



VOLUME 19 ISSUE 4 July 2022
BIMONTHLY ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER
ISSN (online): 2421-8111

Andreas THEOPHANOUS	THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
Ioannis E. KASTANAS	RUSSIA AND THE THEORY OF THE THIRD ROME; AN INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE RELIGION
Christina HAJISOTERIOU	HOW MAY THE CIVIL SOCIETY WORK FOR INTERCULTURAL CHANGE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SOCIETIES LIKE CYPRUS?
Alexis COUVARAS	RECKONING WITH ARCANE POLITICS
Sophie Ioanne KYRIACOU	ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, CAUSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CYPRUS
Aristos ARISTOTELOUS	HOW FINNISH AND SWEDISH ACCESSION TO NATO WILL ALTER THE GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE BALTIC Also, its effect on Turkey and the Cyprus issue
Matthieu GRANDPIERRON	FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: REGENERATING FRENCH POLITICS?
Yiannis CHOUVARDAS	THE ROLE OF ENERGY IN TURKEY'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
Costis PIERIDES	SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND THE LEFT – RIGHT DIVISION IN GREECE
Karine BARCHASZ	EU CANDIDATE STATUS GRANTED TO UKRAINE
Stamatoula PANAGAKOU	THE CONCEPT OF ETHICAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF R. B. HALDANE



CYPRUS CENTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
University of Nicosia

1993-2022 TWENTY NINE YEARS OF POLICY FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN*



*Andreas Theophanous
Professor of Economics and Public Policy
President, Cyprus Center for European and International
Affairs,
Head, Department of Politics and Governance
University of Nicosia*

Inevitably, the war in Ukraine has generated multiple changes in the international system. The objective of this paper is to address the impact of this war on the Eastern Mediterranean. Within this framework we briefly examine possible implications for the relations between Greece and Turkey, for the Cyprus dispute as well as for energy and regional cooperation.

Before we do this though, it is essential to briefly refer to the context of this discussion. The war in Ukraine clearly represents a failure of the international system. Undoubtedly, the Russian invasion constitutes a violation of international law. At the same time, however, it is essential to acknowledge that the West did not pay due attention to fundamental principles of the balance of power and of realpolitik. In this regard Moscow stresses that its own security concerns were ignored by the West. The question is how the world gets out of this mess.

The sanctions against Russia, which have turned this state into the most sanctioned nation in the world, have created a new state of affairs. High energy prices are influencing economic indicators in several ways. The stagflation of this period is much worse than the one which started in 1973 and lasted for a few years.

This state of affairs is leading into a situation in which the EU emerges with less security and less prosperity. Furthermore, the EU does not have a monolithic approach to this crisis. For example, Poland and the Baltic states seem to be closer to the stance taken by the UK and the US. On the other hand, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and other countries would prefer a process which will open the way to end this war.

Under these circumstances, the West considers it important to follow up on issues in the Eastern Mediterranean in ways that prevent conflict and advance cooperation. Ultimately, there are some serious thorny issues which need to

* A version of this article was delivered by the writer at a meeting of the Israel-Hellenic Forum, convened in Athens by the B'nai B'rith World Center-Jerusalem and the Institute of International Relations of Panteion University that convened June 27-29, 2022.

be addressed. Relations between Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies, have been tense for years. Turkey wishes to revise the Treaty of Lausanne while Greece insists that it cannot accept the violation of the *status quo*. Turkey objects to the militarization of the Aegean islands, while Greece indicates that it will not allow the repetition of the Cyprus tragedy in the Aegean.

Even before the war in Ukraine Cyprus was not able to utilize its energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean. We should recall that Turkey challenges the size of the internationally recognized Cypriot EEZ. Furthermore, Ankara aspires to bring into the equation of energy exploitation its own protectorate in the occupied northern part of Cyprus, the “TRNC”.

It is unlikely that the West will impose sanctions against Turkey despite its violations of international law, the islamization and colonization of the occupied northern part of the island as well as its hybrid warfare against it. In this regard we should recall that Russia is a strategic foe of the West while Turkey is a strategic ally.

Cyprus could at least seek a series of measures that may ease tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and thereafter explore the possibility for a settlement of the Cyprus dispute through an evolutionary process. Turkey could be also encouraged by the West to implement the Ankara Protocol. Furthermore, the delimitation of the EEZ between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey could open the way for energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. There could be more steps that would lead to a better climate and mutual economic benefits. These include Varoshia and the end of the hybrid warfare against Cyprus.

Such steps may be extremely difficult but could be politically feasible after the elections in Turkey in 2023. However, a necessary though not sufficient condition is pragmatism. Likewise, the appropriate political will would be necessary as well as the strong encouragement of the US.

To the present day Ankara continues to pursue a revisionist policy against Greece and Cyprus. Turkey did not implement the sanctions against Russia and continued to have relations and trade with both belligerent nations. Western officials stated that it is essential to show understanding to the circumstances of Turkey. Athens, on the other hand, though went beyond the implementation of the sanctions against Moscow. It seems that Athens expects the support of Washington in this conflict. More specifically, Greece may expect the US to use its influence to prevent a Turkish attack.

A few years ago several circles in Israel, Greece and Cyprus suggested that the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean could satisfy some of the needs of the EU. Within this framework the idea of promoting the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline was put forward. Nevertheless, several experts indicated that there was an issue of economic viability; and economic rationale pointed to the exploitation of the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean by the countries of the broader region.

While we expect the tripartite agreements and the cooperation between Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt are expected not only to continue but also to deepen, it is unlikely that they will develop into military alliances. Under these circumstances, Cyprus will be able to exploit its natural resources if there is some form of understanding or even cooperation with Turkey. Could that be possible? Repeatedly, state officials from Greece and Cyprus have indicated that Turkey could join the networks of cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean if it respects the independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the region. So far this has not been a realistic scenario. The challenge is whether in the new circumstances and given the enhanced objective of the West to advance security and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean that would be possible. In any case though Greece and Cyprus need to strengthen their defense capabilities.

RUSSIA AND THE THEORY OF THE THIRD ROME; AN INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE RELIGION



Ioannis E. Kastanas
Post doc-Adjunct Faculty School of Law, University of Nicosia

The recent Russian invasion in Ukraine and its blessing by the Patriarch of Moscow brings to the scientific discussion a crucial and difficult question: the relations between religion and politics.

After the collapse of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453, Moscow cultivated the consideration of the third Rome. According to this, Moscow was the heir of the tradition of Eastern Roman Empire. This tradition included almost three dimensions: supremacy, universality and an eschatological dimension. The holiness of Russia was something more. It was the self-understanding of Russia as elected by God and as having a special task in the divine story within the world. This consciousness of being elected and therefore being the messianic nation has survived even into the secular era". It is obvious that this narrative had both a political and a religious aspect. This theory, which was adopted and enforced by Tsars. In order to build the post soviet State, Russian authorities returned again to the theory of third Rome. It was, and still is, the basis of religious policy and one of the pillars of the "Russian world".

