



SPECIAL ISSUE: Cyprus Foreign Policy – The Way Forward

VOLUME 17 ISSUE 6 December 2020

BIMONTHLY ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER

ISSN (online): 2421-8111

Thematic Editors: Professor Andreas Theophanous and Ms Anna Koukkides-Procopiou

Nikos CHRISTODOULIDES

**CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY – THE WAY FORWARD
KEYNOTE ARTICLE**

**Andreas THEOPHANOUS and
Anna KOUKKIDES-PROCOPIOU**

**A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF CYPRUS FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE WAY FORWARD**

Andreas D. MAVROYIANNIS

**CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY: ALWAYS INVESTING IN
EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM**

Markos KYPRIANOU

THE EU COMMON FOREIGN POLICY AND CYPRUS

Ioannis KASOULIDES

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CYPRUS AND THE WAY FORWARD

Erato KOZAKOU-MARCOULLIS

**THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND FOREIGN POLICY-2021
OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS**

Nicos ROLANDIS

FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES

Tasos TZIONIS

CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY – AND NOW, WHAT?

Loria MARKIDES

CYPRUS – CHINA RELATIONS

Robert ELLIS

PRESIDENT ERDOGAN’S PICNIC

Marios EVRIVIADES

**NICOSIA CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE THE HIGH MORAL
GROUND TO AN AGGRESSOR**

Van COUFOUDAKIS

THE LEGACY OF 2020 FOR CYPRUS AND THE UNITED STATES

Michalis KONTOS

**BIDEN AND CYPRUS: ON CYPRIOT PERCEPTIONS AND US
INTENTIONS**

Cleopatra KITTI

THE GREEN PIVOT – POLYTHEMATIC ALLIANCES

Marianna CHARALAMBOUS

**MARITIME BOUNDARIES: YOU MAY NOT WANT TO PLAY
BUT YOU HAVE TO SHARE**

Maria HADJIATHANASIOU

**OF ‘HEIGHT’ AND ‘STATURE’: THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS,
THE ‘GOOD COUNTRY’**



CYPRUS CENTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
University of Nicosia

1993-2020 TWENTY SEVEN YEARS OF POLICY FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS

CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY – THE WAY FORWARD KEYNOTE ARTICLE



*H.E. Mr. Nikos Christodoulides
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus*

In the sixty years since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, its foreign policy has evolved significantly, in a process that can be described as transitioning from introversion to extroversion. In this evolutionary process certain historical events have had a decisive, transformative effect on Cyprus's foreign policy. The 1974 Turkish invasion, as well as the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union, constitute two of the most critical events in this respect.

The tragic events of the 1974 Turkish invasion and its enduring consequences forcibly carved an inevitable path for Cyprus's foreign policy. This is not surprising given the magnitude of the devastation caused, with over 37% of the territory of the country under military occupation, over 200,000 forcibly displaced from their lands and properties, as well as the orchestrated policy by Turkey to erode the demographic, cultural and religious character of the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus. An island of less than 10,000 km² was violently called to manage a national problem, *the Cyprus Problem*, of a disproportionate magnitude to its size.

Diplomacy was, and continues to be, at the forefront of our determined efforts to reunify the Republic of Cyprus and its people, in a viable, functional, independent, sovereign European country that ensures internally the well-being of all its citizens, and externally is able to be a constructive, stabilizing actor in its region, in its European Union home, and beyond.

The Cyprus Problem continues to be the foremost priority, at the heart of our foreign policy, utilizing all political and diplomatic tools at our disposal. Cyprus's accession to the EU in 2004, possibly the most pivotal moment in Cyprus's modern history and certainly one of its greatest diplomatic successes, has meant that the solution of the Cyprus Problem is inextricably linked to the EU and by extension to EU law, values and principles. Cyprus is and will remain a member state of the Union following reunification. Fully cognizant of the fact that the potential of the country can only be fully reached if the country is reunified, all efforts are exerted to support the efforts of the UNSG for the resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, in a bi-zonal bi-communal federation, fully in line with

United Nations Security Council Resolutions, in line with international law and European law. The EU's expressed commitment to continue participating and supporting the negotiations under UN auspices is of utmost importance in this regard.

And while the solution of the Cyprus problem will always remain the number one priority of the Cypriot Government, in recent years we have embarked on a different strategy. Our efforts have focused on moving beyond a monothematic foreign policy, projecting into a diverse, poly-thematic one, utilizing Cyprus's unique characteristics, amplifying our geostrategic role, and promoting a vision for our region that resonates well beyond the boundaries of the Eastern Mediterranean. The rationale is that the benefits accrued would have a beneficial ripple effect in our efforts to reunify Cyprus.

The multi-faceted foreign policy I refer to is anchored on three main pillars.

The first is the enhancement of our relations with countries in our immediate region, the Middle East and the Gulf. Building on the historically excellent relations with our neighbours, we have worked methodically in deepening our ties, and cooperation. Our actions are underpinned by a long term vision for our region that we believe is relevant not only for the region and its countries but also for Europe. At a time of shifting of powers in the region we see significant added value in increasing EU involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This brings me to the second pillar, which is a more active involvement of Cyprus within the EU, beyond issues that directly touch upon the Cyprus problem, which for a long time following our accession was the case. We have worked methodically to build our voice in Brussels on an array of issues where Cyprus has a strong added value. A prime example is bringing the Eastern Mediterranean's perspective to the EU. The creation of the General Secretariat for the EU last year, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is an important step in building a stronger, more effective, more coherent voice in the EU, which as time passes and horizontal coordination is enhanced, will be achieved to an even greater extent. This is crucial in addressing the critical challenges all member states and the EU are facing and will continue to face in 2021.

The third pillar relates to the strengthening of relations with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, as well as with key players in the international arena. So far as the five permanent members of the Security Council are concerned, we have worked in building our relationship beyond the remit of the discussion of the Cyprus problem at the Security Council, creating an evolving and continuously advancing strategic cooperation in all fields. Through this process, the important role Cyprus can play in a region of strategic importance, is highlighted.

Perhaps there is no better example encapsulating the unravelling in practice of this policy than the trilateral cooperation mechanisms that Cyprus, together with Greece and countries of the region have established with countries of the region, namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon. Energy developments brought these countries together in creating a legal framework for exploration and exploitation of natural resources, fully in line with international law. And yet, the cooperation proliferated in an array of other areas such as security, education, environment, climate change, and innovation. It is important to stress that these forums have a positive agenda with an inclusive, compound effect. They are open to all countries in the region that respect international law, good neighbourly relations, the sovereignty, and the sovereign rights of all their neighbours.

Another characteristic is that these mechanisms are constantly evolving, expanding both thematically and in terms of format and participation. For example we had the meeting in Cairo at the ministerial level of Cyprus, Greece and Egypt, joined by France and Italy. The United States joined Cyprus, Greece and Israel in a meeting on issues of security. In the midst of the pandemic, a virtual ministerial conference with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, France and the United Arab Emirates, on issues of security, took place.

The dynamic of the trilateral mechanisms, and the commitment of countries involved in investing in them, is proven by the decision taken to institutionalise them, through the establishment in Nicosia of a Secretariat for the coordination and implementation of decision taken. The Secretariat is expected to start operate on 1 January 2021.

It is my conviction that the cooperation developed in the region has also created a dynamic that could lead to the creation of a regional Organisation for Security and Cooperation when the political conditions permit. In fact, the East Med is one of the few regions where such an organization does not exist. The Organisation would be inclusive, based on a positive agenda, and with the only pre-requisites being respect for international law, and commitment to good neighbourly relations.

There can be no doubt that at a time when, due to the pandemic, states are turning their backs to multilateralism, opting for insularism, countries in the region are taking a different path, creating a narrative of like-minded countries, with an inclusive agenda coming together to promote a vision of cooperation, peace, stability and prosperity for the Middle East. The message to those countries of the region, which opt for confrontation and gunboat diplomacy of a past era, is to join us and countries of the region on this path of cooperation.

As an academic in my past life, but also as a historian, a diplomat, and currently Minister of Foreign Affairs, I am fully aware that foreign policy in practice differs radically from foreign policy in theory. The Foreign Ministry,

in addition to traditional foreign policy tools, has also embarked on elaborating a strategic plan and utilizing “soft power” foreign policy tools. These include cultural diplomacy, gender mainstreaming, as well as economic diplomacy on which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has undertaken a leading role in defining an Economic Diplomacy Strategy for Cyprus for the period 2021-2031, aiming to effectively use its diplomatic network in reinforcing Cyprus’ position in the global market.

Fully cognizant of the opportunities, the limitations and the immense challenges we are faced with, but at the same encouraged by the potential that is surfacing, we shall continue walking the path of extrovert foreign policy, firmly anchored on international law.

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WAY FORWARD



*Andreas Theophanous
Professor of Economics and Public Policy
President, Cyprus Center for European and International
Affairs
Head, Department of Politics and Governance
University of Nicosia*



*Anna Koukkides-Procopiou
Senior Fellow, Cyprus Center for European and
International Affairs*

This Special Issue entitled “Cyprus Foreign Policy – The Way Forward” is indeed timely as it comes at a period of critical changes in the broader region and the international environment. It also comes at a time when Turkey’s assertiveness and revisionist policies are manifested in Cyprus and beyond. Ankara, which does not recognize the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exist, occupies since 1974 37% of the territory of Cyprus.

While the Cyprus problem remains the major focus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of Cyprus is attempting to position itself on other important issues as well. Cyprus has to play a constructive and creative role in the EU, looking far beyond the immediate scope of the Cyprus problem and positively contributing to the general discourse on a number of other issues of European concern. It is also important to further cultivate bilateral relations with other member states especially those with which there are common goals to pursue. Within this framework we see the enhanced relationship with France. At the same time it has to enhance its role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader area. The objective should be to have a contribution in regional and European affairs much bigger than its size.

In relation to the Cyprus problem the policy pursued has at best not given the expected results and at worse failed. It should be noted that the accepted basis of negotiations – bizonal bicomunal federation – never acquired a precise meaning. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots gave a different interpretation as to what was agreed. Furthermore, a pronounced confusion

exists within the two communities on different aspects of the issue. The precise meaning of political equality is indeed indicative.

This discussion brings us to another important issue; the lack of a narrative by the Republic of Cyprus. It is indeed unfortunate that Cyprus, as a victim of Turkish aggression, has not managed to keep the pressure on Ankara. Turkey's actions in Cyprus can be compared with those of Nazi Germany in Czechoslovakia before the outbreak of World War II. Turkey has been utilizing the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus to advance its expansionist objectives. There are many similarities with Nazi Germany's policy of exploiting the German minority in Sudetenland to eventually occupy Czechoslovakia. This analogy, albeit not identical, has never come out. The Cyprus question is instead viewed by the UN as a biethnic bicomunal problem. It is essential to see issues in historical perspective.

On 15 July 1974, the Greek Junta, which was set up with US involvement, overthrew President Makarios and reversed the course of history. Five days later, on 20 July 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus. Ankara stated that "its peaceful intervention was intended to reestablish the constitutional order and to protect the Turkish Cypriot community." On 23 July 1974 the Greek Junta and the putschist regime in Nicosia collapsed. Thereafter, Glafkos Clerides, the Acting President, suggested to the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash the return to the 1960 constitution; both Denktash and Ankara declined.

Turkey continued its military operations, despite the cease-fire and the ongoing negotiations for a peaceful resolution. On 14 August, Turkey launched a second massive attack against Cyprus after the rejection of its ultimatum to the Republic of Cyprus to surrender about 34% of its territory. Greek Cypriot civilians were expected to evacuate this territory and allow the Turkish army to deploy accordingly. By 16 August 1974, Turkey had, as already noted, occupied 37% of the territory of Cyprus, having committed atrocities and numerous violations of human rights.

