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**CYPRUS CENTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**  
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**1993-2022** TWENTY NINE YEARS OF POLICY FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS

## COVID-19 AND SHIFTING PARADIGMS



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During the Eurozone crisis Germany imposed its own philosophy of strict austerity on how to address the structural economic problems in the Eurozone. Furthermore, the architecture of the Eurozone was faulty as was pointed out by Martin Feldstein and other in 1990's. Despite such warnings, it was erroneously assumed that the market could address effectively all possible issues which might have come up. This belief was upheld despite the absence of an effective crisis-mitigating mechanism. As a result, countries which found themselves in a deep recession were forced to counterproductively pursue a strict fiscal policy with depression being the inevitable outcome. Indicative of this is the example of Greece: the country lost 25% of its GDP while more than 600.00 Greeks, mostly young people, had to search for opportunities in other countries.

Likewise, the treatment of Cyprus in 2013 was unnecessarily harsh. This can be better understood if one compares how Spain's rather similar banking crisis was resolved. Spain, on the one hand, was offered a loan of €40 billions aiming to save its banking system. This loan was provided without a Memorandum of Understanding nor a rescue package. Cyprus, on the other hand was treated much differently and perhaps vindictively. Indeed, Troika exhausted its discretionary power on the scale of austerity enforced using Cyprus as a trial ground of bail-in interventions.

Be that as it may this approach (which I describe as Neoliberal Model II) reflected what was perceived as economic orthodoxy. In this model, the role of the state is limited and the market system is given excessive importance. Moreover, the principles of solidarity and equity are considered irrelevant by this Model. Its value system revolves around individualism and profit maximization. Inevitably collective goals are ignored.

I am noting a distinction with what I describe as Neoliberal Model I which challenged Keynesianism and influenced policymaking in the period 1970's-2000. More specifically, this model focused on the reduction of government spending and deregulation. In addition, it was also in favour of tax reductions and incentives aiming to increase labour supply and investment. While the Neoliberal Model I had its own philosophy, it was also responding to what it considered as the excesses of Keynesianism and the welfare state. Politically,

this approach was expressed by President Ronald Reagan in the US and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK. Evidently, this philosophy was strongly supported by the middle classes in several countries. Subsequently, President Bill Clinton's Neoliberal approach maintained some of the pillars of Neoliberalism I. One of Clinton's objectives was to ensure that the benefits of growth and development were enjoyed and shared by a broader set of Americans. He certainly achieved this goal.

What I describe though as Neoliberal Model II, a model propagated, implemented and exported by Germany, went too far. Even before the pandemic, the impact of the pursued philosophy was negative. More specifically, the pursued rationalization of economic indicators came at a very high socioeconomic cost: reduction of economic activity, higher unemployment and growing inequality.

When Covid 19 came and many countries were faced with extraordinary circumstances, the EU had to revisit this policy approach. To begin with, it was clear that the health sector and infrastructure were adversely affected by the sustained draconian fiscal austerity. This led to a heavy social cost. With the pandemic though this approach could not remain unaltered. The state had a role to play; and there was also relaxation of the rules of fiscal austerity. Furthermore, the Eurogroup acknowledged on April 9, 2020 that the policy approach to the previous crisis had been inadequate.

The question is what would replace the Neoliberal Model II. I think it is important to think and act beyond ideological perspectives. Pragmatism is of paramount importance. Private initiative and the market system will always be very important. But so is the concept of a mixed economy. In this regard the state will always have a role to play. This should entail three roles: strategic, social and referee. Within this framework, it is important to understand that it is wrong to decouple fiscal policy from economic circumstances. This does not mean that we should push aside the principle of fiscal prudence. It means though that fiscal discretion should be part of policymaking. In times of recession the various government(s) should be allowed to stimulate the economy by pursuing expansionary policies. In times of economic growth, budgets should be balanced and in some cases it will be appropriate to even have surpluses.

Last but not least, a new model should also revisit the broader value system. The principle of solidarity should be given great attention. Furthermore, equal opportunities for all should be encouraged. Lastly, while private goals should be pursued we must simultaneously respect and work for collective objectives.

## CHOOSING TO REMEMBER, CHOOSING TO FORGET. CONFLICTING MEMORIES, CONFLICTING HISTORIES: THE SAGA OF A NEVER-ENDING DEBATE



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Human memory, however one understands or utilizes it, to buttress recollecting the past or reminisce about it, has always been and continues to be a powerful weapon at everybody's disposal. For good reason, should one wishes to praise its positive, profound, transparent and deep parameters. Memory assists in remembering events of the past, reminding human beings of the many aspects and twists and the infinite lessons of history. Remembering the past is perhaps the first condition for writing history; plunging into the archives becomes essential. Memory, however, is indispensable and a guiding principle, as one goes through tons of documents in an effort to decipher and interpret the past. Any historian simply does not enter the labyrinth of primary sources as a *tabula rasa* or in an apparent exercise justifying nihilism, i.e., of wandering aimlessly in life, with no purpose whatsoever. In negative terms, especially if memory is employed selectively, the latter stirs passions, unnecessarily so, providing the stimulus for vituperative, sterile and non-productive exchanges. Negative or selective memory seeks to bury a broader understanding of history, but in so doing, it unleashes demons, and opens the Pandora's box for further travails and ordeals, gratuitously so. It also forces people to confront ghosts of the past, seemingly buried, only to be resurrected by the perpetrators of such an approach. An irresistible and artificial momentum is thus created, which is very hard to stop, occasionally acquiring the proportions of a giant avalanche. Thus, people are held hostage and become prisoners to these tactics. If not challenged and contained-seriously so-they question the very fundamentals of our existence, even bedrock assumptions about the past and its liberal and non-prejudicial interpretation.

The motives of such an approach leave serious doubts as regards original intent, while this kind of practice does not entail anything of value; quite the opposite. If for nothing else, negative memory oversimplifies and generalizes history, dangerously so, as it tends to overlook and bypass its many

complexities and complications.<sup>1</sup> Our world and human beings are simply not created like that; they just cannot fit into any frameworks that seek to explain their creation, existence and functioning via a shallow and superficial approach. History is replete with such examples. Adolf Hitler and the stab in the back in Germany, since 1918, is perhaps the most glaring of them all, a combination of a historical lie with selective memory, which-tragically for humanity-fitted into his sinister plans and vision. The consequences, though not inevitable, were indeed devastating, as they led to WWII.<sup>2</sup> A point needs to be made. Controversy, a spice of life, by definition, always accompanies historical memory or the study of history in general, mainly because of its interpretation, be that the former is positively or negatively used. This much is indisputable. What may remedy controversy and lessen its harmful legacy? A historiographic approach (or *problematique*), for one, with no prejudices *ab initio* attached or an one-dimensional analysis, which, combined with objectivity, may go a long way in that direction.

At other times, states and nations compete with each other in memory preservation, employing a variety of means for doing so. This is the case, if their historical paths have been crossed. Greece and Turkey come to the mind as an excellent example, with Japan, China and Korea as well (colonialism, imperialism and WWII having a lot to do with it). Why should this be so, especially since, in the former case, 2021 and 2022-back to back years as it is-mark two diametrically opposed historical anniversaries of paramount importance to both? As an answer to our inquiry, let it be stressed that the two countries gained their independence at the expense of the other.

Inevitably, conflicting memories produce conflicting histories and vice versa, much to the distress of those directly involved-the indigenous people that is-and to the detriment of outsiders as well, especially historians. Equally perplexing is the question that arises: whom and what to believe in the

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<sup>1</sup> Negative or selective memory does not mean falsifying history. On the other hand, it aids and abets the process of falsification, by focusing on selective themes, interpreting them at will, through memory of one's own choosing.

<sup>2</sup> Gordon Craig, *Germany, 1866-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), where he makes the seminal point on the difference a personality makes in history, referring to Adolf Hitler. If somebody else, like Benito Mussolini, would have prevailed inside Germany, then surely history would have taken another path. Even though it is counter-factual speculation, in such a case, it is highly improbable that war would not have broken out.