This ideology influences the religious policy of the Kremlin as well as the relations of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) with the other Orthodox Churches exceeding its constitutional, legal and canonical status.

Traditionally in the history of the Russian State we observe the usage of religious leaders (of ROC) to promote the Russian interests abroad. This tradition commences in the era of Peter the Great through the reforms imposed by him. The Patriarchate of Russia as a purely religious organization was abolished and was integrated in the administrative hierarchy of the State. Thus, clergymen became *de facto* public servants who studied in public universities and were remunerated by the State. The *quid pro quo* was the obligation of the top-ranking principally clergy to serve the imperial regime. The treatment of the Greek Catholics Uniats [the Greek Catholic Uniate Church] is characteristic. During the tripartite division of Poland (1772, 1793,

1796) Galicia became part of the Russian Empire and the Greek Catholics were subjected to pressures.

The presence of Russia and the service of its interests in the Middle East was safeguard via the Russian Mission in the Holy Land without, however, disputing the ancient *status quo* of the Jerusalem Patriarchate. Passing to the modern era, and especially to the Putin era, the support between the political and religious leadership on the one part and the Jerusalem Patriarchate on the other assumed the form of political, moral and material support. Owing to this, Patriarch Theophilos did not recognize the Ukrainian autocephaly and following an initiative of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Moscow Patriarchate, convoked a Synod in Amman, Jordan with the absence of several Orthodox Churches, without, nevertheless, the adoption of any decision.

The second means of the strengthening of the Russian presence in the Middle East is the Antioch Patriarchate, third in rank among the ancient Patriarchates. Circumstanced in an adverse position and in an environment which is not amicably disposed to Christians, it receives the continuous financial support of the Russian government and of the Moscow Patriarchate, especially following the war in Syria against the Assad regime.

Additionally we must note that the focus on the Russian Church does not constitute a stance of partiality against it. At the present historical time, it is the only Orthodox Church which constitutes a pure arm of the State. In Cyprus, the case of the Ethnarchy is included in a completely different logic when applied. After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, it does not exist. In Greece despite the politiocentric system, which was applied only until 1974, the Orthodox Church was the official state religion but not anymore. Yet, with minimum power which did not surpassed the boundaries of the Greek State.

The Ukrainian case is a further episode in this effort of the Russian State and of the Patriarchate of Moscow. The Ecumenical Patriarchate granted the autocephaly to Ukraine on 6 January 2019. The response of the ROC was direct. The ecclesiastical authorities considered the autocephaly as hostile action of Constantinople. President Putin supported and founded directly or indirectly this effort of the ROC. Simultaneously, he included the autocephaly's case in his political agenda. According to him it is an episode of the war between West and Holy Russia. The realization of this rhetoric and the closest link between the Kremlin and the Patriarchate of Moscow are confirmed during the Russian invasion in Ukraine. One of the Putin's justifications is the consequences of the Ukrainian autocephaly. Patriarch Kirill blessed the army and he is supporting the invasion.

To sum up, an oxymoron phenomenon is observed in Ukraine. The ROC considers that the Ukrainian territory belongs to its jurisdiction while it blesses via its Primate the war against its members. This oxymoron, which obviously violates the Holy Canons, only by political criteria, should be explained. Thus, the ROC seems to function as a sui generis public service incorporated in the Russian Public Administration.

HOW MAY THE CIVIL SOCIETY WORK FOR INTERCULTURAL CHANGE IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED SOCIETIES LIKE CYPRUS?



Christina Hajisoteriou
Associate Professor, School of Education, University of Nicosia

In Cyprus, the civil society appeared as 'a legitimate player in the peace process' only in the 1990s (Jarraud et al., 2013: 45). Before that, civil-society initiatives acted mostly as relief-providers, or community-developers. In the 1990s, the increased efforts carried out by international organisations, such as the UN and the World Bank, aimed to reinforce citizens' hands-on involvement in peace processes (Ladini, 2009). Their ultimate goal was to reinforce a civil-society peace-building process independent of or parallel to the political peace-process initiatives. They wished to positively influence public opinion for reconciliation. An important example is the Citizens Joint Movement for a Federal and Democratic Cyprus, which was the first bi-communal movement established in 1990 (but enforced to closed down in 1991 when the Turkish-Cypriots were not granted approval by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to attend the meetings taking place in the Buffer Zone). In 1991, the Peace Centre Cyprus was established as the first initiative explicitly aiming to promote peace, while in 1997 the Youth Encounters for Peace project started in an effort to bring together young people from the two communities through workshops.

Despite of well intentions and hard work, criticisms to the civil society movement in Cyprus argue that their initiatives were only appealing to a 'small elite of activists' (Ladini, 2009) and 'intellectual idealists' (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008: 53). Such criticisms cautioned that the high academic character and the absence of institutionalisation and structures, led to their failure to work at the grassroots level, and affect the wider society (Ladini, 2009; Jarraud et al., 2013). At the same time, the broader society was rather hostile to such initiatives, as they were seen as external interventions serving foreign interests - particularly after the 2004 Referendum that ignited mistrust and nationalism in both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community.

In this context there is an imperative need to examine how can civil society enact it's political and non-political roles with regards to peacebuilding in a society of long-standing and enduring conflict like Cyprus. We may search for

the answer or possible answers in the work of international and supranational organisations. For example, the World Bank (2007), suggests that the civil society may participate in peacebuilding by promoting initiatives to protect citizens in danger; mediate between citizen, states or communities; shift public opinion and conflict attitudes; promote interaction, socialisation and community-building to enhance a culture of peace. An additional example is UNESCO, and particularly its report 'The role of Civil Society Organisations in 2050 and beyond' (UNESCO, 2021: 4-5), according to which civil society organisations, including, civil society should be working against threats and challenges that give rise to conflict across and within states, including: inequality and conflicts that have escalated over the last few decades; crises in democratic systems due to radical views favouring nationalism and protectionism over multilateralism, international aid and global solidarity; and economic, technological, digital, and environmental threats and disparities (ibid: 4-5).

To move the debate forward, we should also focus on the potential of the civil society to develop education products and programmes that have a transformative potential (i.e. Novelli, Cardozo & Smith, 2015). It is important that specific civil society actors and organisations work on developing educational initiatives to fight against the detrimental consequences deriving from the use of education as a tool of ideology reproduction and nationalistic propaganda (Cohan & Howlett, 2018). Having said that, civil society informal-education initiatives may succeed in conflict-dampening, nurturing a culturally-tolerant climate, and cultivating inclusive notions of citizenship. In conclusion, the civil society in areas of enduring and 'frozen' conflict should focus on normative change through initiatives that have a dual character of what Zembylas and Loukaides (2021) call as 'everyday diplomacy', on the one hand, and 'everyday peace', on the other hand. Therefore, they should work towards cultivating 'a set of people-to-people activities that attempt to move a society towards "peace formation"' (Richmond, 2016), but also towards 'routinised practices' that help the broader society to 'navigate their way through life in a deeply divided society' ([Mac Ginty, 2014](#): 549).