Had Turkey stopped its military operations on 23 July 1974 and contributed to the reestablishment of the constitutional order based on the 1960 agreements, few would have questioned its stated reasons for "intervening", despite the unilateralism of its approach. Instead, Turkey committed ethnic cleansing, set up a puppet regime, and pursued an ambitious policy of colonization. Furthermore, there has been systematic destruction of the cultural heritage and massive exploitation and usurpation of Greek Cypriot properties.

Despite the initial outcry and numerous resolutions by the UN and other international organizations no action has been taken against Turkey. Not surprisingly, successive years of bicomunal negotiations under the UN auspices did not lead to any positive results. It is also unfortunate that the weaker side, the Greek Cypriots and the Republic of Cyprus, were repeatedly

pressured by external mediators to accommodate the Turkish requests. Indicatively, the Annan Plan which was rejected in 2004 by 76% of Greek Cypriots and approved by 65% Turkish Cypriots and settlers was an extremely uneven and unbalanced plan. The Greek Cypriots were blamed for that in various circles and attempts to reinstate the building blocks of the Annan Plan, albeit under different mantles, ensued, in complete defiance of any semblance of adherence to the democratic principle of the popular vote. The Turkish narrative has even been since then that “the Greek Cypriots do not want to share wealth, power and the benefits of EU membership with the Turkish Cypriots”. This narrative should not have remained unanswered.

Cyprus cannot accept a solution that will turn the island into a Turkish protectorate. In this regard we recall Makarios statements in relation to the Turkish Cypriot demands a few months after the Turkish invasion in 1974:

“it is indeed amazing: while in other countries minorities are struggling for equal rights, in Cyprus the Turkish Cypriot minority community wants to determine the fate of the entire country.”

While Cyprus has accepted a federal arrangement, at the same time it is imperative to ensure that Turkey will not take control of Cyprus by utilizing the Turkish Cypriot community and the settlers on the island, under the principle of ‘effective participation’ (which can easily turn into effective obstruction of policy-making, in a newly-established state of affairs). Furthermore, it is essential for Cyprus to convey the message that it aspires to have a viable federal arrangement, balancing individual and collective rights. This will turn the island into a place of peaceful coexistence, cooperation and creativity among people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Turning to another issue, we note that many analysts have indicated that the policy of non-alignment pursued by Cyprus since independence was erroneous and that it is to an extent responsible for the disaster of 1974. This is a controversial issue. The 1974 disaster was an outcome of a complex set of factors. In this regard, the Greek Junta, set up with US involvement, was used to stage a coup against President Makarios. It was this fatal act that provided Turkey with a unique opportunity to invade Cyprus.

While this debate is of great historical interest there are similar policy dilemmas today in relation to Cyprus’ foreign policy. It has been argued repeatedly that since Cyprus is located in a region within the sphere of influence of the West, this should be reflected in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, the picture is much more complex. As a member of the EU, Cyprus has to pursue a foreign policy in line with its conventional obligations, while at the same time maintaining cordial relations with all the permanent members of the Security Council of the UN.

Furthermore, Cyprus should enhance its relations with Britain and try to promote common objectives. Cyprus has also the legitimate right to request from Britain, to work in its capacity as a guarantor power, in ways that will lead to the reestablishment of its territorial integrity. After all, in addition to the benefits which accrue to Britain from the bases in Cyprus, there are also obligations arising from the Treaty of Guarantee. Britain and Greece have failed or have not been able to carry out these obligations so far. In relation to Turkey, Cyprus should insist on the withdrawal of its occupation troops and settlers and for the normalization of relations in accordance with international law.

Cyprus is located at the heart of the Eastern Mediterranean which constitutes an important geopolitical region for various reasons: it is a meeting place of three continents, of the West and the East, of the economic north and south, of energy and trade routes and the birthplace of three major religions. Cyprus has to work in ways that will make its presence and continuity indispensable to regional and international players. It is also necessary to turn itself into a model state and to become a regional business, academic and medical centre. Furthermore, the emphasis on economic and cultural diplomacy remains imperative.

In order to achieve these goals it is essential to invest the necessary resources and also have policy continuity, building on the creation and utilization of institutional memory. As this year marks the anniversary of 60 years of diplomatic activity by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expectations remain high while tasks immense.

CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY: ALWAYS INVESTING IN EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM



Andreas D. Mavroyiannis
Ambassador

Small states emerging from decolonisation in the second half of the twentieth century had to struggle unrelentingly in order to create and maintain the organic conditions for their survival. The challenges have been numerous, daunting and far-reaching. From the fragility and vulnerabilities inherent to all newly emerged states, to the lofty fight for political development and the building of structures that guarantee democracy and the rule of law without prior experience in self-administration, the never-ending task of economic and social development, and the fulfilment of the responsibilities emanating from sovereignty and international relations, in the cold war era no less. These are some of the most salient factors that have determined the main tenets of these states' foreign policy.

In the case of Cyprus, one needs to add the weight of history, the consociational nature of its polity and of course geography: a strategic spot on the map that wouldn't allow it to find its place under the sun without interference from powerful neighbours, the currents and the waves that agitate the Mediterranean and the Middle East, constantly imposing the handling of delicate situations that dwarf its size and capacity. The fact that it faces for the last 46 years foreign occupation and division, have made survival and peace through a fair and lasting settlement the primary and overarching determinants of national interest.

Inescapably, Cyprus' foreign policy has always been operating within these constraints, always having to walk a thin line between conflicting interests, in order to repel attempts threatening its very existence: from the tragedy of the Turkish invasion and the ever present threat of use of force to the dismemberment attempted by the proclamation of an illegal entity in the occupied north. Though reunification has eluded us, in spite of continuous efforts, mainly due to lack of political will on the part of the Turkish side which sits comfortably on the *faits accomplis* it keeps creating, the consistent successful implementation of this survival policy, has so far stemmed the efforts for projection of the secessionist entity as a separate state and preserved legality. It succeeded also in contributing in bringing

about growth and stability, while the Cyprus social landscape is being progressively transformed from a rural underdeveloped space into a modern, developed, European society.

Accession to the European Union in 2004, after almost fourteen years of sustained efforts and after overcoming incredible challenges and, conducting successful negotiations and adjustment to the EU *acquis*, with the decisive support of Greece and eventually the understanding of the stakes by all the members of the Union, ushered in a new era. Bemusement, disappointments, mishaps and missteps should not hide the tremendous significance of belonging to the Union and its potential to objectively create the conditions that would render the *de facto* partition of the island a solipsistic anachronism. It thus juxtaposes the logic of integration and unification with the logic of division and the agenda of *de facto* annexation pursued by Turkey.

Of course, the global geopolitical landscape has changed, in particular with the end of the cold war, and continues to shift with new realignments in our region and around the world. The hegemonic ambitions of countries like Turkey and the rise of a new configuration of power in the aftermath of the Arab spring are a testament to that, as are the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel and the very acute confrontations in the eastern Mediterranean and in other parts of the world around natural resources and delimitation of maritime boundaries. Tensions are compounded by transformational challenges, from climate change and migration, to the lasting effects of the 2008 global economic crisis, the asymmetric threats and the multifaceted calamity that is the ongoing pandemic.

As of late, in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, the progressively waning US presence has contributed to unleashing and accentuating centrifugal forces and has also provided space to Turkey's authoritarian and belligerent regime: its aggressiveness and Ottoman-inspired ambitions are adding instability in an already volatile region and are accelerating a forced and anomalous/fractious/irregular reshaping of alliances as well as unprecedented manoeuvring.

Despite this overwhelming source of threat so close to it, Cyprus has not changed the fundamental tenets of its foreign policy: peaceful cooperation in our region while respecting sovereign equality; full and constructive participation in the European Union and enhancing its engagement as a strategic actor in its immediate neighbourhood; international legality and effective multilateralism as the main mitigating factor to the prevalence of might and as the main ingredient for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Cyprus' direct reliance on effective multilateralism is evidenced in the long involvement of the United Nations on two fronts, the UN peacekeeping force deployed in 1964 upon the request of the Cyprus Government and the mission of Good Offices entrusted to the Secretary General of the United Nations by the Security Council. Numerous UN Resolutions define the framework for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, shaping the parameters of the island's reunification.

Full participation in the European Union, including its common foreign, security and defence policies, strengthens the multilateral element of Cypriot foreign policy, in particular bearing in mind that today the EU is probably the strongest proponent of effective multilateralism with the United Nations at its core. Belonging to the European family is the natural place to be in historical and civilizational terms, but also as the par excellence investment in a future of security, prosperity, respect, and unity in a space of values, rights and progress.

In the regional context, building excellent relations with all countries has become a reality, with the notable exception of Turkey, which has effectively excluded itself with its heavy handed insistence for preferential treatment and its contempt for the applicable international legal framework. Synergy, cooperation and coordination, through among others, a series of trilateral mechanisms, draws from objective convergences and augurs the emergence of an economic and political space with unlimited potential.

The discoveries of natural gas by Israel and Egypt and to a much lesser extent by Cyprus seemed to open prospects of constructive engagement in the service of shared prosperity. Cyprus has concluded agreements delimiting its maritime space with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon (this last one is not in force yet). Israel, Cyprus and Greece are working on a pipeline that will channel natural gas to Europe, diversifying energy sources and routes for the European Union and enhancing energy security.

The multiplicity of cultures, traditions and membership of these varying configurations and the objective convergence of interests are expected to continue in the coming years and further provide fertile ground for growth and prosperity and the substrate for successfully addressing outstanding persistent and so far intractable conflicts, by creating a space of collective political and economic advantages at the expense of zero sum approaches.

In this context, Cyprus' foreign policy should not be expected to undergo a dramatic change in its orientation in the years to come. It has to continue investing in the EU and in effective multilateralism by:

- 1) fully playing its part in contributing to further European integration;

- 2) working to strengthen the United Nations through preserving its relevance and the compliance of states with its decisions;
- 3) working to ensure the accountability of states in respect of their international obligations, to strengthen the rule of law at the international level and to further mainstream international justice; and
- 4) promoting enhanced regional political and economic cooperation, through partnerships and ventures, taking into account also the need to counter the climate change threats particular to our region.

In a fragmented new world with selective sensitivities and double standards, disengagement and withdrawal are not viable options, nor do they offer any solutions. Even though reliance on the international community has not yielded the expected results in terms of solving the Cyprus problem, it has contributed to the containment of existential dangers and it has kept alive the hope for peace and the framework within to achieve it. One would be hard pressed to suggest credible alternatives for small states facing big and powerful enemies. Pushing ahead with determination to take our country's fate in our own hands is the only way.

THE EU COMMON FOREIGN POLICY AND CYPRUS



Markos Kyprianou
Ex Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus
Former EU Commissioner

The continuous debate on whether the EU is “punching below its weight” in global affairs is an implied admission that the EU does not have the global role that it should. And the calls by EU leaders, like the French President or the President of the Commission, that the EU must become more assertive internationally and more effective as a global player only prove that it is not yet, at least not to the extent that it should be. With the current geopolitical situation, a more active and more assertive global EU is becoming indispensable.

The EU Treaty sets the parameters for its common foreign policy and these include the same principles that apply within the EU. Because of this, and as a strong supporter of multilateralism and promoter of dialogue, the EU can act in most cases as an honest broker and can contribute to the solution of problems around the world. The EU has the size and the economic strength to achieve that. In my view what is lacking is a geostrategic ambition and the appetite for more involvement in global affairs. One of the reasons is that diverse national interests of member states prevail over the common European ones. Another is the preoccupation with domestic issues which undermines any mood for a more active foreign policy.

The EU gives the impression that it is content to take the back seat and let others, usually the USA, drive. And it is happy to pick up the bill when this is needed, feeling that it has done its duty. The truth however is that the world balance needs the EU, but it must start thinking strategically with long term targets. It needs to formulate pragmatic, interests-driven strategies. For the moment there are too many priorities and an over-expanded agenda with no strategic objectives.