Yet, Zara Steiner offers a completely different view. True enough, Il Duce did not possess the diabolical personality of Adolf Hitler; still, he wanted war, fist against the French in the Mediterranean, later in Africa (Ethiopia and Abyssinia) and finally in the Balkans against Yugoslavia and Greece. In short, he dream was nothing less than recrudescing the Roman Empire. What becomes cardinal is whether he would have followed Hitler's footsteps, if he had been in his position. Zara Steiner, *The Lights That Failed: European International History 1919-1933* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 325-346.

prevailing circumstances? What about objectivity, the noble dream, ever elusive, in the words of Peter Novick?<sup>3</sup>

Nationalism, irrespective of how one understands and interprets the term, accounts for more than its fair share in memory: creating, strengthening, resuscitating, destroying, obliterating, depending of course on which form is utilized. It is also one of the factors that contribute to an one-dimensional approach in many things, the study of history being one of them. Not that nationalism is noxious or malicious by definition. Rather, it is its negative form and extreme version, the forces it unleashes-as a result-which produce perniciousness. If exploited by many, politicians, political speculators, pundits and demagogues, nationalism witnesses bizarre and bitter results, occasionally tragic, the writing of history not being an exception. Put it otherwise, nationalism running rampant, creates malice, a prospect that should be avoided, when and where it is necessary.

In practical terms, what of the two prime cases, Greece and Turkey, that is? Why should their past be a tormentor to two people, two neighbors, even to this day? Must it be the case of conflicting nationalisms, always leading to war and destruction, nationalisms moreover, which antagonize each other, intolerant as they are and being merciless? What can one learn from the writing of so much history, not just for the two countries in question, which may facilitate our understanding for the Asia Minor Catastrophe?

To begin with, nomenclature does play its role, leading to parallax visions.<sup>4</sup> Bruce Cumings has called our attention to this phenomenon between the US and Asia.<sup>5</sup> John Dower has done the same for Japan and the Japanese, countless others for Korea and China.<sup>6</sup> Conflicting interpretations of history, different versions of the same events, create a labyrinth for the historians, inevitably making their task unenviable and infinitely more difficult. They run the risk of being lost in the dark with no salvation in sight. Hope, however, is not lost, as the historian needs to dig deep, to excavate, to enter dark alleys, hitherto unexploited. Patience, persistence and perseverance, and not least an open and clear mind, with a passion for criticism *bona fide*, where many myths need to be exposed and shattered, are necessary and indispensable guidelines and virtues, so that light can be detected at the end of the tunnel.

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<sup>3</sup> Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity" Question and the American Historical Profession* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

<sup>4</sup> For Turkey, it was the war of independence (*istiklal savasi*), in contradistinction to Greece, which sent the expeditionary force to save and protect 1.5 million Greeks from physical extermination.

<sup>5</sup> Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the end of the Century* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> John Dower, *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World* (New York: New Press, 2014).

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Having the aforementioned in mind, and taking for granted that history is never a spontaneous affair, what observations need to be taken into consideration in macro-historical analysis for a serious study of Greece and Turkey, the hundred-year war, which culminated in 1922? First, much can be detected and much more research remains to be done in the relations between the Sublime Porte (the *Bab-i Ali*) and the various millets of the Empire, since the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in 1821. This applies forcefully to the Ottoman subjects of Greek origin in the Empire for the next 100 years. How did they view the modern Greek state and its citizens? How were they viewed by them in return? What was their relationship with the Muslim subjects of the same Empire of Turkic origin? Second, the territorial shrinking of the Empire led to the awakening of national consciousness in South-Eastern Europe and gradually among the many millets. What can be said of the Tanzimat reforms (the *Hatt-i Sharif* of 1839 and the *Hatt-i Humayun* of 1856) and all these people? How did they perceive it, and in what ways did the reforms affect their coexistence, especially with the Muslims of Turkish origin?

Third, the ideological currents, *Megali Idea* (*Great Idea*) and *turkluk* and *turkculuk*. How were they defined? Were they mutually exclusive? To what an extent did they capture the hearts and minds of the people and when? Why did they find fertile ground? Were they exploited by the ruling elite and-if so-what results did they produce? Fourth, was peaceful coexistence impossible, in an era of colonialism and imperialism (mid-nineteenth century to 1914), given that the great powers antagonized one other, forcing the hand and encouraging minorities, the latter seeking to use them and the Ottoman Empire responded accordingly, employing the strategy of divide and survive? Fifth, was there a turning point prior to the outbreak of WWI in 1914, which proved decisive, a point of no return, in other words? How was it that the strategy of preserving the Ottoman Empire was suddenly reversed? How was such a reality perceived and understood by all those affected, within and outside? Sixth, why did the two sides choose to align themselves with the great powers they did, after 1914, a fact that eventually brought them into direct collision with one each other? Seventh, why did the Ottoman Empire enter the war? What were its strategy and ultimate aims? Equally so, why did Greece wish to enter the war?

Eighth, by the war's end, in which case the Entente was victorious, what were the lessons learned in both Athens and Constantinople? For Greece, the sickman was dead. For the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress of the Young Turks) though, the Empire was not quite ready to give up the ghost. Ninth, was partition the only available option for the Entente? Equally so, what kind of peace did the Sublime Porte envisage, given that it was among the defeated? Had they won, what kind of peace would they have imposed (counter-factual speculation notwithstanding)? Tenth, to what an extent was Venizelos a prisoner of the Entente, so much so that he acquiesced in their

demand for a show of force, which led to the dispatch of the Greek expeditionary force in Smyrna?

Eleventh, what precisely was the role of the big powers, between 1918-22, and why? Why did they initially support Greece, only for a *volte face* towards the end? Twelfth, what can be noted about Greek and Turkish diplomacy? How was it that the one proved it was more flexible and thus far more successful than the other, in the long run, making the Catastrophe more or less inevitable? Thirteenth, what are some of the crucial lessons to be learned from 1922? A clash of conflicting nationalisms, leading inevitably to war, physical extermination and ethnic purification, big powers flexing their muscles with Greece and the Ottoman Empire jockeying for position at the expense of the other, one of the two proving more maneuverable the other pursuing hollow dreams, or a combination of all? Finally, how did both Greece and Turkey understand 1922 then and how do they understand it now?

**TURKISH PRESENCE IN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS**

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The aim of the paper is to examine the tendency and dynamics of Turkey's economic relations with selective countries in Africa in order to assess whether these economic ties rely upon economic or political incentives and to what degree. According to the literature, Turkey's presence in the African continent is mainly correlated with development cooperation. According to the theoretical perspectives, donor countries seem to be more selective regarding aid allocation and favor recipient countries which can carry out developmental projects and are more functional in policies and institutions, especially when the rule of law is concerned (Tikuisis and Carment, 2017; Winters and Martinez, 2015; Dollar and Levin, 2006).

Moreover, another significant determinant of aid allocation is trade relations. In particular, donors use aid in order to promote their export interests and their comparative advantage favoring recipients who are also trading partners and create new markets for their products (Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; Younas, 2008; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004) although Nowak-Lehmann et al. (2009:1199) question this claiming that "exports are caused by aid and not vice versa.". However, it is more likely for recipients to be offered a Preferential Trade Agreement in order to foster donor's utility and continue receiving aid (Bermeo, 2018). On the other hand, large donors' competition in trade is reflected in aid allocation, since they provide more aid "in trade-related sectors to important export-market recipients" (Barthel et al., 2014:362) resulting to a serious challenge for aid coordination (Fuchs, Nunnenkamp and Öhler, 2015).

International Political Economy provides methodological tools in order to analyze complex issues breaking the traditional boundaries between political and economic science. One of this tools is the dependency path. In particular, Turkish-African relations have been developed since 1998 and they are based on diplomatic infrastructure and institutional cooperation, increasing the number of Turkish embassies, arranging summits and along with Turkish NGO's paved the way for establishing Turkey as a soft power in the African continent, (Ozkan and Orakci, 2015; Haşimi, 2014; Davutoğlu, 2013; Baird, 2016), especially addressing problems such as food insecurity and poverty.

Therefore, most of the studies attribute Turkey's involvement in Africa to political motives, based on peace and stability, rather than economic ones.