References

- Cohan, A. & Howlett, C. F. (2018). Education as an instrument for peace and democracy: Dewey's perspective on the rise of nationalism. *Faculty Works: Education*, 60.
https://digitalcommons.molloy.edu/edu_fac/60
- Hadjipavlou, M. & Kanol, B. (2008). *The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.

- Jarraud, N., Christopher, L. & Filippou, G. (2013). The Cypriot Civil Society movement: A legitimate player in the peace process? *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 8(1), 41-59.
- Ladini, G. (2009). Peacebuilding, United Nations and civil society: the case of Cyprus. *The Cyprus Review*, 21(2), 37-61.
- Mac Ginty, R. (2014). Everyday peace: Bottom-up and local agency in conflict-affected societies. *Security & Dialogue*, 45(6), 548–564.
- Novelli, M., Lopes Cardozo, M.T.A., Smith, A. (2015). *A Theoretical Framework for Analysing the Contribution of Education to Sustainable Peacebuilding: 4Rs in Conflict-Affected Contexts*. University of Amsterdam.
<http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/partners/research-consortium/research-outputs>
- Richmond, O. (2016). *Peace Formation and Political Order in Conflict Affected Societies*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- UNESCO (2021). *The Role of Civil Society Organisations in 2050 and Beyond*.
https://en.unesco.org/system/files/the_role_of_csos_in_2050_and_beyond.pdf
- World Bank (2007). *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors*. Washington, DC.: World Bank.
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7709>
- Zembylas, M. & Loukaides, L. (2021). Teachers' strategies of everyday diplomacy in peace education: A case study of the "infrapolitics" of peacebuilding in Greek-Cypriot schools. *Research in Comparative and International Education*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1745499921991649>

RECKONING WITH ARCANE POLITICS



Alexis Couvaras

*BA in International Relations, University of Witwatersrand
in South Africa*

*MA in International Relations and European Studies,
University of Nicosia*

Much has been said about the rise of the 'radical right' in Europe and indeed throughout the world. Yet many concerned parties perpetually engage in brute oversimplification, tired historical parallels and outright duplicity concerning their political composition. This article is not intended to champion their cause or lambast their movement. Rather my intention is to illuminate some of the often-missed peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of their eclectic ideology. The reason for this is that this movement has indeed represented a looming-specter to the post-war western liberal order, yet it is not so much met with disgust but threat because this movement has tantalized Europe with its perceived transformative power. Ultimately whether we find a political movement revolting or attractive is inconsequential to a fundamental bedrock principle of intellectual inquiry and responsible politics: *to understand properly that which we criticize.*

The beliefs of the far-right are quite well-known to concerned parties as well as laymen. Their political project tends to ebb and flow in popularity as their reactionary model attracts voters only in precarious times of upheaval and decline. Typical far-right movements wear the garb of populism and advocate for a return to a mythologized recent-past, one which felt more comfortable and satisfied their perceived expectations of government. This naturally breeds an advocacy for policy positions intended simply to reverse decades of change: such as limiting the inflow of racial minorities; halting the slow normalization of sexual minorities and an adherence to all things 'traditional' which happen to align with their particular brand of cultural-political perceptions.

We are concerned with a lesser known school of thought, a faction, that operates simultaneously within and outside of established far-right movements: Traditionalism. This is a philosophy which certainly informs radical right-wing politics but it is by no means discreetly congruent. The largest area of diversion is that right-wing politics have tended to operate primarily as reactionary, modifying their political platform to the prevailing liberal order, whereas Traditionalism operates as an expansive, doctrinal and esoteric type of right-wing thought.

The philosophy of Traditionalism is predicated on anti-modernity and an unwavering rejection of enlightenment values. The philosophy thus rejects western-liberal values such as the sanctity of the individual; liberal justice; universal truth and progress. Traditionalists prioritize 'time-honored' truths; strict social hierarchy; spirituality over materialism; and importantly authoritarian modes of government, viewing democracy as a base form of government which engages in confused pandering to societal fragments which results in a disharmony in the body politic.

Yet, anything uttered regarding Traditionalism must be done in tentative hushed whispers. This is because the school of thought is remarkably diverse in its preoccupations. Their foundational scholar Rene Guenon was transfixed with comparative religion, whilst his intellectual acolyte Julius Evola wrote on topics from Ritual Magic to the Spiritualism of mountain climbing. Yet there has always existed a political undercurrent to Traditionalist thought, one hell-bent on discrediting and undermining enlightenment values and the project of modernity, specifically the western liberal order which truly crystalized itself in opposition to the horrors of the second world war. Julius Evola is credited with the following quote: "my principles are only those that, before the French revolution, every well-born person considered sane and normal". This is an elucidating insight into the type of politics upheld by the Traditionalists. Fundamentally the right-wing, as it exists as a reactionary movement within the liberal political framework, can be contended with because it lacks a political teleology. Its existence is predicated on its opposition to mainstream liberal politics. The merging of Traditionalism and right-wing politics is a far more conceptually sound movement because it enjoys positive politics, that is to say it exists independent of the prevailing political landscape, it makes policy proposals which align with a larger political objective. And this is precisely the situation we have seen developing in the 21st century, a gradual merging between a philosophically orientated Traditionalism and a right-wing political project that enjoys institutional impetus.

Traditionalism in a very real sense is an obscure spiritual philosophy that has, due to its internal logic and historical contingencies, come to be associated with right-wing politics. It is for good reason that advocates of Traditionalism happen to be associated with the emergent 'new-right' or the nationalist-populist right-wing that has engulfed contemporary political discourse. Ostensibly to better understand this odd pairing, that being the synthesis between right-wing populism and Traditionalism, we must understand that whilst the philosophy in question enjoys various conceptual tributaries which emanate from a singular base, the fundamental effect of this philosophy is its adherence to illiberal politics. Due to the fact that mainstream political mores and indeed the very political architecture of the post-war period has been defined by liberalism, we begin to see this illiberal esoteric philosophy operate as a convenient inspiration to the larger populist-rights political program of discrediting the liberal mainstream. It is beginning to appear more

transparent why this odd pairing has synthesized into a very-real political phenomenon in the 21st century.

Traditionalism and the tide of right-wing populism alike consider liberalism a projection of enlightenment logic and a project facilitated by the machinations of modernity. In their worldview, the current post-war status quo is undesirable and must be undermined and supplanted by waging an all-out assault against its two pillars: the enlightenment and modernity.

The above has only begun to scratch the surface of the convoluted labyrinth of a philosophy that is Traditionalism. Yet as interest in right-wing populism increases, due to the fact it is encroaching into the territory of mainstream politics, it would be prudent to familiarize ourselves with the strange bed-fellow populism has increasingly relied upon for its ideological direction and epistemological impetus.