It is true that the Lisbon Treaty has not created the common foreign policy that integrationists would have wanted. Still it has set the foundations to build a credible policy provided there is the political will. Admittedly there are some inherent weaknesses but, in my view, they do not prevent the EU from having an effective external policy.

One challenge is the need for unanimity. Many voices want this to change. I disagree. In the first place, without this rule it is doubtful that the member states would have agreed to the new Treaty arrangements for the common foreign policy. As the member states have maintained their national foreign policies it is important that there is consensus at the EU level. Unanimity provides legitimacy and compliance.

There is, however, room for improvement. The EU usually follows developments and almost never leads; it also appears to be slow in adapting to evolving international political crises. It is true that it is difficult to take a leading role when its policies must be the compromise and synthesis of 27 different national policies. However, this perceived weakness from its diversity also offers an advantage. Its positions are the synthesis of diverse views and as a result the EU has greater credibility than other global players. The problem is that the EU rarely takes advantage of that. The EU is not perceived by interlocutors as an influential or key player (or even as a player at all). Consequently, it has limited influence not matching its size and economic strength.

The EU is rather the cheque-book holder than the deal broker and problem solver. It is very active in humanitarian and development assistance but shies away from a leading political role. It is absent in Syria, in Libya even in Nagorno Karabakh. The lack of European action has allowed Russia and Turkey to be the main players around EU's neighbourhood, and as expected promoting their own interests.

A strong assertive and far reaching EU foreign policy is very important for all EU member states but even more for the smaller ones. These can have greater influence in global affairs through the EU's common foreign policy, provided of course that there is one. And here is the Catch 22 paradox. A smaller member state by withholding its consent can influence an EU decision on external relations but risks in the end not having such a decision at all; but if it does not do so, it may end up with a decision so watered down that it has no effect.

Cyprus as a small EU member needs an ambitious, effective, and principled EU foreign policy. In helping to formulate it Cyprus acquires influence beyond her size. To achieve this, Cyprus must be active at the EU level and have views on all global challenges that should concern the EU. She loses credibility if she is one-track minded and focuses only on Turkey and East Mediterranean. To be convincing Cyprus must appreciate that the EU has to deal with issues broader and further than the region around Cyprus. Therefore, she must contribute to every debate on EU's external relations and be constructive on issues that are important to other member states. And on matters of interest to her, Cyprus should influence policies by creating alliances within the EU and through arguments and persuasion. It is true that she can block decisions, but this does not necessarily work to her advantage. In the end, this may alienate allies and still not achieve its target. Withholding

consent must be the last resort and should be related to the issues under discussion.

In conclusion despite the benefits and the importance of bilateral external relations for Cyprus, these cannot replace the added value of a strong EU foreign policy. As the debate on this issue continues, Cyprus must contribute to it and push for a global assertive role of the EU. Not just for Europe's benefit but of Cyprus's as well.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CYPRUS AND THE WAY FORWARD



Ioannis Kasoulides
Ex Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus

I will take a different approach in this presentation from the traditional one that I have described in my book or other presentations with a similar subject. The Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Nicos Christodoulides, I presume as he has been asked to write his own presentation on the same subject will deal comprehensively in a more authoritative way.

I will limit myself to try to foresee how the Biden Administration might affect our own Foreign Policy, in the region and on Turkey. I am certain that the two main pillars of the Foreign Policy, i.e. the peripheral foreign policy on the one hand and the enhanced relations with five permanent Members of the Security Council will be further pursued, and our consistent alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU remains our goal.

The Trump Administration has wholeheartedly supported Israel, moved the Embassy to Jerusalem and recognised it as its capital, has encouraged UAE, Bahrain and probably Sudan to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and produced a plan for the solution of the Palestinian question that is totally rejected by the Arab side. The new administration cannot go back to the issue of Jerusalem, probably the encouragement of more Arab countries to recognise Israel will not be pursued with the same enthusiasm and the Middle Peace plan will quietly be set aside.

The policy towards Iran will not be the same. The five +two nuclear agreement signed by President Obama will be reopened. Not exactly by directly re-entering into the agreement but by renegotiating with much more good faith and Iran will be asked to reciprocate. As a carrot the lifting of sanctions and an understanding may be pursued towards the threat that Iran poses towards moderate states, the American allies, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and others. The tension that exists between Iran and these States may be eased and the existing polarisation in the region may be moderated.

This polarisation has produced a realignment in our region bringing closer together the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan along with Israel. The common threat of these countries is Iran. Moderate Sunni Arab states found the two EU states

in the region, Cyprus and Greece as most willing to come together and a lot of talks are taking place and probably a preparatory work for the formation of a multilateral forum in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arab Peninsula. This would be a major step forward for the Foreign Policy of Cyprus. The change of the hard line policy of the USA towards Iran may render as not so relevant this realignment. It could be so, but it can also be one reason more that these states should align themselves further.

Turkey pursues a policy of the Political Islam in our region supporting together with Qatar all the Movements of the Muslim Brotherhood that is undermining the stability of the Monarchies, that it also includes Egypt and Israel with the anti-Semitic rhetoric of Erdogan. This is considered by the moderate Arab states as a second in significance threat after Iran.

What could be the policy of the Biden administration towards Turkey? Certainly the personal backing of Mr Trump towards Erdogan will not be there anymore. There was definitively a shift in the policy of the State Department and the Pentagon over Turkey and over Cyprus and Greece respectively. The previous policy in its dealings with Greece and Cyprus beyond a line that would upset Turkey has changed. Secretary Pompeo is visiting all the allies in the region except Turkey. He visited Patriarch Bartolomeo in Istanbul without any contact with the Turkish Authorities. Turkey is not considered anymore as a faithful ally.

President-elect Biden is more close to a traditional Foreign policy. Will he follow the tradition of considering Turkey as too big and too geopolitically important to be pushed to the fold of Russia? A lot will depend on the briefings from the State Department and the Pentagon. The autonomous foreign policy of Erdogan playing with both superpowers is not likely to change. He is beyond repair. If the new Administration agrees it will become even stricter. But we should not be surprised if they try to woo Turkey back into the fold.

I believe that the opinion of the American allies in the region will be taken into account. This will be a cashing in in our regional Foreign Policy in the last seven years.

Biden is a friend of Cyprus, knowing his previous history. He knows the Cyprus problem personally. His stance will depend first on the line to take towards Turkey. Come what may he will certainly lend a hand directly or indirectly if credible efforts are under way for a solution. If the worst comes to the worst the Oval Office will never permit an aggressive military operation against Cyprus.

THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND FOREIGN POLICY- 2021 OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS



Dr. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis
Ex Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus

2021 will be extremely critical with regard to developments surrounding the solution of the Cyprus problem, which should remain at the core of our Foreign Policy agenda until a settlement is reached.

The ascendance to the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community of a leader, who was elected on a two-state/confederation political agenda, which has also been Turkey's declared objective during the last three years, coupled with the fact that the intercommunal negotiations have remained stalled since their collapse in Crans Montana in July 2017, do not augur well for the restart of the UN sponsored negotiations from the point they were interrupted.

The Turkish side's aim to change the basis on which the solution of the Cyprus problem has been negotiated since 1977, runs counter to the High-Level agreements between the leaders of the two communities and to numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions, which, *inter alia*, have reaffirmed that: "a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession".

If 2021 will be critical for the Cyprus problem for the aforementioned reasons, it must be ensured that it will be a year of very intense diplomacy, focusing on securing the maximum support from all our friends and partners in the EU and around the world, towards realizing our efforts to restart the negotiations within the framework of the United Nations resolutions, the convergences reached so far and the 6 point framework of the UN Secretary General. Any attempts of the Turkish side to change the basis of negotiations, should be decisively prevented by the Permanent Members of the UNSC (P5) and our EU partners, as well as any attempts to colonize Varosha and to recognize

the secessionist entity in the occupied part of Cyprus. Our Foreign Policy agenda throughout 2021 should focus on achieving these objectives.

Towards that end, an extensive diplomatic campaign should be launched, with the participation of the Government, the House of Representatives, Political Parties, academics, the diaspora and prominent personalities.

The main features and messages of this campaign should include:

-To remind of Turkey's responsibilities for the continuing military occupation of a sizable territory of the Republic of Cyprus, for the illegal settlement of the occupied areas, for the mass violations of human rights of Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike, for the missing persons, as well as for Turkey's refusal to transfer, as a matter of priority, Varosha under UN administration and allow the return of its legitimate inhabitants therein, as provided for in UNSC Resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992).

-To convince unequivocally the international community for our commitment towards a solution, based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation, with political equality as provided in the relevant UNSC resolutions.

-To garner support in denouncing Turkey and the TC leadership for overtly promoting a two-state/ confederation solution and in mounting pressure for their return to the negotiating table on the agreed framework and from the point the negotiations were interrupted in July 2017.

-As a matter of urgency and priority, the government should launch a formal recourse to the UNSC on the issue of Varosha and seek a resolution calling for the immediate transfer of the area to the administration of the UN and for the withdrawal of all Turkish military presence therefrom, to pave the way for the return of the legitimate inhabitants of Varosha to their homes and properties.

-A recourse should also be launched to the UNSC in the event that Turkey attempts recognition by any other country of the secessionist entity in the occupied areas, the so-called "trnc", whose declaration was unequivocally condemned by UNSC resolutions 541(1983) and 550(1984). Similarly, we should ensure that the European Union will also take measures against Turkey and any other country that might attempt to recognize the "trnc".

-To intensify pressure from the EU and other countries able to exert influence on Turkey, in order to put an end to Turkey's violations of Cyprus' sovereign rights in its EEZ, emphasizing that such illegal conduct jeopardizes international peace and security and is not conducive to a constructive environment for negotiations.

How should we move in our foreign policy, at European and international level, in order for this campaign to be successful?

-Creation and further development of appropriate and meaningful alliances, both within and outside the EU.

-With regard to the UNSC, we should further strengthen our relations with all the P5 countries, as well as the non-Permanent Members, in view of the possibility of recourse to the UNSC on Varosha and possible attempts for recognition.


-Comprehensive, timely and consistent flow of information should be provided to the members of the international community, first and foremost the P5 and our partners in the EU, on our positions on all aspects of the Cyprus problem, identifying issues of possible assistance.

-In addition, it will be necessary to energize forces, from within and outside the EU, including the European Parliament and the Commonwealth, which could contribute catalytically towards the achievement of our objectives.

In order to realize the above objectives and aligned with its primary goal, which should be the solution of the Cyprus problem, Cyprus must pursue a more dynamic and multidimensional foreign policy, relying on its geostrategic importance, which can be best described as a natural bridge between the EU and the Middle East. Emphasis should be placed on history and culture, its key geographic location, excellent relations with the Arab world and Israel, Cyprus' global reach in the maritime sector and the recent discovery of hydrocarbons in the East Mediterranean.

The aim of all efforts is to achieve a federal solution to the Cyprus problem that will benefit all Cypriots, in the interests of stability and peace in the region, for the benefit of the European Union and the international community as a whole. A solution that will transform Cyprus again into a normal country, with abundant potential for growth, peace and prosperity.

FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES



Nicos Rolandis
Ex Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus

I have been heavily involved in international affairs, ever since I became Foreign Minister, in March 1978. Involved not only with the United Nations, but, also, with other important international organisations. Out of this experience, I've realised that although these organisations are useful and may offer a few things to countries, when it comes to resolution of major issues, they are not very effective. This is the experience of everybody. Unfortunately, might makes right in this world. Where might exists, the right is created by this might.

I was there when we started efforts at the United Nations for a solution. We used to have one presentation at the General Assembly every year. We knew that resolutions of the Assembly were not executed anyway, but it was a reminder to the world community that this problem existed. In parallel, we had some recourses to the Security Council. Today, all these resolutions are there and are not implemented. As I had said (and many people in Cyprus disliked it back then), the resolutions of these organisations are similar to a bouncing cheque.