More specifically, according to the literature, Turkish strategic engagement in Africa is based on four pillars: politics, security and diplomacy, trade and investment, aid as well as humanitarian NGO's (Shinn, 2015; Wheeler, 2011; Besenyő and Oláh, 2012; Bacik and Afacan, 2013). Turkey has engaged selectively in territorial conflicts either providing humanitarian assistance or contributing to peacekeeping operations in Africa, especially in Somalia (Shinn, 2015; Ozkan and Orakci, 2015; Akpınar, 2013). In addition, providing Somalia with humanitarian and development aid upgrades Turkey's impact and influence, promoting the "Turkish formula" through the Ankara consensus and thus emerging as a soft power in the region (Ozkan and Orakci, 2015; Kirişçi, 2009; Donelli and Gonzalez-Levaggi, 2016; Donelli, 2018).

Turkish objectives over Africa are carried out through different channels of foreign policy and especially through development cooperation, by the Turkish Development Assistance (TiKA). The Turkish development agency, TiKA, established in 1992 and since then provides development aid and technical assistance in least developed countries, mainly focusing on humanitarian assistance (TiKA, 2021) although Turkey's first attempt to have access in the African continent begun in 1985, focusing on institutional capacity (OECD, 2021). Turkey is among the most generous donors, since its ODA corresponds to 1,15% of its GNI which very high among traditional donors, such as Sweden, Finland and Norway.

In particular, according to the OECD report in 2019 Turkish ODA accounted for 1,15% of the GNI and in absolute numbers Turkey's ODA was 8.6 billion USD. Compared to other OECD countries, such as Germany or the United Kingdom, which spent 23,8 and 19,3 billion USD respectively, the total amount seems low, however, as a percentage of GNI, Turkey is one of the most generous countries, corresponding to the UN ODA objective, which is 0,7% of GNI.

Regarding trade relations, Turkey's exports are higher with North African states, such as Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia in addition to sub-Saharan states, such as Somalia, Sudan and Niger. In particular, the value of Turkish exports in Egyptian market reached in 2020 3,1 billion USD and the exports in Libya 1,6 billion USD. On the other hand, Somalia and Niger accounted for 272 and 58,8 million USD respectively. It also important to notice that exports concern intermediate and consumer goods while Turkish imports from these countries concern fuels, raw materials and minerals (WITS, 2021), while Turkish FDI flows to Egypt in 2018 accounted for 2 mil. USD and in Libya 1 mil. USD in 2010 (CEIC, 2021).

In conclusion the development of Turkish-African relations relies upon domestic political factors. Competition with other great powers in Africa, such as China, the EU, Russia and the US should not be ignored. As it mentioned, "all of the counties, whether they are big or small, try to get a share from the richness that considered will be in the African continent in the future. But the continent is more uncompanionable to the Western countries" (DEIK, 2019). In addition, Turkey's involvement in Africa relies upon development assistance, trade and investments and Turkey has developed a long-term economic relationship with Africa, since does not count only on market operation but also creates institutional frameworks for deepening economic cooperation, such as the African Business Council and Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit.

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## THE HOLOCAUST AND THE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH



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In the current paper, I propose the connection of the Holocaust with the right to the truth, in order to further strengthen the necessity for: i) knowing the full and complete truth regarding the events that took place, ii) more adequate and effective administration of justice, iii) the preservation of collective memory, and iv) the non-repetition of similar hideous acts in the future.

The Holocaust was the systematic persecution and murder of six million European Jews by the Nazi German state regime and its allies and collaborators; an evolving process that took place throughout Europe between 1933 and 1945.<sup>1</sup> The Nazi regime, also, persecuted and murdered millions of other citizens. In particular, it targeted and victimized specific groups of people, such as the Roma, members of trade unions, social democrats, communists, homosexuals, people with disabilities.

The Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations A/RES/60/7/ (2005)<sup>2</sup> -reaffirming that the Holocaust, which resulted in the murder of one third of the Jewish people, along with countless members of other minorities, will forever be a warning to all people of the dangers of hatred, bigotry, racism, prejudice and antisemitism- designate 27 January as an annual International Day of Commemoration in memory of the victims of the Holocaust.

The right to the truth<sup>3</sup> is a modern and a stand-alone right of particular importance and magnitude, as it relates to serious violations of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law. This right, which has emerged as an imperative necessity, is closely linked to the issue of enforced disappearances of persons and the issue of war reparations.

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<sup>1</sup> The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, The Holocaust Encyclopedia.

<https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/introduction-to-the-holocaust>

<sup>2</sup> A/RES/60/7/ (2005).

<https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/60/7>

<sup>3</sup> Virginia Balafouta, *The right to the truth. Aspects and applications in International Law*, I. Sideris Publications, Athens, February 2018, p. 320.

It is the right of the victims and their relatives to know the whole truth about the events that took place, the perpetrators, the circumstances under which the violations took place and their causes, the progress and the results of the investigations, the fate and the whereabouts of the victims, and the reasons of these persons' victimization.

With regard to the ratio of the right, it could be argued that encourages the investigation, disclosure and remedy of serious violations, some of which could not be put forward in any other way. In addition, through this right, legal voids could be covered; as International Law is evolving and International Criminal Law is being currently developing. In the absence of a sufficiently well-established legal framework, without prejudice to the hard core of the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal legislation, the application of the right to the truth -considering its broadness and the guarantees it offers- could contribute to overcome formal obstacles for the prosecution of extremely serious crimes.

The term "right to the truth" is introduced for the first time on the crime of enforced disappearance of persons -by reflecting the right of their relatives to know the whole truth about the fate of their loved ones- and has significantly contributed to overcoming the initial difficulties of delimitation and prosecution of this crime. The contribution of this right to the administration of justice for the crime of enforced disappearance of persons establishes the above-mentioned ratio of the right. In particular, in the case of enforced disappearances, due to the peculiar nature of the crime, the invocation of the right to the truth provided the legal basis for the obvious claims of their relatives. The fact that their relatives did not know the fate of the missing persons was not allowing them to invoke their possible death, illegal detention, torture, forced labor or anything else. This completely formal impediment of legal claim, which opposes to every principle of humanity and jeopardizes the administration of justice, has not only been put aside, but, in essence, it has itself become a legal basis claim.

The right to the truth has individual nature, since the person who has been the victim of serious violations of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law can claim the investigation and revelation of the truth. It has also collective nature, which reflects the general need and the collective interest of the whole society to restore the truth and to administer justice. The administration of justice on such hideous crimes is linked to the known from the ancient Greek tragedy notion of "catharsis" for the victims, for the progress of a democratic society, for humanity, and perhaps even for the perpetrators themselves.

In addition, the right to the truth concentrates features of first generation rights -since it is an individual right, enforceable, directly linked to fundamental human rights-, of second generation rights -because it contains social elements-, but it is more suited to third generation rights -since it involves solidarity, and is linked to our debt to future generations-.

In order to strengthen the binding and normative nature of the right, it could be argued that it constitutes customary law, as it appears that the conditions for the crystallization of an international custom are fulfilled, namely: i) the existence of an unvarying, consistent and repetitive practice (*usus*), ii) *opinio juris* and iii) *opinio necessitatis*.

Furthermore, it could be supported that the right to the truth is closely linked to the International Criminal Law. In particular, it could be argued that the right to the truth pertains to *jus cogens*, as it arises from international crimes, the legal framework of which constitutes *jus cogens*. *Jus cogens* consists of the international, peremptory fundamental principles or norms from which no derogation is permitted. This body of principles of International Law overrides the national law of states, regardless of whether the states have accepted and adopted them. In addition, since international crimes are not subject to prescription, it could be argued that the violations which give rise to the right to the truth and the related claims are inalienable. Also, since international crimes have been judged to offend “humanity” and “global collective consciousness”, the connection of the right with these notions contributes to its empowerment.

The right provides increased protection for individuals, and it could be supported that it functions in general for the interest and vindication of the victims of such violations, namely “*pro persona*” and “*pro victimā*”.