For those interested in exploring the above topic further, I recommend reading Benjamin R. Teitelbaum's book: *War for Eternity: The Return of Traditionalism and the Rise of the Populist Right*.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY, CAUSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CYPRUS



Sophie Ioanne Kyriacou
University of Nicosia
Graduate student – MA International Relations and
Eastern Mediterranean Studies

The effects of inequality were not well documented in the past, but in recent decades have had increased focus. There are some clear indicators emerging from this, pointing to the detrimental effects of within-country inequalities as well as between countries. There exists inequality also in Cyprus. Data can be observed that indicates the extent and how inequality fluctuated during the global economic crisis and the crisis of 2013.

The worldwide trend is that wealth has become more disproportionately concentrated in the 1% of the population, very highly observed in the USA and Europe. Many contemporary analysts are developing economic frameworks for reducing inequality over the short to long term. Progressive tax, and more information sharing across borders are some suggestions to counter act extreme (and corporate) wealth for example.¹ High wealth inequality is prone to bring about high income inequality as income from capital tends to increase faster than income from labor. It has been well-noted that where there is concentrated wealth in the hands of a few, there evolves a degradation of democratic function, with detrimental effect.

During the pandemic period, 1 new billionaire was created every 30 hours. At almost the same rate, 1 million people were pushed under the poverty line.² Data from Credit Suisse (2020) which focuses on global wealth distribution among adult population states that the top (wealthiest) 1,1% of population holds 45,8% of global wealth. Conversely, 55% of the population own just 1,3% of global wealth. Between these two opposite wealth distributions, lies the rest of the population of the world (44%) holding a total wealth of 52,8%.³

¹ EMMANUEL SAEZ University of California, Berkeley GABRIEL ZUCMAN University of California, Berkeley Progressive Wealth Taxation.

² <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/pandemic-creates-new-billionaire-every-30-hours-now-million-people-could-fall>

³ Credit Suisse, 2021, Global Wealth Report.

Economic analysts postulate that in peaceful capitalist economies there exists a tendency for it to become increasingly unequal over time, since returns to capital are higher than the general rate of economic growth and therefore the returns to labor. This was expressed in the formula $r > g$, where r = the rate of return, and g = growth. The rate of return is in nearly all circumstances higher than the rate of growth.⁴

Progress in technology, trade openness, commercialization and economic development are characteristics that lead to rises in inequality. The forming of the state and the power exercised by exploitative elites also caused a rise in inequality, especially in earlier historical periods, but also in modernity. Capital and high-skilled biased technological change increased inequality because it gave rise to the increase in reward to capital and skills. Economists indicate that globalization has elevated inequality. Low-wage country competition has exercised a downward force to wages. Globalization has also made it harder to tax capital, which further increases inequality.

Rising inequality is a global issue. Inequality between nations, as well as within more advanced and developing nations has risen. It matters because, equality, like justice, is a significant value in the majority of societies. Regardless of ideology, religion and culture, societies are mindful about equality. Inequality points to a deficit of income mobility and opportunity, a sign of chronic disadvantage for certain areas of the world and society. The increase of inequality also has noteworthy indications regarding growth and macro economic stability – it has a tendency to focus power and political decision making in the hands of just a few, and points to a deficient use of human resources, causing economic uncertainty, and raises the risk of crisis.⁵ Increasing the income allocation of the poor and establishing that there is no contraction of the middle class, is positive for growth.

Inequality can mean something very important within societies. There is a strong argument indicating that it is no longer gross national income that determines the citizens overall wellbeing, but the inequality that exists within the country. The issue of gross national income remains a significant factor in poorer developing countries, but not in the developed nations.

In effect, higher within-country inequality has been shown to lead to deterioration in major areas; child welfare, homicide, imprisonment, drug abuse, social capital, infant mortality, life expectancy, obesity, trust, social mobility– which can be up to 8-10 times more frequent in unequal societies.⁶ There is a general social disfunction in societies and countries where higher income/wealth inequality exists.

⁴ Thomas Piketty – Capital in the Twenty-First Century, p. 24.

⁵ <https://www.eapn.eu/what-is-poverty/causes-of-poverty-and-inequality/>

⁶ Income per head and life-expectancy: rich & poor countries Source: Wilkinson & Pickett, The Spirit Level (2009).

Wealth inequality in Cyprus, is firmly on the rise.⁷ In 2005, the top 10% of wealth holders, held 50,2% of all wealth, whereas the lower 50% of wealth holders, owned 8,9% of wealth. By 2021, this figure had risen to 66,5% and lowered to 4,1% respectively. As is the worldwide trend with wealth ownership, the wealthy are becoming more so, whilst the poorer 50% of the population become more poor in comparison. To re-iterate, 50% of the population of Cyprus, hold 4,1% of the wealth, whereas the wealthiest top 10% of the population hold 66,5% of the total wealth. During times of crisis, there is an increase in economic inequality, and this could also be seen during the 2007 and 2013 financial crisis in Cyprus.

In order to counteract the rising trend of the ultra-rich, and extreme inequality, public policy needs continued debate, and new regulatory frameworks need to come into effect. A progressive wealth tax may be a better way to tax billionaires. Oxfam has just recently released a report prior to the Davos meeting, where it is suggested that a wealth tax starting at just 2 percent annually for those with more than \$5 million, 3 percent for those with over \$50 million, and up to 5 percent annually for billionaires could generate upwards of \$2,52 trillion a year - enough to lift 2,3 billion people out of poverty, fund vaccines for everyone in the world, and deliver universal healthcare and social protections for all the citizens of low-and lower-middle-income countries (3,6 billion people).⁸

It is necessary for a global asset registry to exist, indicating the beneficial owners of financial assets. This would enable the reduction of tax evasion and diminish money laundering, also to review international capital flows, and measure inequality more efficiently.

Tax competition and profit shifting requires further analysis and elimination. Tax policy worldwide in the last few decades, has seen the reduction of corporate income tax. From the mid 1980's until 2018, the global average corporate tax rate has decreased by about 50%, to 24%⁹, due in great part to international tax competition. Despite public debates and the prominence of these issues, there is no data currently available to comprehensively view the profit loss or gain that each country experiences due to differences in corporate taxes. The extent of globalization and tax competition, and how they are redistributing profits across countries is unclear. What is clear is that some countries profit more than others, and it is widening the gap of inequality.

⁷ Cyprus Economic Policy Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp 50-60 (2020).

⁸ oxfam.org/press/releases

⁹ The desperate inequality behind global tax dodging, by Gabriel Zucman on November 8, 2017.

It is suggested that tax havens could be more heavily regulated and sanctioned. Companies and countries that aid and abet financial crimes and tax evasion, can be disincentivized by strong sanctions, or by being closed down.

In Davos Switzerland in May 2022, at the WEF, many of the above reforms were discussed. The two-pillar multilateral tax agreement has already been agreed in October 2021.¹⁰ The first pillar reallocates taxing rights from the home countries (headquarter country of company) to the countries where companies actually engage in business activities and generate revenue of over EUR 1mio (therefore reducing profit shifting). The second pillar aims to implement a global minimum corporate tax rate of 15% regardless of the countries in which companies are resident or carry out business activities. The first pillar is to be a multilateral agreement, and the second pillar will be enforced by each nation. This will enable a consistent implementation of worldwide minimum tax. The two-pillar reforms have yet to be ratified.