Nevertheless, a number of efforts were made, mainly by the United Nations¹ for a solution, since the late '70s. Yet, we have reached a very difficult point. The mistake is on our side, as well, but, certainly, the intransigence of Turkey and its objective from the very outset of dividing the country were there no doubt. Nowadays, the whole matter has gone into a larger frame, which includes the Eastern Mediterranean and also, the Aegean-the whole area. I wouldn't necessarily describe this as good or bad, but it's certainly neither simple nor easy. In addition to this, the other side has taken a stand of partition and the creation of two states and the question is who is going to change it. The United Nations? They cannot. Europe, I believe, cannot. And they would not be so interested anymore. They may try, but once you have Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership in favour of this solution, I think the situation will be extremely difficult. Neither would the Americans want to

¹ The Anglo-American-Canadian plan had American clout behind it and might have worked for that reason.

be involved strongly, because they have to gain back Turkey. Turkey is playing a very astute game. Erdogan is now playing between East and West. Biden will feel obliged to win him back.

Most of our politicians try to say there is some hope, but I am wondering whether this hope is still there. Thus, if I were a decision-maker now, I would go to the talks with a will to work out a federal state on a loose federation, with two federated states and a central government. The federal government should only have the powers necessary to keep the unity of the country intact, while the two federated states would decide their own affairs. As a matter of fact, most of the federal states are like that these days. If you go to Canada, if you go to the US, if you go to Australia, the states have their own rights and are very strong. In the case of Cyprus, the federated states should be stronger, if we are truly seeking a solution to this problem.

Still, there is the possibility that the other side says no even to this proposal, insisting on two sovereignties. Something which we cannot accept, at this juncture at least. I do not know whether this, at the end of the day, will be imposed on us by the events. I say this because we've made a number of blunders from 1974 until today. I know it, because I am one of the very few living persons involved in politics who was there from the very beginning.

Take the issue of hydrocarbons. When I started working on the hydrocarbon possibility and signed the agreement in Cairo, with the Egyptians, regarding the EEZ of our two countries, I also made, a little later, a proposal that we additionally sign a disclaimer between the two communities in Cyprus. Meaning that we should disclaim any legal or political precedent and then, decide how much out of each dollar that would go into the coffers of the Republic of Cyprus would, then, go into an account in favour of the Turkish Cypriots, a percentage to be agreed. An escrow account, that is. That amount would go there, stay there until the solution of the Cyprus Problem. Or, in case of no solution, in 10 or 15 years, the Turkish Cypriots could take their own share.

When I mentioned that, Talat was interested. He invited me twice to talk about this. He said, 'Mr. Rolandis, if you think that what you are proposing might be accepted for negotiation by your own people, I am prepared to proceed and take the matter up with Ankara.' Tassos Papadopoulos did not react. He left it. Things became worse and worse. Now, fifteen years later, Anastasiades makes a similar proposal. However, in politics, what matters is not only what you propose, but also when you propose it. Timing. If you miss the right timing, you miss everything. Now it is the Turkish Cypriots that do not accept it anymore. Now they want to be co-administrators of the situation. From those days, I had said that Ankara will pump our oil and gas, if we do not move. We didn't move. And who is going to stop them now? Erdogan is prepared to use force and grab what he can.

I am also very much concerned about Varosha and the future fate of the city. We made too many efforts in the late 1970s and Varosha was almost in our hands. We said no to the Anglo-American-Canadian plan and we lost the city. Now we are crying over spilled milk.

My sense of urgency stems from the fear that the 46 years will easily become 50 years. I feel that we missed the opportunity many times and now the train is gone. I hope that if we run after the train, we may still catch it.

CYPRUS FOREIGN POLICY – AND NOW, WHAT?



*Tasos Tzionis
Ambassador/Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Ret.)*

As things stand, everything seems to lead to the conviction that our island will be living with the Cyprus Problem, namely the Turkish problem of Cyprus, for a long time to come. The solution of our national problem by peaceful means will continue to be the Republic's highest foreign policy objective. All aspects of the Republic's foreign policy will continue to be subjected to the ultimate and most urgent need of reaching an acceptable solution to our national problem as soon as possible.

Cyprus, while trying to achieve a solution to its Problem, managed through its foreign policy to ensure the continued international recognition of the Government of the Republic, despite the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the state's organs and institutions. Ten years later, under the risk of the Republic's dissolution as a result of the Greek Junta coup d'état and the Turkish invasion, it managed to survive as a state albeit remaining severely mutilated to this day. In the years that followed, the Republic of Cyprus succeeded in erecting a miraculous economic edifice on the ashes, the rubble and the devastation left by the invasion, and to internationalise its problem, while maintaining high moral grounds, thus ensuring precious international support. It also managed to accede to the European Union and to be, for 16 years now, an upright and reliable Partner. Also, whilst taking regional initiative, Cyprus signed agreements for EEZ and continental shelf delimitation with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel, as well as other hydrocarbons and investments-related agreements thus, preventing bilateral border disputes and thereby providing, together with its neighbours - including Greece, but excluding Turkey - a framework that provides multinational hydrocarbon companies with the legal certainty and safety required for investments in the order of billions.

Furthermore, the Republic of Cyprus was a pioneer in the establishment of tripartite cooperation formations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, creating a vibrant, fast-growing and promising system of cooperation across a historically very hesitant or even suspicious region with regards to interstate contacts and cooperation. This is an area which has enormous strategic value for Europe and the West in general, but also for the Middle

East and North Africa. The first great institutional success of this endeavour was the creation of the EastMed Gas Forum which is, now, an international organization based in Cairo, with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Palestine and Italy as its founding member; France has asked to become a member whilst the USA requested permanent observer status. Soon will follow the establishment of a Secretariat (Secretariats in fact), in Nicosia for the tripartite formations, to further contribute to the attainment of the common objective of developing cooperation in all possible fields between the partners in each tripartite formation.

All these and many more were made possible by Cyprus following a prudent foreign policy. The question is: can it be sustainable?

Lately we witness a dramatic, provocative and pompous hardening of Turkey's positions on the Cyprus Problem as well as of Turkey's behaviour in general, towards Cyprus and Greece. This includes a combination of aggressive diplomacy and the use of military means, especially at sea.

Turkey seems, on the one hand, to seek the expansion of its military occupation in Cyprus (the opening of the fenced area of Famagusta is the most striking example on land); on the other hand, it attempts through the use of warships, seismic survey vessels and drilling rigs, and through the threat of use of force, the usurpation of huge parts of Cyprus' EEZ/continental shelf it claims for itself, as well as the sharing between the occupied areas secessionist entity and the Government of the Republic, of the natural resources in the rest of the EEZ/continental shelf of the Republic. Cyprus appears not to have the means to stop Turkey.

The international and EU solidarity towards Cyprus is shown almost exclusively through declarations and statements, most being ambivalent, so as to displease Turkey less. One of the guarantor powers, the United Kingdom, maintains the advantages given to it by the 1960 Treaties but acts or omits to act as it did in 1974, remaining only active in its supportive policy towards Turkey, disregarding its guarantee and other obligations under the Treaties and pretending that the process of decolonisation of our island is over. The other guarantor, Greece, does not appear to be in a position to fulfill the obligations undertaken in the '60s, their exercise being of vital importance for, but also owed to, Cyprus, due to the Greek Junta's traitorous coup d'état serving Turkey with a reason and an excuse for the invasion, which led to the birth of the inexhaustible source of our current problems. On the other hand the European Union may have proven to be an economic powerhouse but has not established itself as an important player on the geopolitical chessboard, remaining rather inactive in our region when unaffected or when the interests of its major member-states, especially Germany, are served.

In order to cope with the difficulties of the present and the foreseeable future, we need to have a pragmatic, efficient, combative and anti-occupation foreign policy and diplomacy; and to enlist the forces of society and the capabilities of the state towards the liberation of our country from Turkey's occupation. We must also be aware of the fact that the Cypriot people as a whole are at risk from Turkey's "spirit of conquest" and its neo-ottoman aspiration for further territorial expansion. Our foreign policy must go a long way in addressing this reality, starting as a matter of priority, with strengthening and utilising the institution responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, that is, diplomacy, something which *is* within the capabilities of the Republic, in order to withstand Turkey's intensified offensive. The importance that Cyprus gives to diplomacy is disappointing; this is reflected, *inter alia*, in the state budget. In 2020 the Foreign Ministry was provided with only 0,69% of the state budget. No Ministry was provided with a lower budget. The MFA employs 162 diplomats who make up the Headquarters and 53 diplomatic missions, of which 3 without a diplomat whereas 29 of them with only 1 diplomat. No further evidence is needed to demonstrate the hollowness of the words we hear, that our problem can only be solved through diplomacy and persuasion!

The solution of our national problem and the promotion of Cyprus's national interests in the international field require a state's vision, strategic planning and political will. The struggle for survival and freedom requires Cyprus to become (no matter how small it is) a much stronger and efficient state, as well as to regain the moral high grounds. It can pursue this by investing, *inter alia*, in the capabilities offered by the appropriate foreign policy. We of course mean a foreign policy and diplomacy for which the necessary resources and means will be made available and which will have the necessary human resources with the appropriate knowledge and skills to promote the achievement of our national objectives in the international field. Everything must be done to develop and strengthen the diplomatic capabilities of Cyprus, in order to be in a much less unfavorable position than it is today to successfully deal with the Turkish bulimia, while enhancing our leadership's confidence when sitting at the negotiation table either for the solution of our national problem or for the accomplishment of our national interests in general.

CYPRUS – CHINA RELATIONS



*Loria Markides
Ambassador a.h., Former Ambassador to the People's
Republic of China*

The People's Republic of China, the Middle Kingdom, was kept outside the family of nations since its establishment in 1949 and until 1971. The country's isolation was due to the policy of the United States of America and its allies, out of fear for the communist regime of China.

However, as early as October 1967, the Nixon Administration realized that excluding a country of the magnitude of China from America's diplomatic options did not serve the national interests of the United States and the global balance of power.

Nixon's view that America could not afford to leave China forever outside the international community opened the road for the Middle Kingdom to join the United Nations Organization and to hold a seat at the Security Council as a permanent member. China was, thus, led into a multipolar world.

To-day, the People's Republic of China, a country with a five-thousand-year-old civilization and with a population of nearly 1.4 billion, has become the world's second largest economy and second largest recipient of foreign direct investment. A remarkable progress was also made in information and technology and in spatial science.

Since the implementation of reforms and of the policy of opening up to the outside world, China is moving fast towards joining the club of developed countries while the Chinese people's lives have been improved.

In urban and rural areas, though, some seventy million people still live in poverty and rely on allowances from the Government.

The Chinese leaders adhering to the policy of socialism with Chinese characteristics, are promoting the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation; the dream that aims at pursuing progress and development of China, rejuvenation of the nation and prosperity of the Chinese people through reforms and innovation.

The Chinese endeavor sets a glaring example for Cyprus to follow suit and proceed with the implementation of reforms and innovation.

In an attempt to boost cooperation between Asia and Europe, between the East and the West, the visionary president of China, Xi Jinping launched a few years ago his Initiative entitled the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road – the Belt and Road Initiative – aiming at reviving the ancient Silk Road. His initiative was welcomed by a great number of countries and international organizations.

Consequently, in 2017 a Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation was established with the participation of over one hundred countries and organizations, to promote and implement the ambitious project.

The President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Nicos Anastasiades participated in the Belt and Road forum in April 2019 and a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the framework of the Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road was signed.

In spite of the geographical distance and the difference in size, the Republic of Cyprus and the People’s Republic of China established and maintain close and friendly relations since 1971.

In recent years the bilateral relations have been more enhanced. There is, however, room for further strengthening and deepening the relations in all fields. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the framework of the Belt and Road initiative opens new avenues for Cyprus and China to boost their cooperation in the areas of energy, tourism industry, high technology, telecommunications and trade.