From the above analysis regarding the right to the truth, it becomes clear that the concept, the content, the proposed ratio of the right, as well as the proposals for its strengthening and further development of its dynamics, could contribute to the issue of the Holocaust. In particular, they could play a critical role in the full restoration of aspects of truth that have not yet been established till today. They could contribute to a more adequate and effective administration of justice, more specifically to the satisfaction of the right to a remedy/reparation both individually and collectively. In addition, their contribution could be crucial in preserving the collective memory, in ensuring that the victims will never be forgotten, and that such heinous international crimes can never happen again.

Furthermore, exploiting the proposed framework of the right to the truth could also play an active role and make a significant breakthrough to the field of education. It could cultivate and enforce respect for the life and dignity of every person across the World, regardless its identity, nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or immigration status. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>4</sup>, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the World. The provision of appropriate and adequate education regarding the events that

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<sup>4</sup> Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948).

<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>

took place before and during World War II is a sine qua non condition for the management of the “collective trauma” of humanity, for the preservation of the collective memory, for the fight against Holocaust denial and revisionism, and for the prevention of similar horrific theories, behaviors and crimes in the future.

## SHAPING HUMAN GEOGRAPHY THROUGH LAW: JEWISH SETTLEMENTS AS A NATIONAL VALUE IN ISRAEL\*



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### I. Introduction

In recent years, the interconnection between law and geography has been subject to cross-disciplinary debate among scholars.<sup>1</sup> Law shapes spaces, draws boundaries, determines territorial and social belonging and exclusion. Likewise, physical and human geography influence the way laws and legal actors operate in each context. Legal geography proves particularly useful in investigating the interaction between law, territory, and ethno-religious identity in post-colonial scenarios and divided society, such as the State of Israel.

Judaism acknowledges the bonds between territory and Jewish people, since several prescriptions in Jewish law exclusively apply in *Eretz Israel*, the Land of the Jews, such as the laws governing land property and farming. Although Jews lost their politico-territorial independence in 70 AD, they kept cultivating the link between the Diaspora ad Eretz Israel and their sense of community belonging, hoping to eventually return in their homeland. In 1948, the foundation of the State of Israel brought « "Jewish geography" down from the heights of abstract idea to the firm soil of existential reality».<sup>2</sup> The State was conceived of as the "national home" for Jewish people, and the "Jewish and Democratic" character of the State has been entrenched into the

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\* This article pertains to the activities of the IEL (innovative education laboratory) GEOLawB, which is part of the research excellence project "Law, Changes and Technology" – Ministry of Education and carried on by the Law School of the University of Verona.

<sup>1</sup> F.W. Maitland, *Township and Borough: The Ford Lectures 1897*, Cambridge UP, 1964, pp. 6 – 7; I. Braverman et. al. (eds.), *The Expanding Spaces of Law. A Timely Legal Geography*, Stanford UP, 2014, pp. 1-29; I. Braverman et al., "Expanding the Spaces of Law", in Braverman I et al. (eds.), *The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography*, Stanford UP, 2014, pp. 1-29; M. Nicolini, "Territorial and Ethnic Divide: A New Legal Geography for Cyprus"; in *Law, Territory and Conflict Resolution*. Brill, 2016, pp. 285-315; R. Bartel, J. Carter (eds.), *Handbook on Space, Place and Law*, Edward Elgar, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Y. Shilhav, *Ethnicity and Geography in Jewish perspective*, in *GeoJournal*, 30(3), IGU Commission on Population Geography Symposium on Ethnicity and Geography: Ljubiana, Slovenia, September 8 – 11, 1993, pp. 274.

constitutional and legal framework. Since then, the meaning and content of the Jewishness of Israel has been debated, as well as the implication of the Jewish character of the State for ethno-religious minorities.

Against this background, this article focuses on land laws as fundamental tools to shaping human and legal geography in Israel (and the Occupied Territories). Emphasis will be placed on Article 7 of the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People (2018), which grants constitutional sanction to Jewish settlement for the first time in Israel's history, opening up further perspectives for reflection.

## **II. Shaping Israel's human geography through land law and policies**

Land acquisition in Palestine by the Zionist movement begun at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1901 the National Fund was established and tasked of collecting funds from the Jewish Diaspora for the purchase of land in Palestine. Alongside land acquisition by individuals or Zionist institutions, land confiscation was directly managed by the Jewish National Fund under the British Mandate.<sup>3</sup>

The policy of land occupation accelerated following the establishment of the State of Israel and the 1948 War. Israel's land regime was mostly inherited from the Ottoman and British Mandate land laws.<sup>4</sup> Then, new laws were enacted to facilitate the transfer of land owned by Palestinian Arabs to the Israeli State, such as the Absentee Property law (1950), the Land Acquisition law (1953), and the Negev Land Acquisition law (1980). The legal framework regulating land ownership and property rights interacts with other legal and administrative provisions on regional and urban planning, as well as emergency laws. The outcome is a legal architecture which creates spatial inequality between the Jewish majority community and ethno-religious minorities.<sup>5</sup>

In this respect, the Absentee Law is particularly interesting, since it allows the State to seize lands that were deemed abandoned by their owners by the time of the UN Resolution 181 on the partition of Palestine.<sup>6</sup> Whilst the

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<sup>3</sup> H.S. Abu Hussein, *The Struggle for Land Under Israeli Law*, Routledge, 2022, p. 4. See also A. Kedar, *The legal transformation of ethnic geography: Israeli law and the Palestinian landholder 1948–1967*, in *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 33, pp. 923–1000.

<sup>4</sup> Hon. Mr Justice Tute, "The Registration of Land in Palestine", in *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law*, II, 1929, p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Y. Holzman-Gazit, *Land Expropriation in Israel. Law, Culture and Society*, Ashgate, 2007, pp. 79 – 129.

<sup>6</sup> Under Art. 1 of the Absentee Law (1950), the "absentee" is anyone (individual, company, *waqf* or other legal entity) who, on or after 29 November 1947 was either a citizen or a subject of one of the countries at war with Israel, present in one of these countries or in any

definition of “absentee” does not differentiate on the basis of ethnicity, the Law envisages mechanism to exclude Jews from the legal status of absentee.<sup>7</sup> Internal refugees, as well as residents of those areas annexed by Israel during the 1948 war fell into the legal category of “absentee” and their land placed under the control of the Custodian of Absentee Law. The latter is empowered to sell the properties to a non-governmental organization named the Development Authority, which sell them to the Jewish National Fund and the State. Recently, the Absentee law has been invoked to justify Palestinian Arabs forcible evictions and Jewish settlement in Sheikh Jarrah (East Jerusalem).<sup>8</sup>

Israel’s land regime further contributes to Jewish settlement through land expropriation and re-allocation policies that favor Jewish components of the society. Since pursuant to the Basic Law: Israel Lands, 1960 most of the lands in Israel fall under public or national ownership, it follows that the State is primarily responsible for the distribution of resources and wealth within the society; thus, shaping legal and human geography in Israel/Palestine.

The allocation of lands on ethnic basis has been challenged before the Supreme court by the Kaa’dan, an Arab family willing to settle in Katzir. In the leading case *Kaa’dan v. The Israel Land Administration* (2000), the Court held that the fact that the settlement of Katzir was built through the Jewish Agency could not legitimize discrimination based on nationality.<sup>9</sup>

### **III. Promoting Jewish settlement in the Nation State Basic Law**

On 19 July 2018, the *Knesset* enacted the Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish people, being part of Israel’s constitution “in the making”.<sup>10</sup>

Among other controversial provisions, Art. 7 of the 2018 Basic Law affirms Jewish settlements to be a “national value” and mandates the State to take positive actions to promote them. Article 7 must be read in conjunction with

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part of Palestine outside the State of Israel, or, a citizen of Mandatory Palestine who abandoned their place of residence.

<sup>7</sup> Art. 27(2) of the Absentee Law provides that a person that “left his place of residence for fear that the enemies of Israel might cause him harm” may obtain a certificate by the Custodian of the Absentee Property which proves that he is not “absentee”. This provision was designed to exempt Jews technically falling under the definition of absentee from application of the Absentee Law. See A. Kedar, “On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler States: Notes towards Research Agenda”, in *Law and Geography: Current Legal Issues*, Vol. 5, 401, p. 425.