A focus on progressive wealth-tax on high-wealth individuals and corporations, higher progressive inheritance tax, with stronger transnational tax legislation could change inequality worldwide. It could translate to lifting the lower income societies out of poverty, mean more spending power and higher opportunity for more people, whilst increasing government revenues, enabling higher spending on health-care, education and infrastructure. It could aid in significantly reducing global inequality.

Less inequality would mean more satisfaction within nations and a better standard of living and growth particularly for developing nations. This surely is what the international political economy must be aiming for in the decades to come. As quoted by Jeremy Bentham, 'The greatest happiness of the greatest number is the foundation of morals and legislation.'

Additional Bibliography

The Global History of Inequality, Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 July 2019.

Global Income Distribution: From the Fall of the Berlin Wall to the Great Recession. Lakner and Milanovic, 2013.

Ourworldindata.org

On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), David Ricardo, Robert Lucas, 2003.

¹⁰ Sam Quigley, Global Millionaires Demand Davos Attendees Tax the Rich.

HOW FINNISH AND SWEDISH ACCESSION TO NATO WILL ALTER THE GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN THE BALTIC Also, its effect on Turkey and the Cyprus issue



Aristos Aristotelous
Ex-MP, Director of the Cyprus Centre for Strategic Studies

The accession of Finland and Sweden to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will change the Baltic region's geopolitical and military landscape. It will affect the confrontation between Russia and the West, impacting on international peace and security. While, further south, Turkey objected to their membership, extracting concessions from these countries for its advantage, it will benefit from NATO enlargement - without ignoring the dangers and challenges of the Ukrainian crisis. At the same time, nothing promising for the Cyprus issue appears on the horizon.

Geopolitically, the accession of Finland and Sweden will create a solid network of NATO member countries in the region. A petal of allied states isolating Russia in the Baltic Sea forms where lies one of the largest naval bases of the Russian fleet, in Kaliningrad, as well as the strategically important port of St. Petersburg, the second-largest Russian city. St. Petersburg is the country's marine capital and one of the most important financial, industrial and cultural centers.¹

Geostrategically, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Atlantic Alliance, removes a massive area of neutral geographical space between the NATO countries and the Russian Federation. It is of particular importance for this country's defense. Finland's accession offsets this Russian advantage, as NATO's borders now would shift eastward and be in direct contact with Russia - on a 1.300-kilometer front.

Further West, with the accession of Sweden to the Alliance, that country, along with Denmark and Norway - both members of NATO - can resolutely block the Russian fleet's exit of the Danish Straits from the Baltic to the North Sea or vice versa. Under the circumstances, Moscow's military planning will

¹ CREDO, <https://credo-trans.com/russias-port-of-st-petersburg/>
19/05/2022 (retrieved 23/06/2022)

be seriously affected, impairing the operation of its Navy in the region, whose actions extend to the Mediterranean basin.

This type of horseshoe belt of allied states created in the Baltic is a continuation of a chain of member countries of the Alliance on the eastern borders of the NATO Europe to Russia. It stretches from Poland to Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria to Turkey. These countries are the NATO vanguard against Russia, with a force of 619.000 troops and a defense budget of \$ 21,3 billion.²

As for NATO, Turkey, a historical rival and an occasional partner of Moscow, is also influenced by this development. With the enlargement of the Alliance, Russia will have to tackle a new but essential front, which will divert more and more of its interest and energy and absorb, at least in the short run, from its already limited military resources in other directions.

Combined with the bleeding of Russian forces in Ukraine, this fact negatively affects the country's conventional military capabilities inside and outside Russia or in areas of competition with Turkey. Therefore, it creates room for relief in Ankara from the pressure of the Russian threat and possibly foreign and defense policy opportunities.

From another perspective, Russia's military intervention in Turkey's neighborhoods, such as Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and the ongoing war in Ukraine - not to mention the historical differences between Ankara and Moscow - is a source of Turkish continuous anxiety and concern.³

Under such conditions of Russian confrontation with the West, the aim of Moscow's naval dominance and control in the Black Sea makes this basin an even more vital space for the security and defense of Russia and vice versa for Turkey. Consequently, the growing need for the Russian fleet to exit through the Turkish straits into the warm waters of the Mediterranean is an increased headache for Turkey.

Thus, in conclusion, the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in the Atlantic Alliance will formalize the creation of a new front of Russia - NATO confrontation, schizophrenically involving both deterrence and enhanced threats to international peace. Furthermore, Turkey's emerging geopolitical situation creates a mixture of advantages, challenges, and risks. At the same time, it highlights to Turkey the importance of being part of NATO and the great value of this country's geographical location and military deployment as a member of the Western Alliance and a partner of the United States.

² *The Military Balance 2021*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Routledge, 2021), pp. 317-318.

³ Emil Avdaliani, "Turkey Re-evaluates its Position in the Wider Black Sea," *Caucasus Watch*, 12 April 2022, <https://caucasuswatch.de/news/5193.html> (retrieved 23/06/2022)

Undoubtedly, the realization of this fact is something that Ankara is taking full advantage of to extract benefits from the West, either by blackmailing its fellow allies with deepening relations with Moscow or by providing obstacles like in the case of Finish and Swedish application to join NATO.

Finally, as far as the Cyprus issue is concerned, the emerging geopolitical landscape and Turkey's enhanced role and position as a NATO ally make it harder to exert pressure on Ankara for a more flexible policy and concessions. It does not seem, at least for the time being, that there are such elements that could substantially overturn the Turkish position on a two-state solution or the fait accompli at Varosia, paving the way for a fruitful dialogue. Since UN Security Council resolutions govern these issues, it is evident that the international community will continue to disapprove of such Turkish provocations, which perpetuate the Cyprus problem and threaten regional security and stability.

FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: REGENERATING FRENCH POLITICS?



Matthieu Grandpierron
Assistant Professor in political sciences, Catholic
University of Vendée (ICES)

The French parliamentary elections have produced many surprises, and seem to usher in a new hope for French politics and for France.

For the first time since the constitutional reform of 2000, the President of the Republic does not obtain an absolute majority. This is probably the most important consequence. Before 2000, this phenomenon was not abnormal, since the term of office of the president was 7 years and that of the parliamentarians was 5 years. Therefore, there were legislative elections during the mandate and it was not uncommon for the President to be sanctioned for a policy that was deemed negative; this led to cohabitations. In 2000, the President's term of office was reduced to 5 years and the electoral calendar was modified: election of the President in April and election of deputies in May of the same year.¹ The phenomenon known as the "majority fact" was then observed: the camp that won the presidential election saw its score boosted during the legislative elections by its victory, while the other camps tended to lose interest. This time voters chose to re-elect Emmanuel Macron without giving him a blank check by giving him only a relative majority.

This should have several consequences. First of all, the government will have to negotiate with the opposition forces (the Rassemblement National being the first opposition party - NUPES cannot be considered as such as it is a collection of different parties without a single leader) if it wants to see its bills passed. The other consequences should be more profound: the opposition has a majority for once, albeit a very fractured one, but it is once again quite possible for the opposition parties to get their bills passed, provided they reciprocate. Usually, the possibility was non-existent with a presidential party crushing all competition. The whole parliament will benefit from these results.