More Chinese private companies should be invited to invest in Cyprus. The Cyprus investment policy is liberal and allows 100% foreign participation in many sectors. The Chinese companies can benefit from a series of incentives by using Cyprus as a base for their activities. Moreover, Cyprus membership to the European Union turns the country into a gate to the European markets for Chinese goods.

It is true that the long distance between Cyprus and China and the low level of infrastructure connectivity make easy flow of goods and economic factors difficult and negatively affect Cyprus exports. In order to facilitate the infrastructure connectivity, Cyprus and China should cooperate towards finding ways and means within the framework of the Initiative to solve this impediment.

By solving this problem tourism will also be benefited. Chinese people love travelling. Following the opening up to the world and the improvement of the standard of living of Chinese people, thousands of them visit foreign countries, always with a camera in hand, and they enjoy discovering the history and culture of the places they travel to.

Cyprus, with its long history and culture has over the years developed the tourist industry with high standards and modern tourist accommodation infrastructure. Cyprus turned into a “mosaic of nature and culture, a whole magical world concentrated in a small, warm and traditional hospitable island in the Mediterranean at the crossroads of the three continents”.

Furthermore, Cooperation in the fields of education and culture is considered of paramount importance. Both Cyprus and China are proud of their historic past and rich cultural heritage. Cultural exchanges between the two countries promote understanding and friendship and should be intensified when the economic and other conditions will permit it.

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Education and Cultural Cooperation every two years offers the framework for the realization of these exchanges. It is worth mentioning here that China intends to establish a Cultural Centre in Cyprus.

In view of the fast technological and scientific development higher education has an important role to play in the economic and societal development by offering knowledgeable and competent professionals. It is, thus, up to the academic community in Cyprus and in China to become more active in promoting bilateral, transnational exchanges and synergies between universities in both countries.

Cyprus needs to learn from the expertise of the Chinese scientists in the domain of health care and high tech.

While the political relations between Cyprus and China are excellent and were reconfirmed as such during the meeting of President Anastasiades and President Xi Jinping last year in Beijing, the contacts between them should increase at all levels of the government.

The statement by President Xi that China considers Cyprus a strategic partner, a reliable partner and a good friend of China, apart from satisfaction and appreciation, creates an obligation on Cyprus to exert every effort in order to maintain and further strengthen their partnership.

Cyprus adheres to the policy of “one China” with Taiwan as part and parcel of mainland China. And Beijing appreciates Cyprus’ stance.

China on the other hand supports the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus – a “one Cyprus”. It also supports the positions of Nicosia when the question of Cyprus is raised before the Security Council of the United Nations.

“China now has an impact on the world that is even more comprehensive, profound and long-lasting, and the world is paying even greater attention to China”. This should be taken into consideration.

Bibliography:


President Xi Jinping (2018) *The Governance of China*. 2nd edition. Beijing.

Henry Kissinger (1994) *Diplomacy*. New York.

Chen Yue & Pu Ping (2017) *Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind*. 1st edition. Beijing.

Chinese State Council Information Office. *China and the World in the New Era*.

PRESIDENT ERDOGAN'S PICNIC



Robert Ellis
Member of the Advisory Board at Vocal Europe in Brussels
International Advisor at RIEAS (Research Institute for
European and American Studies) in Athens

Cyprus is, and always has been, at the mercy of whoever calls the shots in the neighbourhood. As the Arab geographer Al-Muqaddasi noted in 985: "The island of Qubrus is in the power of whichever nation is overlord in these seas." At present, this is Turkey.

It was a *place d'armes* for the Crusaders en route to the Holy Land, it protected Venetian trade until conquered by the Ottomans in 1571. When the Venetian governor surrendered against a promise of safe conduct, he was literally stuffed and paraded around town. The British took over in 1878 and it took on strategic importance to protect the Suez Canal.

In the 1950s the Greek Cypriot majority's demand for independence and *enosis* (union with Greece) was met by a Turkish Cypriot demand for *taksim* (partition), which was backed by Turkey.¹ Independence in 1960 led to intercommunal strife and in 1964 the two communities were separated by UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus). In 1974 this separation was cemented by Turkey's occupation of northern Cyprus after a coup by Greek Cypriot extremists who, backed by the Greek junta, intended to declare *enosis*.

The unilateral declaration of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) in 1983 was the conclusion, and the recent election of Ersin Tatar as president of the TRNC could well lead to the creation of two separate states. In the event, as is likely, that a Turkish Cypriot state is not recognized, this could lead to annexation by Turkey. As the first Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios, concluded, "It is in the name of *enosis* that Cyprus has been destroyed".

By 1968 Makarios had abandoned this dream and opted for the "feasible" rather than the "desirable", but all the king's horses and all the king's men couldn't put Humpty together again. In 1975 an attempt to achieve a federal solution began in what the present UN Secretary-General António Guterres

¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/mar/03/cyprus-turkey-eu-uk>

has called “a horizon of an endless process without result”.² The last attempt ended in Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017.

The process has been a political graveyard, which has consumed the efforts of several UN Secretaries-General and countless envoys. As James Ker-Lindsay, visiting professor at the London School of Economics, has noted, “There is clearly a sense of frustration and fatigue at the international level about Cyprus.” Further, “No one will want to invest considerable time, effort and even money into pursuing something that clearly has no hope of a successful conclusion. If the Turkish Cypriots elect someone who clearly has little interest in a settlement on realistic terms, then it will obviously affect perceptions”.³

In defence of their rump state, the Greek Cypriots themselves bear a share of the blame for this state of affairs. Up against Turkey’s propaganda machine they are defenceless. As Martin Packard, the British naval officer who in 1964 worked tirelessly to secure peace between the two communities, wrote,⁴ the Greek Cypriots were given solid reason to complain of a separatist insurrection. But “faced by the more powerful PR mechanisms of Britain and Turkey, the Greek Cypriot authorities failed to impress on the international community a convincing presentation in this light”.

In 2012 I urged on Cypriot foreign minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis the adoption of an effective communications strategy, and as Professor Andreas Theophanous wrote in *In Depth*⁵ at the time, “It is of utmost importance that at last Cyprus has a “narrative” and that it regains the moral high ground”. However, our views were ignored.

The following year Peter Droussiotis, the president of the National Federation of Cypriots in the UK, also urged in an interview⁶ with the CNA (Cyprus News Agency) a co-ordinated communications strategy but without result. Nevertheless, the Filoxenia Conference Centre was renovated as a prestige project at a cost of €28 million in connection with the Cypriot presidency of the EU in 2012. Meanwhile, the PIO (Press and Information Office) continued to push pamphlets.

² <http://www.uncyprustalks.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2018-10-15-SG-GO-Report-S-2018-919.pdf>

³ <https://ahvalnews.com/northern-cyprus/ankara-interven-es-northern-cyprus-election-could-shape-peace-process>

⁴

https://www.amazon.co.uk/s?k=martin+packard+getting+it+wrong&i=stripbooks&ref=nb_sb_noss

⁵ <https://cceia.unic.ac.cy/volume-9-issue-1-a-theophanous/>

⁶ <https://cypriotfederation.org.uk/2013/02/federation-president-london-must-send-clear-message-to-ankara-on-eu-course/>

Particularly after Cyprus blocked the adoption of sanctions against Belarus at the meeting of EU foreign ministers in September, the ROC (Republic of Cyprus) has been accused of holding the EU hostage. The leading Danish daily Berlingske called on Cyprus to stop playing primitive power games and stated: “The Greek Cypriots are now members of the EU, but do not enjoy much respect in wide circles in the EU”.⁷

The fear is that the Cyprus question can be dismissed by the EU in the same way that the Sudetenland question was dismissed in 1938 by British prime minister Neville Chamberlain as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”.

The ROC has also expected US support but the end of the arms embargo has been limited to non-lethal weapons of defence. A lightning visit by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo resulted in the creation of a joint security training centre with the acronym CYCLOPS, named after the one-eyed monster.⁸

Turkey’s President Erdogan, with one eye on Cyprus’ hydrocarbon resources, has expressed support for a two-state solution and on November 15 had a picnic in the fenced-off town of Varosha.⁹ Turkey has long adopted a policy of “Heim ins Reich” towards the Turkish Cypriots in the north. As Germany did with the Sudetenland Germans in the 1930s, Turkey has also found its Konrad Henlein in Ersin Tatar.

Five days before Erdogan’s visit, Turkish Cypriots protested against Ankara’s interference.¹⁰ In the circumstances, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had better beware of the outcome, as it might not only be the Venetian governor that gets stuffed.

⁷ <https://www.berlingske.dk/ledere/cyprn-skal-holde-op-med-primitive-magtspil>

⁸ <https://in-cyprus.philenews.com/cyprus-fm-and-us-secretary-of-state-sign-mou-on-security-issues/>

⁹ <https://chillreport.com/erdogan-has-a-picnic-in-the-ghost-town/>

¹⁰ <https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-cypriots-stage-protest-against-ankaras-interference-in-internal-affairs-news-55003>

NICOSIA CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE THE HIGH MORAL GROUND TO AN AGGRESSOR



Marios Evriviades
Professor of International Relations and Security, Neapolis
University Pafos

In February 2008, the new elected Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias took his first trip to Brussels to attend the EU summit there. He flew on the official carrier, Cyprus Airways. As had been the custom for many Cypriot pilots soon after takeoff, the specific Captain informed the passengers on the plane that they could see from their windows, if they so desired, the parts of Cyprus that had been under Turkish military occupation since 1974, when NATO member Turkey launched its massive attack on Cyprus.

Apparently the pilot's announcement was not to the liking of the Cypriot President. Soon after the pilot returned to base, he received friendly advice from acquaintances he had in the AKEL communist party, the party of the President, that he should stop making announcements of the sort during takeoffs and landings in Cyprus. And unofficially he was so advised by the carrier. Henceforth no such announcements were made on Cyprus Airways. This story was revealed to me by the pilot in question.

Some years later, in 2015, the Director of the Press and Information Office (PIO) retired abruptly from government service. The PIO, it should be stressed, was at the time the communications agency of the Cypriot state. Ever since 1964, when policies were launched in the Western centres of power to terminate Cypriot independence, the PIO was tasked a) to counter western and Turkish propaganda to delegitimise the Cypriot state and, ultimately, bring about its demise and b) to go on the offensive and promote a narrative in support of policies enhancing its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Soon thereafter, this now retired former PIO Director, commenced employment as an "associate" at an educational institution in the Turkish-occupied part in the city of Famagusta. In fact the grounds of employment housed a Greek college, the Center for Higher Education of Famagusta, prior to the Turkish invasion. Its premises had been taken over by the Turks in 1974.

In so far as I know, this event of a state communications chief turning over and working for the other side is unprecedented in the annals of modern times. Yet this event was of no concern to Cypriot authorities. And it almost went unnoticed and unreported in the press. When written about, it was done in code. References were only to "a high ranking Cypriot official" who was never named. The name did in fact surface. But only on the web, citing a Turkish source. The person was never called in, even for routine questioning. Surely arrangements did not happen overnight. Did they occur while this person was carrying on official duties?

These two events, each in its own way, were symptomatic of the final collapse of an already ineffective and ailing communications strategy on the part of successive Cypriot governments. This condition remains true to this day.

Cyprus is on the verge of losing the high moral ground to an aggressor and NATO member state, Turkey, that committed massive war crimes against it. In the space of just one month (July-August, 1974), the NATO armed and trained army of Turkey, attacked Cyprus and killed one percent of its population. It implemented massive ethnic cleansing against Cypriots, the first such ethnic cleansing in Europe since the end of World War II. Turkey continues to this day to bring colons from the mainland, implanting them on Cypriot territory, while refusing to allow the autochthonous Cypriot refugees to return to their homes and properties. Actually this was what the Turkish invasion was designed to do: to take over the land by cleansing it from its indigenous population. All these crimes are continuing violations of the 1948 Geneva Conventions, of international conventions on human rights and of the Charter of the United Nations.