<sup>8</sup> See Sheikh Jarrah: Israeli police evict Palestinians from East Jerusalem home, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-60052131> (last accessed, 9.02.2022)

<sup>9</sup> HCJ 6698/95, Ka’adan v. The Israel Land Administration, PD 54(1) 258 (2000)

<sup>10</sup> S. Navot, *The constitution of Israel. A contextual analysis*, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, pp. 1-12.

Art. 1, which defines Israel as the “historic homeland” of the Jews and recognizes the right to self-determination *exclusively* to the Jewish people. In doing so, the Law designates the constitutional identity of the State as Jewish. For the first time in Israel’s legal history, indeed, no mention is made to the democratic principle.

On 18 July 2021, in *Hassoun v. The Knesset*, the Supreme Court rejected the petitions challenging the constitutionality of the 2018 Basic Law.<sup>11</sup> With regard to Art. 7, the Court held that the promotion of Jewish settlement as a national value must be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the democratic and the equality principle, as well as with the right to self-determination in international law. The “enabling interpretation” envisaged in the majority opinion would exclude any possible discrimination of non-Jews in land allocation and related rights, such as the right to housing and housing-related funding.

Prior to the enactment of the 2018 Basic Law, Jewish settlement was not explicitly mentioned in Israel’s laws. Notwithstanding the majority decision in *Hassoun* affirms that the Law must be interpreted according to the principle of equality and democracy, the meaning and implications of Art.7 remains unclear. As stated by Justice Kara in the minority opinion, Artt. 1 and 7 negate the very existence of minorities.<sup>12</sup> The promotion of Jewish settlement as a national value to be pursued by Israel’s may provide a constitutional basis to preserve and further develop the ethnic land regime already in place.

So far, the Supreme Court displayed a careful approach towards land ownership and housing disputes. The Basic Law 2018 has not been called upon to justify Jewish settlements in Israel, as well as in the Occupied Territories and the West Bank. In June 2020, the Court invalidated the Regularization Law (2017) of the Jewish settlements on lands privately owned by Arab Palestinian in the West Bank on the ground that it infringes the equality principle enshrined, albeit implicitly, in the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty (1992).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> HCJ 5555/18 *Hassoun v. The Knesset and 14 other petitions* (in Hebrew), at <https://www.adalah.org/uploads/uploads/H CJ 5555 18 ruling.pdf> (last accessed, 03.02.2022). For the summary of the judgment (in English), <https://www.adalah.org/uploads/uploads/Translation of Summary of JNSL Judgment.pdf> (last accessed, 03.02.2022)

<sup>12</sup> See T. Hostovsky Brandes, *Does Where You (Legally) Stand Depend On Where You Sit?: The Israeli Supreme Court’s Decision on the Nation State Law*, in *VerfBlog*, 2021/7/20, <https://verfassungsblog.de/does-where-you-legally-stand- dictate-where-you-sit/> (last accessed, 7.02.2022)

<sup>13</sup> HCJ 1308/17, *Silwad Municipality, et al. v. The Knesset, et. al.* (joined by the court with HCJ 2055/17, *The Head of Ein Yabrud Village v. The Knesset*).

## ARE WE 'SUPPRESSING' CHILDREN'S VOICES IN THE TIMES OF PANDEMIC?



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The transition from the period of 'We stay at home' to the period of 'We stay safe' has been accompanied by intense discussions regarding the presence of the educational community in schools. The plans of the Ministry of Education focus exclusively on the publication of strict health protocols which are constantly amended to respond to the ever-changing conditions caused by the pandemic. Nonetheless, emphasis in managing this crisis in the field of education should also be placed on the dynamics of human agency, which should be filtered through the emotional situation of those directly involved. While both the student and teacher communities, through their representatives, are communicating their concerns about the current operation of schools, human agency seems to be ignored by the state. Having said that, the Ministry of Education should focus on the psychosocial situation of our students and their parents, as well as our teachers, which clearly affects the learning process.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Education has not paid attention to providing psychosocial support to students, and their families. We have been and are still going through a prolonged period of social distancing, which is often accompanied by feelings of isolation and panic. During this period, there has been a rise in the incidents of domestic violence with devastating social implications for children. Furthermore, the coronavirus crisis, as well as economic consequences, have increased children's feelings of anxiety about what is going to happen in the future. Many students of the last grade of lyceum caution that they experience intense feeling of stress and anxiety since during these difficult times, they have to take the university entry examinations, the outcome of which will determine to a significant extent their professional future.

At the same time, over the last months, the daily press has been recording incidents of intense (sometimes extreme) reactions of several parents and other bodies to the state's measures against the pandemic which refer to schools, and thus children. The right to protest and the free expression of the objections of the wider civil society to the state's decisions is and should be

undeniable. However, this right derives from the democracy that should characterise the functioning of the state, and therefore - or better by definition - it should be democratically practiced. Therefore, the question arises: To what extent does the instrumentalisation of children as 'mouthpieces' of adults' views runs counter to the democratic character that protest should have?

Instigating children to express our views and positions takes the form of 'imposition' and 'suppression', as in the end, is silencing children's original and authentic voices. Have we really thought as a state, civil society, academia, organised educational institutions and/or as parents what the children themselves want to really say about the pandemic? What psychological effects do they want to report? What do they actually propose to improve their education during the pandemic? We are already counting two years in this maze of successive lockdowns and ever-changing strict measures. It is now the time to see the consequences of the pandemic through the eyes of the children themselves – not only intuitively, but in an organised manner that draws upon science and research. The state and especially the Ministry of Education and the Services of Educational Psychology bear the 'burden' of this responsibility.

Over the past twenty years, the active listening of children's voices is considered by the international research community as an important aspect that facilitates school improvement, but strengthens children's education by their families. Despite calls by academics and researchers around the globe, in the Cypriot context, there is no tangible evidence that children's voices are taken 'seriously'. Education, however, should be understood by all of us, including state leaders and parents, as an approach in which children participate freely in all efforts for social emancipation, which presuppose children's participation in decision-making processes. Therefore, children should not be the 'result' of the formal education or family education which they receive as the 'object' of adult action, but should be understood as 'subjects' taking an active action to 'mediate' in their education and emancipation. It is thus not enough to just listen to children's voices, but children's voices should be taken into account as an important (perhaps the most important) way to improve education and schools.

If we listen to children, then only we will function as a democratic society, crediting them with their inalienable right to mediate not only in official educational policies, but also in parental behaviours and actions, through their ideas, experiences, choices and social relationships. Children have their own voices! We should listen them in their original and authentic form!

## AN ARDUOUS PUZZLE: WHY HAS THE CYPRUS PROBLEM NOT BEEN SOLVED YET?



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*"We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them"  
Albert Einstein*

For almost half a century Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) and Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs) have been trying hard, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and the support of the international community, to solve the Cyprus problem and reunite their beautiful island. Regardless, however, of the various efforts by all parties involved to solve the said problem no substantial result has yet been produced. Why, however, all these rounds of negotiations to solve the problem under a bizonal bicomunal federation with political equality failed? Presumably because, via this protracted consultation process, G/Cs and T/Cs have always put the cart before the horse! That is, they have always attempted to find a comprehensive solution prior to creating the necessary conditions (i.e. trust, confidence, cultural, political, socio-economic understanding, collaboration, respect etc.) for a solution to be accepted and eventually be implemented by both sides. Thus the failure!

By and large it appears that the fundamental reason why the Cyprus problem has not been solved is the traditional lack of political will by both sides to find a balanced comprehensive solution that can address their current needs and interests. The seemingly non-existent political will to find a solution is, nonetheless, a result of the current state of mistrust to form a common state that survives between the two Cypriot communities. The lack of trust, however, is directly related to the fact that, rightly or wrongly, both the G/Cs and the T/Cs are afraid of one another. This common fear (or phobia to a large extent) which has so far resulted in the failure by both sides to reach a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem seems to emanate from *five* basic reasons as follows:

- First of all, it is the continuous military presence of the Turkey in Cyprus. Even though this presence has created a feeling of security within the T/C community it has still produced the opposite result within the G/C population. It is therefore unrealistic for anyone to believe that

the G/Cs will ever accept a solution of the said problem without, *inter alia*, a) the finalization of a plan for a gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and b) the direct or indirect abolishment of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (signed between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, Turkey and the U.K.), including the abolishment of the unilateral right of intervention by any of the three guarantor signatories to the said Treaty.