¹ This constitutional reform was wanted by Jacques Chirac and his socialist opponent Lionel Jospin for purely electoral reasons: each imagining that this system would bring them victory in the 2002 elections.

Parliament has been transformed by force of circumstance into a recording chamber and the government could safely use several tools of constraint if necessary: blocked vote², use of article 49 paragraph 3³). With regard to the new political composition of Parliament, the use of these tools becomes much riskier. This fact is absolutely fundamental. The Fifth Republic was originally conceived as a parliamentary regime (as established by the Constitution) and system (as put into practice). However, political practice since the constitutional reform of 2000 has put in place a presidentialist political system (concentration of powers on the President, loss of usefulness of the Prime Minister and transformation of the Parliament into a registration chamber) deviating and betraying both the Constitution and its spirit.

Along with Parliament, the other great institutional winner of these elections is the figure of the Prime Minister. Without an absolute majority, the President can do nothing, he will need his Prime Minister to find occasional back-up forces to implement his policy; the Prime Minister ceases to be his institutional doormat and should regain the central place that the Constitution had assigned to him in 1958.⁴ If the Prime Minister has personality...

These elections are also important for the political future of individuals. The Rassemblement National, the only real right-wing party (LR being more a copy of the Macronist movement than an opposition party), made a historic breakthrough (89 seats, whereas before it was rare for it to have 10 deputies) and, above all, its leader, Marine Le Pen, was elected, whereas on the far left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon made the mistake of not running. I think this is a big political mistake on his part. Without an electoral mandate, he will become more and more inaudible, without real legitimacy and this will lead to the explosion of the NUPES coalition in the more or less long term. This will kill Melenchon's dream of becoming President, and hopefully his treacherous indigenist and pro-(illegal)migrants political ideas with him. On the other hand, Marine Le Pen ran and was elected, she leads the main opposition party (89 deputies) and will appear over time as the only credible opponent to Emmanuel Macron and the deviated pro-European movement he embodies.

² Blocked voting allows the government to force MPs to vote on a text only in the format the government wants (with only the amendments supported by the government; this allows the government to get rid of opposition amendments)

³ Article 49 paragraph 3 allows to force the vote of the deputies by leaving them only two options: to vote the text as it is or to file a motion of censure against the government, leading de facto to new legislative elections. If no motion of censure is tabled or if the absolute majority is not reached, the text is automatically adopted. When the President has an absolute majority, this article is a real nuclear weapon: the opposition never has the means to vote a motion of censure and the majority, for fear of new elections and of losing its seats, never dares to oppose it.

⁴ The Constitution actually gives very little power to the President. All powers belong to the Prime Minister. The majority fact, by removing all political legitimacy from the Prime Minister (the legitimacy of the presidential election imposing itself on him), allowed the President to exercise the powers of the Prime Minister in his place.

In short, these legislative elections seem to bode well for France, with its political system returning to what it was meant to be all along.

THE ROLE OF ENERGY IN TURKEY'S QUEST FOR STRATEGIC AUTONOMY



*Yiannis Chouvardas
PhD (Cand.), Department of Politics and Governance,
University of Nicosia, Cyprus
External Associate of the 'Militaire.gr' website*

By mid-2016, the quest for strategic autonomy emerged as Turkey's grand strategy. This development was a product of four events: The diffusion of power from the US and the West to China and other developing countries. Turkey's rising as a multi-regional power by mid-2013, with influence in many regions and a status tending to become higher than of a regional power. A sense of exclusion, internal undermining and siege, which entrenched in Ankara until the failed coup in mid-2016. The Turkish leadership's disappointment with the US at the same time, mainly because of their cooperation with a pro-Kurdish PKK-linked party in Syria. In this context, the search for free and independent political action in the international system has become Turkey's main goal.

The Turkish leadership is building this strategy in three pillars: Boosting domestic stability. Achieving regional leadership. Upgrading international status. To build them, it implements three strong policies: Preventive elimination of threats. The prevention of other powers from gaining supremacy in its region. The US strategic hedging. At the same time, it projects Turkey as the leader of the Turks and Muslims of the former Ottoman lands, as the heir of the Ottoman empire, while incorporating pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism into this narrative it claims their leadership globally. Thus, this Aggressive Neo-Ottomanism becomes the key tool for building every pillar of its strategy.

To boost domestic stability, Ankara incorporates Islamic Conservatism into Nationalism, strengthening central authority. It also seeks technological, economic and military-industrial independence.

To achieve regional leadership, it merges the Kemalist-rooted "Blue Homeland" doctrine with a modernized version of the Ottoman "National Contract", challenging the Lausanne Treaty. The use of military force and the bargaining with great and regional powers are at the core of this policy, aiming to create zones of Turkish influence or de facto sovereignty between its borders and "threat" areas, to drive out other powers from its neighboring

countries and to balance them in the region, to ensure its access to raw materials and control of transport routes, to include its interests in the development of regional issues.

To upgrade its international role, it is trying to restore its alliance with the US, while developing its cooperation with other great powers and strengthening its ties with Muslim states. It is trying to exploit the rivalry between the West, China and Russia and the ambitions of emerging Muslim powers, to pursue an independent role as an ally of the US, while preparing for scenarios of competing with them or reducing their power.

At the same time, Turkey imports large volumes of oil, natural gas and coal, which dominate its total primary energy supply (TPES). These come from a few suppliers, often competitors¹, creating insecurity about supply disruptions. They have a huge impact on its trade deficit², fueling inflation and consuming foreign exchange reserves. On the other hand, Turkey's location favors the transit of hydrocarbons (H/C), benefiting it economically and politically. Thus, reducing the energy deficit, achieving energy security and multiplying transit power have emerged as Ankara's top three energy priorities.

To reduce its energy deficit, Turkey is trying to reduce fossil fuel imports and their costs. It has already stepped-up exploration for shale oil and also for natural gas in areas it claims are on its continental shelf. Increases crude oil refining capacity and domestic coal production. Improves its energy efficiency and H/C storage capacity. Renegotiates H/C imports terms on expiring contracts.

To achieve energy security, Ankara insists on securing H/C imports and diversifying fossil fuel suppliers and energy consumption. It built the Turkish Stream 1 pipeline to secure gas imports from Russia, while the state-owned TPAO's participation in H/C production in Iraq, Azerbaijan and Russia supports imports from there. In addition, it increased the crude suppliers and the balance in their contribution. It promotes LNG imports and gas imports from Azerbaijan to reduce imports from Russia. Favors imports from the US, South Africa and Indonesia to reduce coal imports from Russia and Colombia. Ankara is also interested in nuclear energy production with the realization of the Akkuyu NPP and the increase in renewable energy production.