When Turkish officials, from the President down, are not publicly threatening with atavistic and sadistic pleasure to repeat their 1974 conquest crimes against the Cypriot people - who form more than 80% of the population of the country- they send their gunboats and drilling ships inside the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone for drilling, hoping that with the help of Allah, always, they can usurp once again more of the wealth of Cyprus. These days they do both. They make war threats and they drill simultaneously.

Turkey cannot be allowed to get away with such behaviour simply because she is deemed to be an "indispensable" member of the Atlantic alliance and by pretending to be a "paragon of peace" in the Eastern Mediterranean, when in fact she is a threat producer and a warmonger par excellence. Ankara should be called to account. And so should its enablers and apologists.

Cypriot officials ought to know better. But they behave as if they do not. It appears that successive governments have finally succumbed to the whispers of Atlantic sirens. If only they would behave properly, Ankara will eventually come around, withdraw its NATO trained occupation troops and accept

fundamental rights and freedoms within a sovereign Cypriot state. That is how the song goes. British diplomats in Nicosia are the conductors. This is no secret.

Driven by this illusion, Cypriot officials abandoned a communications strategy that in the past had served Cyprus well. This strategy did not allow Turkey to escape the stigma of its 1974 aggression and the crimes it committed against the Cypriot people. It was the PIO, from its Director down to its press offices in critical overseas capitals, that spearheaded this campaign. This campaign enabled Cyprus to retain the high moral ground, an indispensable condition for its survival.

Today the PIO as a communications agency is no more. In fact as these lines are written it is actually headless due to bureaucratic infighting. But this is only a symptom. As were the two examples already cited. For decades now the PIO has been systematically stripped of its functions. Its overseas press offices have been eliminated one by one. And its communications budget was taken over. "Streamlining" and "efficiency" were the ostensibly reasons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) took over the communication policies of the state. And they have been languishing there ever since. The functionaries of the MFA are totally unable to cope with the "tous azimuts" Turkish propaganda campaign against Cyprus and its people. Today both the MFA and the PIO, an account of decades of stasis, intentional and otherwise, have been reduced to mere domestic mechanisms for the personal promotion of government officials from the President down.

Turkish propaganda against Cyprus and its people is currently in full throttle. It has become so overwhelming and threatening that it may be about to achieve its strategic objective of turning the victims of its 1974 aggression into perpetrators, in the eyes of world public opinion.

Nicosia needs to step back and strategise. And the first thing it needs to do is to formulate new communications policies that will effectively take the initiative away from Ankara. Nicosia cannot afford to lose the high moral ground to a country that has victimised the Cypriot people for decades and one that jails and kills its own people and confiscates their properties arbitrarily, even for much longer. And to boot, a country that practices shamelessly hostage and blackmail diplomacy on the world stage. Turkey may wear Atlantic and NATO hats. But they do not immunise her. Nicosia ought to comprehend this and formulate its policies accordingly.

THE LEGACY OF 2020 FOR CYPRUS AND THE UNITED STATES



*Van Coufoudakis, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Indiana University-
Purdue University*

I am writing this short essay as the unprecedented year 2020 comes to an end. The legacy of this year whether in the areas of health, the economy or on international politics will be felt for years to come. Because of space limitations, this commentary will focus on two issues: the recent US elections and the Cyprus problem.

As far as my country is concerned, the four years of the Trump administration have had a devastating effect on American society, our political system and the ties of this country with its traditional allies. Trump applied the tactics and practices of populist dictators. He was able to mobilize and legitimize the worst elements of American society, raising serious questions about the political maturity of the American public. He decimated and undermined American political institutions, democratic procedures and the credibility of our political system. Trump managed to do in four years what we accused the Russians of trying to do to our political system during the Cold War. He set back the social progress achieved in the US by appointing ultra conservative judges in vacancies in the federal courts. The damage done to American institutions and political processes would not have been possible without the complicity of the Republican Party that tolerated Trump's actions fearful of the reactions of Trump's political base. I have lived in this country on and off since 1955. I have witnessed momentous events including the Communist witch hunts of the 50's, Vietnam, the Civil Rights movement, Watergate, to just name a few. But the nation survived and came out of these crises stronger and united. Unfortunately, this is not the case today. The legacy we are leaving to the next generation is one of extremism and polarization that will not be easy to heal. Reading Ortega Y'Gasset's "Revolt of the Masses" should be a wake up call for all who still believe in democracy and human rights.

Cypriots followed closely the American electoral marathon. The relations of the Trump administration with Turkey had a serious impact on Greece and Cyprus. Trump showed his deference for Erdogan because he considered him a "strong leader". This was Trump's characterization of the cadre of dictators he supported. Trump also had economic interests in Turkey. He and his

associates were involved in the affairs of corrupt Turkish banks. Despite high level visits by US officials to Greece and Cyprus and the facilities made available to the US by both countries, Trump took no steps to curb Erdogan's disregard of international law and aggressive behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Even though President Elect Joe Biden during his Senate career showed understanding of the issues affecting Cyprus, his victory will need to be assessed realistically. Trump is leaving the Department of State in chaos. He has neglected and undermined US interests in the region. The pro-Turkish views of the Departments of State and Defense remain, despite Turkey's actions in Syria, the support it extended to the Islamic State, its acquisition of the S-400 missile system, and its promotion of Islamic ideology. A Biden victory should not be celebrated by the ringing of Church bells, as it happened with the Carter election. In view of these developments and the absence of an effective Greek American lobby, US policy in the region will not change. US foreign policy priorities are elsewhere. This is why Cyprus must develop its lobbying presence in Washington and cooperate with Israel and the American Jewish community. Both have a significant presence and impact in Washington. With all the domestic and foreign policy issues that will confront the Biden administration, Cyprus will not be a top policy priority. The new staff in the Department of State will return to the traditional position of supporting a new round of talks aiming for the adoption of the elusive "bi-zonal, bi-communal federation", regardless of the effects of that solution on the survival of the Republic of Cyprus.

Following the "elections" in occupied Cyprus and the rise of Mr. Tatar as Ankara's favorite "Turkish Cypriot leader," a new drive is underway for five party informal talks from the point where the Crans Montana talks deadlocked, despite Turkey's continuing violations of Cypriot sovereignty and Turkey's demand for a two state solution. For all those who shed tears over Mr. Akinci's loss, his "presidency" was not a missed opportunity for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Despite his alleged "European" and progressive image, Akinci faithfully executed Turkey's policies. Once again, the old theories of the "lost opportunities" have appeared in Cypriot political discourse along with warnings that new talks are needed in order to avoid the partition of Cyprus. All this, despite Turkey's daily provocations and threats and Mr. Tatar's endorsement of a two state solution for Cyprus. Looking at what transpired in and around Cyprus in recent months, I want to remind readers that, had the Annan Plan been ratified in 2004, Cyprus would not have been able to articulate any of its limited diplomatic protests over Turkey's violations of Cypriot sovereignty.

In 1939 Chamberlain believed that by negotiating with revisionist dictators he could achieve "peace in our time". We all know what happened in Eastern and Central Europe in the late 30's. Greek Cypriots have a major responsibility

to protect their 60 year old Republic and the hard won rights of its European citizens. Working with like minded alliances of European states, Cyprus must resist the siren song of “reunification” under the unprecedented constitutional construct of the “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation”, a system created in New York, London and Ankara with the tacit acceptance of Nicosia’s Presidential Palace thanks to the “constructive ambiguity” employed by foreign mediators. Turkey means when it says that the Republic of Cyprus is “defunct”. Turkey wants two states on Cyprus, one directly under its control and the other controlled by Turkish Cypriot and Turkish settler vetoes. The Greek Cypriot state with its strong economy will end up supporting the Turkish Cypriot puppet state and sharing equally with it the Republic’s hydrocarbon revenues.

The specter of new talks is upon us despite Turkey’s unrelenting threats. The Greek Cypriot negotiating backsliding is nothing new. Turkey and the UN negotiators know that. The most serious recent concession came two years ago when the Cypriot President adopted the idea of a “loose confederation” following secret talks with the Turks in New York. Like other constitutional abstractions that have gained currency in Cypriot vocabulary, the average citizen does not understand the implications of these unprecedented constructs on the survival of the Republic of Cyprus and on the rights Cypriots enjoy as European citizens.. Time has come for such a discussion because, as Cicero said in his first Philippic, we have “Hannibal ante portas”.

BIDEN AND CYPRUS: ON CYPRIOT PERCEPTIONS AND US INTENTIONS



Michalis Kontos
Assistant Professor of International Relations
Department of Politics and Governance, School of Law
University of Nicosia

This article aims to discuss relations between the United States and Cyprus, with special focus on the historic visit of Vice President Joe Biden in 2014 and the prospects regarding his upcoming presidency. His stance during his visit in 2014, despite Greek Cypriot reservations and negative perceptions on US intentions, manifested a new approach vis-à-vis Cyprus. What about his intentions now, as the new President? Which factors will define US policy on Cyprus after January 2021?

Vice President Biden and Cyprus: negative perceptions and noble intentions

In the first half of 2014, there were efforts to revitalize the talks for the solution of the Cyprus problem amidst Turkish maritime violations in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A joint declaration between the leaders of the two communities, President Nicos Anastasiades and Mr. Derviş Eroğlu, marked the beginning of a new round of negotiations. It was a time of transformation in US foreign policy. President Barack Obama was committed to end costly military adventures in the Middle East and take a “no boots on the ground” approach in the region. At the same time, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (then Prime Minister) had clearly showcased his domestic and international ambitions: to dominate as the new strongman of Turkey, and to promote a new foreign policy agenda that would reverse Ankara’s Cold War and early post-Cold War pro-Western and NATO-centric orientation. In this context, US Vice President Joe Biden decided to pay a historic visit in Cyprus in May, the first of a sitting US Vice President since 1962.

While the government of the Republic of Cyprus perceived the US involvement as a positive development and carried out intensive diplomatic activity to prepare for the Vice President’s visit, the opposition was rather suspicious. The main concerns focused, among other issues, on the Mr. Biden’s planned meeting with Mr. Eroglu in the occupied North, which could reinforce the efforts made by the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”)

for international recognition. However, this concern did not come true. At first, during his visit in Cyprus Mr. Biden would repeatedly clarify that there was no “TRNC” recognition issue. Furthermore, the US Vice President’s schedule while in Cyprus was designed to ensure that facilitating the “TRNC’s” recognition aspirations was not among his objectives. For example, the Vice President avoided entering Mr. Eroğlu’s “presidential” residence from the main entrance; he didn’t stop on the doorstep to shake hands and take a photo with the Turkish Cypriot leader; he even failed to remove his sunglasses while entering the building, side-by-side with Mr. Eroğlu.¹

In May 2014, Mr. Biden proved that his intentions vis-à-vis Cyprus were noble. Apart from the way that he dealt with the issues above, as well as the fact that he called Cyprus a “strategic partner of the United States”, his overall stance called for a revision of Greek Cypriot perceptions on US policy on Cyprus. After all, it was the Vice President himself that made these statements during an official visit to Cyprus, by itself a rare occasion. We should not forget that until a few years earlier, US officials would treat of Cyprus in a fundamentally different way: for example, in 2004 then US Secretary of State Collin Powell would provocatively defy the political hierarchy of the Republic of Cyprus and make a phone call to the President of the House of Representatives, late Mr. Demetris Christofias, in order to ask him to support “yes” vote to Annan plan. A few years later, in 2009, during his official visit in Cyprus, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Matthew Bryza, when asked by journalists whether Washington was willing to press Turkey for a solution to the Cyprus problem, he unequivocally stated that no such pressure would be exercised and, contrary, he praised Turkey for its constructive stance in relation with the negotiations.

President Biden and Cyprus: positive perceptions, but what about intentions?