- Secondly, it is the conflicting historical past exacerbated by the historical involvement in this problem of the two 'motherlands' namely, Turkey and Greece and primarily by Turkey which since 1974 occupies around 36% of the island by maintaining on the ground around 40,000 troops. This historical past has been perceived and explained by every side's overwhelming majority of the population in a subjective and opposing manner. The political discourse between the two sides has become diametrically opposite in the aftermath of the Annan Plan referenda in 2004, a traumatic experience on both sides of the divide after the T/Cs voted 'yes' to the Plan and the G/Cs voted 'no'. In the T/C minds the G/C 'no vote' to the specific plan seemed a condemnation of a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with *political equality*.
- Thirdly, it is the reality that strong and influential ruling economic, political and religious elites on both sides of the divide oppose the specific solution. Some elites (predominantly, I must admit, on the G/C side) believe, rightly or wrongly, that the political and socio-economic cost based on such a solution outweighs the various benefits that this solution might yield for their respective communities and therefore oppose it. Moreover, there appears to be fear and phobia within other elites on both sides that an alteration of the current *status quo*, via such a solution, may potentially endanger their subjective political and economic interests. The "anti-solution" elites have been winning the "battle of information" vis-à-vis the "pro-solution" ones because the former are more influential on domestic mass media than the latter.
- Fourthly, it is a fact that both G/Cs and T/Cs have not been educated by their respective leaderships to become citizens of a federal State. For example, school texts on both sides are still far from creating the necessary psychological and intellectual environment that can encourage a relevant rapprochement between the two sides.
- Last of all, it is the obvious absence of bold and effective leadership by both sides. Up to now (perhaps with the exception of former President George Vassiliou and ex T/C leader Mustafa Akinci) it appears that there have been no leaders on either side of the divide who could persuasively pinpoint a way to peace and reconciliation that both communities would be willing to follow. The tragic outcome in July 2017 in Switzerland (Crans Montana) of the last UN effort to solve the Cyprus Problem has

proven that, at least, the current G/C leadership is not able to grasp the importance of timing and urgency in solving the said problem.

Based on the above it seems futile for all parties involved to keep trying to find a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem before eradicating the above-mentioned five primary reasons which have nurtured the dispute for so many years. This, I have argued since 2005 (via various Greek and English articles, papers, speeches and interviews) can be achieved by an evolutionary approach based on the implementation by all sides of high and low policy Confidence Building Measures (CBMCs) within the framework of a pre-specified road map. Such Measures could potentially and gradually eliminate all the above-mentioned reasons for a non-solution. The said CBMs could on the one hand potentially engage all sides involved in a creative, constructive and trustful political, economic, military and cultural collaboration and on the other hand the CBMs could satisfy each side's core negotiating interests. Such CBMs can and should have the full support of the UN and the international community in general. In fact, it must be noted that successive UN Secretary Generals-including the current UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres-have since 1992 encouraged all sides to implement such a course of action (for a more detailed analysis of my evolutionary approach proposal please view "*Solving the Cyprus Problem: An Evolutionary Approach The Cyprus Review, Vol.26:2 Fall 2014*").

In conclusion, years of fear, mistrust, hatred, separation, violence, stereotyping, misuse of national symbols, selective use of historical memory and foreign intervention have deterred the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots from coming together. The two Cypriot communities, however, need to free themselves from this past, solve the Cyprus problem and move to the future with determination, imagination and confidence in order for them to commonly build a new prosperous Cyprus. It seems quite evident by the previous analysis that a new approach is needed to assist in solving the Cyprus problem, an approach that should aim at cultivating the bi-communal socio-political and cultural ground before any comprehensive solution, ideally based on a bizonal bicomunal federation with political equality, is negotiated, is agreed and most importantly is implemented. Such an evolutionary approach could offer the two Cypriot communities the opportunity to fulfil their negotiating interests by creating trust and confidence concurrently; something quintessential for a future comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem based on a future comprehensive plan by the UN.

## ENHANCING FRESH GRADUATES' JOB SATISFACTION, MOTIVATION AND COMMITMENT



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In the age of globalization and digitalization, “fresh” University graduates are worldwide faced with various challenges. These may include a lack of jobs that match their qualifications, unwillingness of employers to hire or train inexperienced employees, high living costs compared to their starting wages, complexity of work integration or inclusion.

Since fresh graduates consider their job to be the reward for their hard efforts in obtaining their degree, they usually have higher expectation levels in comparison to their satisfaction levels. In effect, unlike earlier generations and unlike long-term or older employees, they are constantly ready to shift between jobs until their expectations are met, making it harder for their organizations to retain them. One of the keys to improving organizational efficiency appears to be the recognition of the importance of fresh graduates in confronting labor market challenges and handling them as a special group of employees that requires attention.

Successful organizations generally need effective job design and redesign practices in increasing productivity and performance. The Job Characteristics Model (JCM)<sup>1</sup> has long been considered a basis for job redesign theories. JCM has been widely used and still remains one of the most frequently cited instruments for assessing employee perceptions of job characteristics. It is based on the relationship among three components: (a) core job dimensions (b) experienced psychological states of employees and (c) employees’ personal and work outcomes, such as job satisfaction, motivation and commitment. However, JCM does not differentiate between employees with adequate work experience and employees who are fresh graduates and also omits important dimensions of the current state.

A comprehensive and integrated framework was recently developed with the aim to reflect changes in the labor market during the last years and to focus on fresh graduates. This new, extended model, namely the “Modified Job

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<sup>1</sup> Hackman, J.R. & Oldham, G.R. (1980). *Work redesign*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.

Characteristics Model” (MJCM) has been shown to be a valid and reliable instrument.<sup>2</sup> The model is customized by adding factors that were not assessed in the original JCM. It identifies the role of job enrichment as well as the importance of enhancing fresh graduates’ work fulfillment and enjoyment.

The MJCM framework was empirically tested and depicted that various core job dimensions significantly influence the experienced psychological states of fresh graduates, which in turn have a positive effect on their personal and work outcomes.<sup>3</sup> More specifically, the results indicate that the most significant determinants of job satisfaction, motivation and commitment of employed fresh graduates are:

- 1) **“Feedback”**: receiving constant feedback provides fresh graduates a sense of engagement and interactivity and offers opportunities for advancement. It helps them obtain an understanding of how efficiently they are performing and makes them feel more self-confident and responsible for the actual outcomes of their work.
- 2) **“Job significance”**: positive psychological states are experienced when fresh graduates perceive their job as significant or prestigious, that it is widely respected and admired and affects the personal lives or work of their colleagues or externals to the organization.
- 3) **“Decision-making and autonomy”**: employed fresh graduates need to be trusted and be offered independence and involvement in decision-making in their organization as well as freedom to plan the work and decide the procedures for carrying it out. Employers should identify their strengths and weaknesses, in order to better utilize them in appropriate strategic positions and demanding work tasks.
- 4) **“Skill variety”**: fresh graduates, who come with innovative ideas and new academic knowledge, look for variety in work activities. They look for jobs that require the use of several, diversified skills and allow them to complete substantial pieces of work (as opposed to the continuous repetition of simple tasks). They find meaning and value in jobs that are intriguing and challenging, where they can apply their qualifications.

Factors like “working conditions”, “workload”, “benefits” (e.g., pension), “promotion” and “physical effort” have not been found to be critical. Being mostly of younger age, single, without family obligations and energetic, fresh graduates are instead rather enthusiastic with the new job perspectives. Similarly, “technology use” was not a determinant of their job satisfaction;

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<sup>2</sup> Serhan, C. & Tsangari, H. (2019). Reliability and validity of a modified job diagnostic survey for fresh graduates’ retention. *Academy of Strategic Management Journal*, 18(5), 1-17.

<sup>3</sup> Serhan, C. & Tsangari, H. (2022). Employed fresh graduates: Modeling job design and redesign, forthcoming. *European Journal of International Management*, DOI: 10.1504/EJIM.2021.10039779.

young generations are “digital natives”, early adopters of new technology, whose technology skills could be exploited.