¹ For more details look at the tables. Sources: IEA, 'Turkey 2021' (2021) *Energy Policy Review & EMRA*, (2020) *Turkish Petroleum Market Report* & BP, (2021) 70th Edition *Statistical Review of World Energy 2021*.

² In August 2021, 15 of the 23 bn\$ in the current account deficit on a rolling basis were related to natural gas imports.

To multiply transit power, Turkey has become a hub for Russian gas exports to Europe by building the Turkish Stream 2 pipeline. It also wants to be a hub for EU gas imports, looking to transit gas from Turkmenistan, Iraq and the Mediterranean, while already transporting gas from Azerbaijan by building the TANAP pipeline. Finally, it is trying to upgrade itself as an oil transport hub by boosting the Turkish Straits capacity, through which 3% of the world's daily oil supply passes, by building the Istanbul Canal. Turkey already exports Azerbaijan and Iraqi Kurdistan oil through BTC, ITP pipelines and Ceyhan port and periodically exports oil from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through BTC.

The implementation of Turkey's energy priorities is crucial to the success of Aggressive Neo-Ottomanism. If Ankara reduces its energy deficit and achieves energy security, it will have taken a big step towards economic security and independence. Moreover, if Turkey multiplies its transit power, it will be strengthened in its negotiations with other powers, exporters and importers of H/C and will put pressure on its neighbors. Therefore, Ankara will continue to try to implement them, even fueling regional tensions.

Table 1 – The share of fossil fuels in Turkish TPES in 2020

Fossil fuel	Share in Turkish TPES in 2020
Oil	28,9%
Natural Gas	26,6%
Coal	26,4%
Total	82%

Table 2 – The share of imports in Turkish fossil fuel consumption in 2019

Fossil fuel	Imports share in consumption in 2019
Oil	93%
Natural Gas	99%
Coal	58%

Table 3 – The share of top three natural gas suppliers in Turkish natural gas imports in 2020

Supplier	Share in total natural gas imports in 2020
Russia	33,59%
Azerbaijan	24%
Iran	11,06%
Total	68,65%
*Imports from Russia jump to 45% in 2021 due to high spot prices	

Table 4 – The share of top four crude oil suppliers in Turkish crude imports in 2020

Supplier	Share in total crude imports in 2020
Iraq	40,12%
Kazakhstan	11,34%
Russia	11,13%
Saudi Arabia	10,76%
Total	73,35%

Table 5 – The share of top three petroleum products suppliers in Turkish petroleum products imports in 2020

Supplier	Share in total petroleum products imports in 2020
Russia	47,70%
India	18,37%
Israel	12,58%
Total	78,65%

Table 6 – The share of top two coal suppliers in Turkish coal imports in 2019

Supplier	Share in total coal imports in 2019
Colombia	48%
Russia	36%
Total	84%

SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND THE LEFT – RIGHT DIVISION IN GREECE



Costis Pierides

Adjunct Lecturer, University of Crete, department of Political Science

Author of the book "Social Cleavages and electoral behavior in modern Greece (2004-2018). Ideology, Religion, Values", Epikentro Publications.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold-war era most scholars in the western world embraced the narrative of the so called "end of history". This urge for a new world -in which liberal democracy and parliamentarism remain unchallenged- was followed by an imperative necessity of overcoming political ideologies, affiliations, as well as long-standing cultural and political identities. This westernized intellectual totalitarianism implied -even if with minimum empirical findings- that the dominance of liberal regimes and the spillover of this political system to the entire world would provoke a post-ideological identity, leading to a fade out of the Left-Right cleavage. Yet, the first reaction came from within this liberal academic trajectory, as a new scheme proved to be more persuasive; the constitution of a pattern that restored divisional understandings, asserting the West – East dipole between incompatible forms of civilization as the dominant post-cold-war cleavage.

This profound need for inventing societal and political evidences that bring the end of ideology and specifically the end of the Left -as this end comes through the dominance of liberalism- neglected the depth of social and political cleavages. "Right" and "Left", as terms, as connotations, as self-defining mechanisms, as electoral behavior patterns, retained their salience and continued to shape the political systems of the Western world. The resurrection of ideological politics, the "cultural backlash" hypothesis as a response to the globalized world, territorial explanations of politics regarding stiff identities, the new waves of extremism and finally a significant wave of far-right electoral increase, all those aspects combined overshadowed the voices that predicted a world without divisions.

This pattern is apparent in modern Greece. Since the mid 1990s academics implied a transition of the Greek society towards post-materialist cleavages, transcending the ideological dimension and formulating a new political environment. Yet, the era that followed the world economic crisis and the neo-liberal treatment of the Greek debt crisis, reminded that class-based politics and the ideological dimension never diminished. On the contrary, my research (2004-2018) finds that the Left – Right division (but not cleavage)

in Greece remained the most important factor in terms of electoral behavior. From the division between the “Venizelists” and the “Royalists” to the division of indigenous peoples and refugees after the Asia Minor Catastrophe; From the “Right - anti-Right” dimension of the ‘cachectic’ democracy (1949-1967) and the continuation of this division in the early period of the restoration of democracy (1974-1981); from the clear Left-Right division of the interim “Metapolitefsis” (1985-1996) to conjunctural representations such as “cleansing-corruption”, “modernization - anti-modernization” or, at the “end” of the *Metapolitefsis*, in the dimension “Memorandum-Anti-Memorandum”. Throughout the Greek 20th century and until today, if there is a division that appears to be significant in Greek society and which incorporates most other divisions, limited or temporal conjunctural conflicts, this is the ideological division of Left Vs Right. The prism of this differentiation in regions, villages, cafes, in the neighborhoods of big cities, in stadium kops, in social movements and claims, in the parliament, seems to maintain a defining dynamic of the political and electoral behavior of the Greek people. Even in the context of questioning the importance of ideological self-determination, such is the depth of these identities (often even subconsciously, when political behavior is determined by family tradition) that new divisive stakes of a materialistic or cultural nature, instead of replacing ideology, are integrated into it and aligned in a similar way.

But what lies behind this dominant ideological division? For the period 2004-2018, religiosity is the strongest of the examined determinants of ideological, left or right, attitude. Since the Left-Right division is crystallized in Greece in ideological and cultural terms, the value charge determined by the religiosity and practices of the hegemonic Christian Orthodoxy is very much related to it, so much that it ultimately defines it. In other words, in the absence of social or class structures for interpreting the Left-Right divide in Greece, the ideological division might be determined by other value dimensions, among which the degree of religiosity of the citizens holds the most salient role. Even if the correlations of religiosity with left or right attitudes seem relatively obvious or expected according to the theoretical claims of linking secularism with the Left and religiosity with the Right, they acquire a completely different meaning and dynamic regarding social cleavages in Greece. This is because a reflection of a potential religious division is inherent behind the ideological division and more than any other possible ruptures influences and determines the self-placement on the ideological axis.

EU CANDIDATE STATUS GRANTED TO UKRAINE



*Karine Barchasz
MA International Relations and European Studies,
University of Nicosia*

The return of war to Europe marks a geopolitical turning point. Since the beginning of 2022, an armed conflict has erupted between Ukraine and Russia, following tensions between the two countries in the last few years. Because of this tragic event for the populations on both sides, Russia has alienated all the great powers of the world, including the Union of 27.