In November 2020, when these lines are written, Cyprus and the United States enjoy an unprecedented momentum in their bilateral relations. This momentum was made possible mainly due to policies implemented during President Trump’s tenure: the partial reversal of the embargo of US arms sales to Cyprus, the active support of Israel-Cyprus-Greece trilateral partnership, and Nicosia’s cooperation with the US financial crime prevention network, known as FinCEN, on tackling money laundering related with Russian interests are only some examples. At the same time, the bipartisan initiative that brought about the East. Med. Act, a law that aims, among other things, to recalibrate Cyprus’ role in US Eastern Mediterranean policy, shows that developments in US-Cypriot relations have a depth that exceeds individual beliefs and views. At the same time though, President Trump’s

¹ On Vice President Biden’s visit to Cyprus see M. Kontos, “Foreign Interventions and Greek Cypriot Perceptions,” in J. Warner, D. Lovell and M. Kontos, *Contemporary Social and Political Aspects of the Cyprus Problem* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 36-56, 49-52.

personal relations with his Turkish counterpart have been viewed by Cypriots as an obstacle in fully capitalizing on this honeymoon's potential. Cyprus hopes that President Biden will continue from where he stopped in 2014 and actively support Nicosia at a very difficult juncture marked by Turkey's efforts to turn the Cypriot EEZ to a Turkish lake and its determination to promote the "TRNC's" international recognition.

However, we should always bear in mind the complexity of international politics and that we should take on multiple levels of analysis when examining such issues. President Biden might be a better interlocutor than President Trump (who definitely lacked his successor's deep knowledge of Cyprus-related issues). However, he will also have to restore NATO's credibility, which was put to the test during Trump's tenure. To do so, he will have to deal with a recalcitrant Turkey and make sure that Ankara will realign with NATO. Furthermore, he will have to decide on Trump's legacy vis-à-vis Iran, Israel and the Arab world: will he revert to an effort to re-engage with Iran on its nuclear ambitions, or continue Mr. Trump's containment? Will he retain strong relations with Israel, or will we see an Obama-style approach? Will he keep up with strengthening Saudi Arabia and UAEs relations with Israel, thus forming a new anti-Iranian balance of power in the region, or will he lash out on Riyadh over human rights?

Being a small state, Cyprus' ability to influence great powers and achieve favorable policy outcomes is not self-reliant. It is dependent on regional developments and, particularly, a favorable regional balance of power. In the last ten years Nicosia found its way through the consensus that has been formed with Greece, Israel and Egypt, as well as with other friends in the broader region like Saudi Arabia. Therefore, its foreign policy orientation is defined by this consensus, whereby US approach on Cyprus has been revised in a favorable way. It remains to be seen whether this legacy is resilient or not. In any case though, despite polarization in US domestic politics, new administrations usually take moderate steps on bilateral relations and prefer smooth to radical changes. There is no strong evidence suggesting that President Biden will be an exception to this rule.

THE GREEN PIVOT POLYTHEMATIC ALLIANCES



Cleopatra Kittu
Founder, The Mediterranean Growth Initiative
Senior Policy Adviser, ELIAMEP

The first two decades of the 21st century have seen the international scene's rearrangement. Firstly, on the geopolitical front, we are witnessing a return to a multipolar global order characterized by the reappearance of regional powers and the absence of a clear global hegemon. Secondly, the slowdown of globalization, caused by the financial crisis, climate change, trade tensions, and the pandemic has brought about a retraction of global trade and Global Value Chains; mercantilist ideas are once again tempting DC, Paris, Berlin, Beijing, and Moscow. In these last years, we have seen how trade, technology, currency, and capital market supremacy has shaped foreign policy and security priorities.

Given these political, technological and socioeconomic re-arrangements, the future will be regional and polythematic. With the EU Green Deal, Europe is courageously pivoting its trade and economic model to address the aggressive threat of climate change. It is ambitiously aiming to be the first carbon-neutral continent by 2050.¹ Therefore, Cyprus's foreign policy must be redrawn to capture the potential in these new realities. What worked in the past, will not work in the future.

Cypriot foreign policy should adjust to reflect the trend of geopolitical and trade regionalism and at the same time operate in the context of the EU's Green Deal. Concurrently, it should be undergirded to Eastern Mediterranean's geopolitical realities. If this is achieved a pragmatic and renewed economic, trade, and investment profile, with a policy toolkit that delivers Cypriot geopolitical priorities will be created.

Firstly, only Greece, and to a lesser extent Italy, the UK, and Israel, feature as primary Cypriot trade partners.² Instead, excluding Greece, the primary Cypriot trade partners are Libya and the Cayman Islands. Conspicuously absent are the US, France, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates. Secondly,

¹ https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

² <https://www.mgi.online/trade>

Cyprus's trade profile is heavily reliant on brown energy sources: mineral fuels and oils are Cyprus's second-largest import and export, whereas its primary is shipping—a carbon-heavy industry.³

Cyprus needs to address these two issues. On the one hand, it will have to significantly shift its economic and trade profile's composition to better align it with EU Green Deal's goals. On the other hand, it will have to broaden its profile's scale and scope in regional value chains and investment. This will help Cyprus create sustainable future growth, attract investments, tap into EU funds, build security alliances.

Cyprus should strive to increase its trade volumes from new coalitions and reciprocal partnerships. Such a move will further intertwine its partners' interests to Cyprus's and thus strengthen the existing security frameworks. The goal should be to integrate Cyprus into regional and Global Value Chains. Cyprus boasts a geographic location at the crossroads of continents, but this does not yet reflect in its economic and trade profile.

- Investments in infrastructure such as the Euro-Asia Interconnector should be encouraged. Emphasis should be given to sectors such as transport, tourism (by sea and air), and grids in green utilities (solar, wind, water).
- The EastMed Gas forum is a blueprint framework that can encourage cross-border regional investment in other sectors. The Eastern Mediterranean gas market is a reality only because of private capital commitment weighing risk and opportunity.
- With the privatization of the Cyprus Stock Exchange, Cyprus can drive a regional stock exchange, data and indices hub, along the lines of the Vienna Stock Exchange (Vienna and Prague), and other regional capital market exchanges.
- Cyprus has a strong services sector. As the EU's southeastern frontier, it can become a strong, credible, well-governed services hub for Middle Eastern and Asian markets into European and international ones.
- And once a solution to the Cyprus problem is finally agreed upon, Cyprus – in all of its capacity in the Greek and Turkish communities – can support Turkish entrepreneurs in venturing into new investments and markets.
- It is a fact that the entire Mediterranean region's trade is brown energy- and old economy-based. For the EU to succeed in its green goals, it needs to have the Mediterranean, Europe's proximate region, transition to a green model and build the necessary grids and infrastructure. This is an opportunity that Cyprus must capture.

³ <https://www.mqi.online/trade>



Top export category by value

Source: UN Comtrade
 Data are for: 2018: Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Montenegro, Slovenia
 2017: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, France, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey
 2016: Malta, Palestinian Territories
 2010: Libya, Syria



As an island with limited territory, we can only magnify our regional footprint and potential if we connect to regional value chains. By connecting to such value chains in accordance with our geopolitical realities, we will propel our prosperity, security, and growth.

The onset of the EU's Green Deal, in combination with the tumultuous geopolitical situation we are currently experiencing, is a propitious moment for Cyprus to take the initiative and promote stronger economic and trade collaborations and investments with partners. In paving the future of Cypriot foreign policy, geopolitics and trade should go hand in hand.

MARITIME BOUNDARIES: YOU MAY NOT WANT TO PLAY BUT YOU HAVE TO SHARE*



Marianna Charalambous

Marianna has a BSc in Accounting, an MBA in Information Technology, a Juris Doctorate in International Law and an LLM in Oil and Gas. She has worked in several States in the US and countries in Europe as both Regulatory Affairs and Legal Director for multinationals at local, regional and Europe level.

Recent discoveries of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean brought the region into focus both because of the magnitude of the potential discoveries and the presence of geopolitical conflict. Turkey's assertions in the Eastern Mediterranean prevent other States from mutually agreeing and conclusively settling the delimitation of their boundaries. Turkey's stance 'is a general power move that places Turkey at odds with the international system of maritime claims ... Turkey is registering non-acceptance of maritime claims in EASTMED in general'.¹ It refuses to adjudicate the matter and threatens military action in the event of any agreement. Does Turkey's stance mean that the Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries will remain unsettled?

A Way Forward

This note proposes two possible solutions to overcome the stalemate. First it suggests that an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the maritime boundaries delimitation in the Mediterranean is sought. Second and concurrently with the first suggestion, Greece and Cyprus should bring a case to the ICJ for a ruling on the maritime boundaries of the two countries.

The Statute of the ICJ prescribes the Court's function as dual: an advisory instrument to the General Assembly, the Security Council and the different UN organs, and the world court to disputes between states.² In contentious cases, Article 36(1) states that the 'jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.' However, jurisdiction cannot attach without the consent of the State.

* This contribution is based on her publication in the European Energy Journal: The Settling of the Boundaries in the Mediterranean: You may not want to play but you have to share, 2013/2 EEJ 64 and on her LLM dissertation.

¹ Dyer J., 'Seas without a Sheriff' 31 October 2011, <http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2011/10/31/seas-without-a-sheriff/> likening Turkey to China, accessed 4 August 2012

² Charter of the United Nations, Chapter XIV Article 96 and Article 92

The Court's advisory opinions whilst not binding do nonetheless carry great legal weight and moral authority. Turkey's gunboat diplomacy in the region creates tensions which could risk war, an eventuality not beneficial to anyone. In the name of peace, the affected states should lobby the Security Council to request an ICJ advisory opinion on how the delimitation of the boundaries should be drawn. Consent by the affected party in this case is not considered necessary.

Despite Israel's jurisdictional objectives, in its 2003 *Wall Opinion*³ the Court issued an opinion following a request by the General Assembly regarding 'the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel, ... in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ... considering the rules and principles of international law ... and relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions?'⁴ In rejecting Israel's arguments and asserting an expansive jurisdictional attitude the Court held:

The Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take.⁵

Note that for the first time in more than fifty years the Court was able through its advisory function to address a number of legal issues regarding the applicability of the law and whilst the Opinion is only of an advisory character it went a long way acting as preventive diplomacy.

The second suggestion is consistent with the 1985 case of *Libya v Malta*.⁶ It is suggested that Greece and Cyprus come to a special agreement and request the Court to articulate the law applicable in the determination of their boundaries. As jurisdiction will be clearly manifested by all the States parties to the dispute the case will be entered in the Court's General List of cases.⁷ Next the Court's Registrar will under Article 42 'transmit copies ... to: (a) the Secretary-General of the United Nations; (b) the Members of the United Nations; (c) other States entitled to appear before the Court.'⁸ At this point

³ *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 2004, p136 (the Wall Opinion)

⁴ Regarding the history of the UN deliberations leading to the question being submitted to the Court see generally, Aljaghoub, M. The Absence of State Consent to Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice and Political Restraints, Reflections on the *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, Arab Law Quarterly 24 (2010) 197-207 (Aljaghoub No Consent)

⁵ The *Wall Opinion* [47]

⁶ *Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta)*, Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1985, p.13

⁷ Court Rules Article 38[5]

⁸ Court Rules Article 42

Turkey will be informed of the case at hand and will have the right to intervene.⁹ 'Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene'.¹⁰

It is unlikely that Turkey will intervene on the merits and will object to the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case. However, the Court does have jurisdiction over Cyprus and Greece and nothing stops it from ruling on the boundaries of these countries as long as it does not rule on the outer limits of the boundaries the location of which affects the *legitimate [emphasis added]* interests of third parties.^{11,12} In the case of *Libya v Malta*, the Court held that it will not 'define the legal principles and rules applicable to any delimitation between one or other of the Parties and any third State'.¹³ Nonetheless it is hereby argued that by determining the boundaries in the areas where the Court's jurisdiction is clear it will still go a long way in settling uncertainty in the area.