Fresh graduates seek jobs that match their qualifications, meet employers’ expectations and offer them the opportunity for taking initiative and participating in decision-making. To this end, in addition to obtaining hard skills through their degree, it is very important that they also cultivate their soft skills. On one hand, University programs, apart from offering academic knowledge and skills, should enhance critical thinking, effective communication skills and flexibility to work in multi-cultural environments. On the other hand, employers should redesign job strategies acknowledging the needs of this special group of employees and targeting the significant determinants that have been evidenced to offer cognitive, emotional and behavioral benefits. This will create stronger bonds with the organization and lead towards increasing organizational performance, sustaining productivity and a win-win situation for employers and employed fresh graduates.

## STRATEGY TO ATTRACT INVESTMENTS: LEARN FROM PAST MISTAKES



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Last October the government announced the new strategy for attracting international investment in Cyprus, which aims to attract investment primarily in the fields of technology, research and digital economy in Cyprus. The strategy has an implementation horizon for the first half of 2022 and includes six pillars of incentives:

1. Incentives to ease the access of foreign companies in Cyprus, as well as support Cypriot companies in specific sectors of economic activity (shipping, technology/innovation, pharmaceuticals, biogenetics and biotechnology).
2. Reduction of barriers and time for approval of applications for employment of personnel from third countries to work in foreign companies in Cyprus or in Cypriot companies in specific sectors of economic activity (as above),
3. Programme to grant residence permits to third country nationals for a period of 12 months for remote work for employers/clients outside Cyprus (under the name Digital Nomad Visa),
4. Tax incentives to legal and natural persons,
5. Incentives related to the granting of citizenship procedure,
6. Additional complementary actions relating to the promotion and implementation of the strategy.

An important outcome is initially apparent from the first presentations. The model of attracting investment based on the logic of monetary investment without any requirement of substantive physical presence and economic activity in Cyprus, which has become known as the golden passport scheme, has come to an end as it cannot provide a perspective for the Cyprus economy. Not only because it has become a monument of institutional corruption and non-transparency, but primarily because the discrediting of the country due to the way it has been handled and implemented by the current government has deeply damaged the credibility of the country and the economy itself. The new incentives include the need for a real presence and operation of companies in Cyprus, so that investments create a multiplying effect.

At the level of the economy, the goal set is certainly significant. Namely, to make Cyprus a hub of technology, research and innovation. Although a number of incentives are included in this strategy, I am of the opinion that these cannot be described as a comprehensive and coherent plan for achieving the objective. The effort to make Cyprus a research and technology and innovation hub cannot be limited only to the process of attracting financial resources, but should be extended to other key areas such as:

- (a) the creation of the necessary infrastructures (building - technology - digital).
- (b) the creation of adequate and efficient support services (health, education, justice)
- (c) ensuring knowledge and training through the education system in order to achieve a long-term perspective with the inclusion of domestic labour force in these sectors

Particularly with regard to the domestic labour force, the current strategy has a significant shortcoming. A key element of the strategy must be both incentives to employ Cypriots and an obligation to gradually train Cypriots to be able to cover shortages in the labour force in the future. The sustainability and durability of a growth model based on these sectors is directly linked to the ability of the domestic force to participate in the sectors in a long-term horizon.

For that reason, and besides the quota of 70-30 foreign – local employers that is included within the strategy, it is imperative that education and training programmes are created for Cypriot graduates, with the aim of gradually meeting needs rather than depending on the continuous influx of working people from third countries. Within this framework, both the Human Resource Development Authority and the Productivity Centre could be used. The involvement of higher education and universities in this process is also crucial. The announcement of the measures without the necessary consultation with the higher education institutions is one of the negative aspects of the plan.

In the specific incentives there are a number of issues that could arise from further discussion i.e., the supervision of the criterion of the quota of working people per company, the tax incentives, the framework of third country working permits as well as the limits regarding granting of citizenship procedures. In any case however, experience has shown that, in addition to the regulations and regulatory framework that are imperative, the Achilles' heel is the control and supervision mechanisms.

Without downplaying the importance of the various incentives, ensuring transparency and accountability is a cornerstone of such a strategy. The absence of a horizontal mechanism for oversight and control of the programme represents a major weakness and it is my assessment that

without such a mechanism the risk of abuse of the programme and the discrediting of the country remains particularly high.

In conclusion, I would like to recall another premise that historical experience has shown. Incentives, with their positive and negative aspects, are always an instrument. Whether it will become a lever for corruption and abuse depends not only on the content, but also on the official response by the government and its ability to create specific and transparent institutional procedures. To achieve this, the current government will have to convince politically and institutionally that it does have the will. And of course, it will have to confront and force a rupture with itself and its past.

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVISION OF SOCIAL WELFARE SERVICES – WHAT ABOUT CYPRUS?



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The need of local authorities' engagement in the field of social welfare policy is becoming more and more urgent in many Member States of the European Union, as the perception that local government must intervene effectively in the process of addressing local social needs and challenges is promoted and growing. The new social risks are not distributed in the same way in all EU Member States, since regional and local disparities are clearly visible. Horizontal and vertical decentralization or reorganization processes, both in the field of social welfare systems and in the field of public administration and self-government systems, contribute to the understanding that: the provision of social welfare services is increasingly becoming the result of complex multi-level governance models, where the role and contribution of the different levels varies accordingly.

The new conditions formed in recent years have given an impetus to the research community to deal with analyzes in the field of local social welfare systems. In most cases, the central government reduces its role to the executive level, while local communities, families, civil society organizations, local authorities, service providing professionals and other local actors are now the main elements shaping the new supporting landscapes. This is the new framework in which social welfare and all necessary supportive services in this context are now being provided, to ensure a decent and satisfactory standard of living for every citizen. A local system of social welfare services aims to improve living conditions, provide social protection, and combat social exclusion at the local level. Essentially, it is a system of social welfare services applied at the sub-national level, i.e., at the level of a region or municipality or any other form of self-government, lower than the central state's level.

In the case of Cyprus, the involvement of local authorities in the implementation of social welfare policies seems to remain at a substandard level, as the degree of centralism and of the importance of the central government in relation to the design, organization and financing the social welfare system is significantly high. The local government system of Cyprus seems like disconnected and independent of any form of social welfare policy

both at institutional, organizational, and financial level. According to "On Municipalities" and "On Communities" Laws in force, municipalities and community councils, respectively, have the right to establish, maintain and operate aid or charity stations, schemes and institutions/foundations for the provision of social, health, paramedical services and first aid to the poor or disabled. Therefore, based on the regulations of the two legislations, the local authorities in Cyprus may provide social welfare services not directly, but indirectly, through the establishment of other legal entities which are especially established for this purpose. The social welfare services provided by these legal entities are controlled, co-financed and approved for operation by the central government, to be more specific by the Social Welfare Services of the Deputy Ministry of Social Welfare (until recently operating under the Ministry of Labor, Welfare and Social Insurance).

Although the institutional responsibilities of the Cypriot Local Authorities in this area are very limited, the contemporary international trends indicate the need for transition, through the necessary reform process, to upgrade the role of local government in the field of social welfare.

Current circumstances provide the necessary conditions to initiate the required processes towards this direction. This assumption relies on the fact that the long-lasting discussions on the reform of the local government system of Cyprus seem to result in the formation of a new backdrop, as it is promoted through the relevant draft bills submitted by the competent Ministry of Interior for voting to the Parliament (House of the Representatives). These developments contribute to the formation of an important opportunity to strengthen the role and responsibilities of local government in the field of social welfare services, in line with the provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and all relevant evaluations, studies or reports of external experts' groups of international organizations. Strengthening the competences of local authorities in the area of social welfare services is also in line with the 'Strategy for Social Policy 2014-2020' of the Ministry of Labor, Welfare and Social Insurance of the Republic of Cyprus<sup>1</sup>, which in Section 4, part e) entitled 'Effective Governance' states (inter alia) that:

*"The role of local authorities and civil society is very important in protecting and promoting the well-being of citizens through the operation of social welfare programs... () ...The state in its efforts to support these partners aims to maintain dialogue and consultation with them but also aims in finding methods to strengthen their role for responding better and more effectively to the needs of the individual and society in general. Among others, the goal is to*

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<sup>1</sup> Republic of Cyprus (2014), Social Policy Strategy 2014-2020, Ministry of Labor, Welfare and Social Insurance, available at: <http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/sws/sws.nsf/All/57FD2B0E5E091B63C2257F48003F1B12?OpenDocument>, accessed on 16/2/2022.

