies. Therefore, theoretically all the obstacles were removed and new government has been established and signed the financial protocol and economic programme which was prepared mostly by Turkey. Therefore, Turkey has begun to allocate the funds to the government too.

²⁹ Halkın Sesi, April 4, 2016.

³⁰ Yeniduzen Newspaper, April 5, 2016, <http://www.yeniduzen.com/Yazarlar/sami-ozuslu/hukumeti-bitiren-paket-ve-siyaset/8433> ,

³¹ Statement of Sonay Adem, Detay, 20th April 2016, <http://www.detaykibris.com/sonay-adem-hukumeti-turkiye-yikti-119072h.htm>

VII. CONCLUSION

Eventually, two main security perceptions are seen within the Turkish Cypriot political life. Although these two main streams have different security perceptions, they sometimes securitize same actors by looking at social, economic and political themes from different dimensions.

Turkish Cypriot community and its political, economic and social institutions have got a crucial, interesting adventure on the securitization process. Turkish Cypriots' securitization has developed mostly on societal level. During the intercommunal conflicts, the leftist ideas were very weak within Turkish Cypriot Community and Turkish Cypriots mostly had focused on securitize Greek Cypriots-nationalists and the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus too. They believed that Republic of Cyprus had failed to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and supplying their security. That process has mostly continued until the mid of 1980s. Afterwards, the securitization has been seen in various aspects and levels.

Left wing political parties and some of the trade unions mostly have begun to criticize the status quo in 1980s at the political and economic level too. However, securitization on societal level has begun in the beginning of 1990s and the massive movements emerged at the end of the 1990s.

The emergence of different security perceptions within the society is related with the development of Turkish Cypriot identity during 1990s. Thus, we tried to clarify these perceptions even by touching their nuances inside of these perceptions. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have their own unique perceptions who believe to protect and strengthen their own identities by securitizing the others. However, Turkish Cypriots they do such things by getting support from other as well. For example, they securitize Greek Cypriots and Turkish governments, but they don't refuse the aids of Turkey and its military presence in Cyprus to provide the balance in the island against to Greek Cypriots. It means that some of the Turkish Cypriots, they would like to limit the political, social and economic presence of Turkey, even though they accept military presence of Turkey in the island. It means that they don't securitize Turkey in military sector due to providing "balance" in the island.

We may talk on complications-dilemmas on the minds of political elites and representatives of non-governmental organizations regarding the securitization due to feeling insecure conditions for a long time. Hence, it can be seen different ideas and perceptions within two main stream in different times and themes. However, the reality is that feeling of insecure in economic, political, military and societal themes push the institutions of the society to re-think about the radical democracy and limiting their individual freedoms.



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