It is argued that a business entity will refrain from exploring in any of the areas that the Court declared as belonging to a particular State without the express permission of that State. It is possible that Turkey will instruct its national oil company to explore in areas delimited within the boundaries of other States. However, under the doctrine of *acta jure gestionis* the immunity enjoyed by the State is not extended to acts of commercial nature performed by public companies on their behalf.¹⁴ An aggrieved state would be able to sue both Turkey and its national oil company in its own courts and may secure an international judgement and attach company assets outside Turkey.¹⁵

⁹ Court Rules Article 81

¹⁰ ICJ Statute Article 62

¹¹ *Qatar v Bahrain* [221] where the Court noted that it will refrain from fixing a delimitation line in the outer points where the interests of Saudi Arabia are involved.

¹² *Libya v Malta* [20]

¹³ *ibid*

¹⁴ *Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening)* Judgement ICJ General List No 143 2012 [59]

¹⁵ The law regarding state immunity in this context is beyond the scope of this paper

OF 'HEIGHT' AND 'STATURE': THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE 'GOOD COUNTRY'



Maria Hadjiathanasiou
Horizon 2020 (MSCA Widening) Research Fellow
Department of Politics and Governance, School of Law
University of Nicosia

"There is no single future until it happens, and any effort to envision geopolitics in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic must include a range of possible futures".¹ This sentence, borrowed from Joseph S. Nye's recent opinion piece on post-pandemic geopolitics, provides an easy answer to the missing question mark (not) found at the end of this special issue's title: "Cyprus Foreign Policy - The Way Forward". What is, then, the 'way forward', and how do we get there in regards to the Republic of Cyprus's foreign policy? How does the state of Cyprus approach the future, at this specific moment in time, amidst the unprecedented global challenge of COVID-19 and amidst several other challenges, pre-existing but also new and 'rebranded' ones? When we refer to this future and 'forward' 'way' to 'Cyprus foreign policy', what do we mean, and to what extent does the Republic of Cyprus (official state organs and citizens, together) can shape it? This short article does not claim to answer the above questions; it merely provides some of the author's current (and scattered) thoughts on current issues that concern the Republic of Cyprus and its foreign policy.

Nye seems disarmingly honest in his dictum: "There is no single future until it happens". What states, what *all* states, are required by necessity to do today, is to envision 'a range of possible futures' for themselves and in relation to others, decide on the most appealing one, design the ways they are approaching it, until they make it (or not make it) 'happen'. It would be an easy and lazy 'way out', for 'small states' such as Cyprus, to hide behind the realities of our size, adopting a 'wait-and-see' approach, restrained and defined by our (actual and perceived) limitations rather than our possibilities (similarly, actual and perceived), trapped in an infinite loop of reactions

¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Post-Pandemic Geopolitics", *Project Syndicate* webpage, 6 October 2020, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/five-scenarios-for-international-order-in-2030-by-joseph-s-nye-2020-10?barrier=accesspaylog> last accessed 22 November 2020.

against others' initiatives (be that Greece, Turkey, the EU, the US, the UK, Russia...).

Our size should not define our stature.² "A man's height starts at their feet, and reaches to their head. From there onward, begins their stature.", Greek poet Argyris Chionis wrote.³ Paraphrasing the quote, we suggest: the Republic of Cyprus should start imagining its 'stature'. It should start doing so by attempting to see beyond the reflection of its 'height'. The latter has a natural limit, the former one does not; and, it doesn't, because stature resides in the 'imagination' of the people, both of the Cypriot people and the international public. It was Albert Camus who, in a visit to Athens in April 1955, attending as a keynote speaker a round table discussion on the future of the European civilisation, along with some of the greatest Greek minds of the time (e.g. C. Tsatsos, G. Theotokas), spoke about the years to come. "I have", he said, "a rather rich imagination for the years to come. These are years that belong to me. In that sense, they are present for me. Everything in front of me [...], everything that can make me suffer or give me joy, is my present".⁴ The COVID-19 pandemic and Turkey's multileveled provocations (beyond parallel, excluding the invasion of 1974), make up a large part of Cyprus's "present". The pandemic and Erdogan government's threatening actions and also threatening political rhetoric, are arguably the present problems monopolising and, to a large extent, defining Cyprus's 2020 foreign policy considerations. Ad hoc engagement with these problems and their (attempted) treatment does not suffice. We need to come up with imaginative, creative yet realistic, 21st century solutions that drive us towards an improved present and a more hopeful and secure future.

Both problems, the pandemic and the Turkish government's aggressiveness pose an existential threat to the Republic; the former as a new threat, the latter as a diachronic and persistent threat since 1974. The way the Republic of Cyprus currently handles and communicates these, shapes internal perceptions and experiences, and creates external perceptions, that eventually form local and international public opinion, and affect the state's political legitimacy. Yet, neither of these two problems is the "real problem". "The real problem is knowing if we want to survive as a culture".⁵ It is an eternal truth, that speaks volumes today, as it did in the past, that

² The word 'stature' is translated from the original in Greek «ανάστημα».

³ Greek poet (1943-2011), «Το ύψος του ανθρώπου ξεκινά από τα πόδια, και φτάνει μέχρι το κεφάλι. Από εκεί και πάνω ξεκινάει το ανάστημά του.» Αργύρης Χιόνης

⁴ Albert Camus, *Το Μέλλον του Ευρωπαϊκού Πολιτισμού (L'avenir de la civilisation européenne)*, (Athens: Patakis, 2018), pp.166-67. «[Ε]χω [...] μια αρκετά πλούσια φαντασία για τα χρόνια που μέλλουν να έρθουν. Είναι χρόνια που μου ανήκουν. Με αυτή την έννοια, είναι παρόντα για μένα. Ότι βρίσκεται μπροστά μου, με τρόπο αισθητό, ό,τι μπορεί να με κάνει να υποφέρω ή να μου δώσει χαρά, είναι το παρόν μου.»

⁵ Camus, pp.155-56. «Το αληθινό πρόβλημα είναι να ξέρουμε αν θέλουμε να επιβιώσουμε ως πολιτισμός.»

“Civilizations die from suicide, not by murder”.⁶ In other words, as many great thinkers argued, “the main enemy of a culture is generally itself. If European culture [or the culture of Cyprus, in our case, with all its regional and Western infusions] is in danger, it is undoubtedly because [old and modern] Empires or cultures are exerting external pressure on it, but *mainly* [my italics] because it is neither healthy enough nor strong enough to respond to this challenge of history”.⁷ The pandemic is a challenge of history. Turkey is a challenge of the Republic of Cyprus’s history. At the same time, the pandemic is an opportunity for countries to re-imagine, re-activate and re-present themselves to their citizens and to the international public. On the other hand, Turkey’s renewed and intensified provocations may be seen as a warning bell, reminding us that in international relations nothing remains static, and change takes place whether we like it or not (see for example, Ersin Tatar’s election as President of ‘trnC’ and how this is interpreted by local and international actors).

“How does one hate a country, or love one?” the American author Ursula K. Le Guin wrote, only to continue “I know people, I know towns, farms, hills and rivers and rocks, I know how the sun at sunset in autumn falls on the side of a certain plowland in the hills; but what is the sense of giving a boundary to all that, of giving it a name and ceasing to love where the name ceases to apply? What is love of one’s country; is it hate of one’s uncountrry?”⁸ How do people love or hate countries? And even though this simplified-to-the-extreme question may seem crude, nonetheless it bears validity. One example of its application may be found in the “Good Country Index” which, since 2014, “measures what each country on earth contributes to the common good of humanity, and what it takes away, relative to its size”.⁹ The index reports on each country’s positive and negative external impacts, outside its own borders, on the world we all share. In the index’s latest version, Cyprus ranks 12th out of 149 countries.¹⁰ Cyprus’s global contribution to Science & Technology, Culture, International Peace & Security, World Order, Planet & Climate, Prosperity & Equality and, Health & Wellbeing (as the index categorises contributions), is arguably disproportionate to its size, it nevertheless creates a certain image regarding its global stature.

If we were to replace Le Guin’s ‘love’, we could do it by ‘a good impression’. In other words, how do people create good and bad impressions on foreign countries? Cyprus creates ‘a good impression’, persuading the global public

⁶ Arnold J. Toynbee

⁷ Camus, p.141. «[O] κύριος εχθρός ενός πολιτισμού είναι γενικά ο ίδιος του ο εαυτός. Αν ο ευρωπαϊκός πολιτισμός κινδυνεύει, αυτό συμβαίνει αναμφισβήτητα επειδή Αυτοκρατορίες ή πολιτισμοί ασκούν σ’ αυτόν εξωτερικές πιέσεις, κυρίως, όμως, κινδυνεύει επειδή δεν είναι ούτε αρκετά υγιής αλλά ούτε και αρκετά ισχυρός ώστε να αντιδράσει σε τούτη την πρόκληση της ιστορίας.»

⁸ Ursula K. Le Guin, *The Left Hand of Darkness* (1969)

⁹ About The Good Country Index, <https://www.goodcountry.org/index/about-the-index/>

¹⁰ The Good Country Index, <https://index.goodcountry.org/>

for its contribution to the world, exerting credibility because of its stance towards global priorities as the ones seen above. The Cypriot state should build further on this 'good name' and take every opportunity to publicize its achievements and communicate with honesty its drawbacks through transparency and a sense of responsibility. By creating and maintaining a good impression abroad, the state's stature rises, regardless - or in spite - of its size. Using the same reasoning, it is only logical to argue that the latest story of 'The Cyprus Papers' (Al Jazeera Investigations documentary) is a significant blow to the country's name and stature. And it is here that Christos Yannaras's 2003 words on the quality of the Cypriot House of Representatives sound eerily current: "With half the island enslaved to Turkish barbarism, with Attila's breath outside the doors of their homes, the Greek Cypriots express themselves politically with humiliated skirmishes of mediocre stature, people of comically tragic inadequacy, who insist on having imprudent ambitions".¹¹

Proposing and putting into practice new, realistic means of resistance to external threats, while utilising to the maximum the toolkit that the Republic of Cyprus has already developed, should be the state's concern and aim. The animate material of the Republic of Cyprus should do some critical thinking "about who they are and what they want to be"¹² in order to envision *possible* future(s). Yes, "there is no single future until it happens"; however smart states design and create it, they don't wait for it to happen.

¹¹ Christos Yannaras, 'Το ανεξάρτητο κράτος της Κύπρου' ('The independent state of Cyprus'), *Πολιτισμική Διπλωματία: Προθεωρία Ελληνικού Σχεδιασμού (Cultural Diplomacy: Preview of Greek Design)*, (Athens: Ikaros, 2003), pp.238-49, p.243. «Με το μισό νησί υπόδουλο στην τουρκική βαρβαρότητα, με την ανάσα του Αττίλα έξω από τις πόρτες των σπιτιών τους, οι Ελληνοκύπριοι εκφράζονται πολιτικά με ευτελισμένες αλληλομαχίες μετριότατων αναστημάτων, ανθρώπων κωμικοτραγικής ανεπάρκειας, που επιμένουν να φιλοδοξούν αλόγιστα.»

¹² Yannaras, p.244. «Στην περίπτωση της Κύπρου οι Έλληνες έδειξαν να βρίσκονται σε αμηχανία και σύγχυση για το ποιοι είναι και τί θέλουν να είναι.»

Editorial Team: Andreas Theophanous (Editor)
 Michalis Kontos
 Yiannos Katsourides
 Anna Koukkides-Procopiou
 Christoforos Christoforou
 Styliana Petrou



IN DEPTH
Bimonthly Electronic Newsletter

Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs (CCEIA)
University of Nicosia

Makedonitissis 46, CY-2417, Engomi, Cyprus

P.O. Box 2405, CY-1700 Nicosia, Cyprus

T: +357 22841600 F: +357 22357964

E: cceia@unic.ac.cy

W: <http://cceia.unic.ac.cy> www.emgr.unic.ac.cy

ISSN (online) 2421-8111



9 772421 811107