*develop a closer cooperation to gradually create the conditions to delegate more responsibilities to the local authorities".*

What needs to be done though to make this a reality - to fully delegate the responsibility for the provision of social welfare services to the local authorities of Cyprus?

The process to reform a system, in this case to reform the 'social welfare services' and 'local self-government' systems of Cyprus, requires the fundamental transformation of the institutional arrangement, of the organization and of the financing means. Reforming these three levels is essential and necessary for the establishment of a fully operational new system (in our case of a new way to provide social welfare services at the local level).

Obviously, a small article included in the draft of the new "On municipalities" law stating that "*...the municipal council... () ...will be looking after the provision of social services and other relevant social welfare services...*" is not sufficient. In practice, a large process should be applied, structured in four main stages: a) the stage of policy commitment and goal setting, b) the stage of new policy design, c) the stage of implementation and d) the stage of monitoring, evaluation and review. The completion of the four above-mentioned main stages (which need more in-depth analysis) will aim at the processing and appropriate modification of the relevant institutional framework<sup>2</sup>, the establishment of the appropriate infrastructure including the necessary equipment and to ensure the existence and allocation of adequate resources. It will also aim at securing the adequacy of human resources (both numerically and in terms of capacities / skills). Essentially, the vital concern is to ensure the quality of social welfare services provided by local authorities, a fact that emerges from the new acknowledgement of the welfare state throughout the EU.

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<sup>2</sup> That would not only be the new proposed law on municipalities but also all other existing laws that define the operation and provision of the various social welfare services.

## IT'S NOT ABOUT UKRAINE



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The final defeat of Napoleon in 1815 brought with it the first attempts by the Great Powers of that era to create a collective system of security in Europe, so as to avoid the repeat of a similarly long and devastating war- such a war as the one which had just swept the European continent for almost two decades. The inside workings of the Congress System collapsed a few years down the road; its tombstone was exuberantly laid with George Canning's exclamation. From now on, said Canning, 'every nation for itself and God for us all', summarising in Britishness the very essence of international relations. Still, one of the most important concepts underpinning this primary form of collective security arrangements remained- the principle of the Balance of Power. In modern terms, a win-win situation.

How did this come about? The French foreign minister, the conniving and competent Prince Talleyrand, having learned well from the machinations of the Catholic Church which he had served as bishop before he turned his attention to diplomacy, made this point very clear to those clever enough to listen. There were five Great Powers in Europe, he argued, even if one of them, France, had just been defeated. Cutting France off any of the new collective arrangements the other powers were planning to make would give rise to a loose cannon with not much to lose. Risking having France throw its weight behind any one of the other Powers which could wish at some point to act unilaterally would dangerously disrupt an equilibrium to which France had anyway never given its consent. Therefore, it was much more useful and beneficial to engage France rather than isolate it. And thus, they did. Even with occasional (short) fighting breaking out from time to time, it took another century before a Great War came about. That was World War I in 1914.

Enter the Treaty of Versailles which ended it in 1919 and what do you get: the cries of 'squeeze Germany until the pips squeak' and 'hang the Kaiser' filled the air. British and French leaders promptly aligned their mood to the election-winning jolts of frantic public opinion. They went ahead with the former demand, while even entertaining the latter. Much to the dismay of a rather young politician at the time, named Winston Churchill, who thought otherwise- 'In victory, magnanimity'. Creating vacuums, he insisted, was

madness. It would upset rather than restore the equilibrium on the Continent. Stick to the Balance of Power you know than the one you don't, one could add in retrospect.

It came as no surprise, then, that trying to kickstart the collective security system that was hastily set up after the First World War, the League of Nations, was as effective as trying to administer medicine to a dead man. It just took 20 years for the seams of this new security architecture to come undone. Let's not forget that, among other reasons, Hitler came to power as an only hope in the washing away of the shame and the hardships imposed on a humiliated Germany by its victors. Refusal to allow Germany to enter the League of Nations had been one of them.

Enter Yalta, after World War II, and Churchill was determined not to repeat the same mistake twice. The infamous 'percentages agreement' between Churchill and Stalin divided the world into equanimous spheres of influence. It was cynical yet safe. If Metternich had been watching from the side curtains of the Congress of Vienna, he would have wholeheartedly approved. This arrangement lasted half a century, with no direct war ever breaking out between the two sides. For 45 years, Europe became a haven of peace. It was instead the implosion of Communism and the tumbling down of the Iron Curtain that called for the revising of the rather stable security structures that had been put in place.

What the archives from that period clearly show is that Gorbachev and his sidekick Shevardnadze had given their consent in the 1990s to the unification of the up-to-now divided German state and the admission of Eastern Germany into NATO to join its western counterpart, only because they had been given repeated assurances that following this unavoidable enlargement, NATO 'would not move an inch eastward'.<sup>1</sup> Everyone in the room clearly understood and validated Moscow's claims of the need for maintaining a cordon sanitaire of sorts in former Soviet space.

In fact, initially, both the Bush administration and the Clinton administration collectively engaged with Russia when making security decisions (see, for example, joint decisions on military cuts and arms control agreements, jointly condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and agreeing on how to proceed through the United Nations Security Council, START II agreement etc.). The Americans and the West Germans even offered assistance to newly re-emerged Russia in terms of economic aid, technical knowhow, while cooperating on energy matters. Moscow may have lost a war but there was no need to bring it to its knees. Navigating the troubled waters of democracy

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<sup>1</sup> The US Secretary of State, James Baker, had reiterated this phrase many times. His Western counterparts did the same, including the then West German, the French and the British political leadership.

for the first time in its history, while undergoing rapid economic transformation, was rather enough.

Yet a decade after the fall of the Soviet Bloc, nothing proved as strong as to glue the cracks on the once-shared wall between the Kremlin and the White House. The recent release of hitherto classified documents<sup>2</sup> regarding security negotiations during the transition period of the 90s verify today's Russian claims of disrespect and subsequent disregard of Moscow's security concerns by the West. Russia was duped in the form of a gentlemen's agreement until reality came calling.

One by one, despite assurances to the contrary, the security dominoes began to fall. At first, it was Visegrad. Followed by the Baltics and the rest of Eastern Europe. Reaching the Russian Near Abroad through the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration in 2008, which extended the West's open-door policy up to the very doorstep of Moscow- Georgia and Ukraine. The bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO, a few years back, had certainly done nothing to ease Russian concerns regarding Western ambitions in Europe and the modus operandi that came part and parcel with that.

For anyone who knows their History ABC, what followed was to be expected: the wounded animal, when it became strong enough, reacted. And react it did. In realpolitik terms of hard power, at the cost of many human lives. It may still not have as many capabilities as its counterparts, but it certainly has appetite. Using the best possible pretext that his Soviet predecessors had carefully laid out before him through their 'delineation policy'<sup>3</sup>, Putin claims to have acted by intervening into the affairs of these two states in order to defend the interests of other Russians, who merely happen to live outside the territorial jurisdiction of Moscow and are now being threatened as minorities by the Georgian and the Ukrainian authorities.

Therefore, what began in 2008 in Georgia, has now culminated in Ukraine. The land of Trotsky and Khrushchev and Brezhnev is now surrounded and threatened by the very state they helped create. Europe is in disarray. America is trying not to blink. History is a stern teacher.

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<sup>2</sup> Such documents are now accessible through the National Security Archives, affiliated with George Washington University in Washington DC.

<sup>3</sup> This policy was initiated by Lenin, perfected by Stalin and completed by Khrushchev: a. ensure that each and every one of the Soviet republics is ethnically divided (the existence of a minority is very useful in breaking down homogeneous national aspirations) and b. bring over, empower and embolden a local Russian diaspora to try and run -or destroy- the show (the Baltics are still a modern case in point).

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