Being part of the EU, Cyprus follows the measures taken in Brussels against Russia. At the same time this island state recalls that Turkey has been tolerated by the West for its crimes in Cyprus, a member state.

From the start of this terrible conflict, an unprecedented strong mobilization was recorded throughout the world, particularly in the EU and Europe as a whole. To best help this country at war, Europe has enrolled multiple resources and supported President Zelensky.

Certainly, Ukraine and its civilians must be helped, protected and supported, but the Ukrainian President must not abuse the situation of his country.

During his speech before the United Nations last September, Nikos Anastasides, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, recalled that he was the President of a country which, unfortunately, is still suffering the consequences of the flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations, following the illegal military invasion of Turkey in 1974 and ongoing occupation. A third of Greek Cypriots were forced from their homes and even today almost 1.000 people are missing.

In the current context of the war in Ukraine, the Cypriot people are perhaps the only Europeans who can really understand its consequences. But the position of Cyprus on this war is very divided following the speech of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Cypriot Parliament. He left a bitter aftertaste in the disgruntled political establishment for his failure to mention the Turkish invasion.

“We are troubled by the fact that there was no reference. The rule of law does not discriminate between states, and the rights of some are violated, but the rights of others are ignored. What we expected today is to hear that the Ukrainian people are suffering now, as we suffered in 1974”.

Europe wanted to show strength and solidarity against Putin’s Russia by approving Ukraine’s application for EU membership. Granting EU-candidate status to Ukraine would not only symbolize the EU’s support for brave Ukrainian civil society, fighting for their freedom and liberal democratic values, but also provide a clear road map for further Ukraine’s accession steps and powerful tool for European reforms.

On June 23, at a European Council, political leaders voted in favor of granting EU candidate status to Ukraine. This request is far too premature, given these YEARS of conflict (and not months of conflict as the headlines would have us believe). In view of the request submitted by its neighbor, Moldova has done the same. It is a small, poor country which wishes to be protected against the immense Russia of Mr. Putin. Since the EU cannot refuse one without the other, the two neighboring countries are added to the waiting list for entry into our Union.

On top of that comes Finland's and Sweden's application for NATO membership. The European Union is ready to defend these countries in the event of a possible attack by Russia. The head of European diplomacy also hailed the rapprochement of the two Scandinavian countries with the Atlantic Alliance.

My understanding of this event from both my French side and my Cypriot side is as follows:

- We start (or continue?) to use diplomacy (too much). Relations between France and Russia are ancestral and essential (beside China, Africa, etc.).
- We need to think more deeply about the manipulations and pressures exerted by the United States (NATO).
- Perhaps you will be challenged by my surname, which has nothing to do with French or Cypriot. Indeed, it is Ukrainian / Polish (USSR at the time). However, my roots/origins do not prevent me from gaining height in the face of this conflict.

Of course, we are all bruised to see this drama behind our TV screen.

But how far does Europe want to grow?
Defend the wounded peoples? Counter a giant?

That Europe does not lift a finger, starting by returning to Cyprus, ITS territory. There, it is worth ink and acts....

THE CONCEPT OF ETHICAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF R. B. HALDANE



Stamatoula Panagakou
Department of Social and Political Sciences
University of Cyprus

The Scottish Idealist philosopher, lawyer and politician Richard Burdon Haldane was born in Edinburgh in 1856 and died in 1928 at Cloan, Perthshire. On his mother's side, Richard was related to Lord Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, and to Lord Stowell, the judge. Haldane studied at Edinburgh under Alexander Campbell Fraser, and continued his philosophical training in Göttingen under the direction of Hermann Lotze who "had a profound influence on him" (Mander, 2002: 472) and whose moral standing and intellectual power Haldane deeply admired (Haldane, 1911: 24-32). In 1885, he was elected to Parliament. After studying law in London, he was called to the English Bar in 1879. He was made a Queen's Counsel in 1890 and he was elevated to a peerage in 1911. Despite his hectic professional life, Lord Haldane was a prolific writer and one of the most important figures in the philosophical movement of British Idealism.¹

Haldane was a man of action, dedicated to both philosophical inquiry and politics. He also maintained a life-long interest in the philosophy of science and he discussed the philosophical importance of scientific developments for the evolution of thought, social theorising, and the metaphysics of the self. According to Haldane, the various disciplines focus on different aspects of the real enabling us to discover the spirit of the totality as well as the ethical nature of human fellowship.² He espoused the moral view of politics, society and the state which characterised the philosophical discourse of Idealist philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet. Haldane elaborated a vision of politics and leadership based on moral principles and on a philosophical conception of the social whole. He showed a profound interest in the spiritual development of the community, as well as in the cultivation of civic virtue and national pride. Consistent with the philosophical discourse of British Idealism, Haldane affirmed the

¹ For information about R. B. Haldane's life and work, see Haldane (1929), Mander (2002, 2011), Matthew (2008), Panagakou (2012a), and Vincent (2007).

² "Knowledge is a whole, and those who pursue it are not only fellow-men but brothers in its pursuit" (Haldane, 1921: 75).

indispensable relation between the common good and the self-realisation of individuals and placed the idea of ethical citizenship at the heart of his political thought and praxis. The idea of ethical citizenship reflects the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia as life according to virtue and reason in the ethical framework of the polis.³ It affirms the role of human agency in the moral development of the social whole and depicts the effort of human beings to promote, in a harmonious synthesis, individual wellbeing and the common good.⁴

In the philosophy of R. B. Haldane, the concept of ethical citizenship is an indispensable element of his social ontology, his metaphysics of the self, and his moral view of state, society and the individual. At the root of the metaphysical constitution of ethical citizenship is a “self” that is both active and receptive and in a constant process of spiritual moulding. In *Human Experience* (1926), Haldane theorises the self as the epicentre of the dialectic of the finite and the infinite (a pattern of thought that we also find in the philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet). Self-transcendence – the spiritual mechanism of self-realisation – enables the human being to enter an all embracing view of life through religion, philosophy and art (Haldane, 1915: 12, 27). Interest in the above provinces of the spirit widens our outlook, enriches our being,⁵ and helps us fulfill the duties of citizenship (Haldane, 1915: 22).

In his discourse of ethical citizenship, Haldane refers to education and the role of the University to contribute to the good life and heighten the moral tone of society. According to Haldane, education and the University constitute the backbone of society and the state (Haldane, 1902, 1911). They provide us with the skills, abilities, knowledge, and understanding which are necessary for the functioning of effective citizenship. A good educational system makes a country stronger for it promotes both national progress and human development. Investment in education and its people is worthwhile and has transgenerational benefits. Teachers must have adequate training, financial security, and must enjoy recognition concerning their contribution to the common good. The University is a hub of ethical citizenship. Great thinkers mould the soul of the people and influence the public ethos. They can offer moral and intellectual leadership and can transform the lives of their disciples. On the other hand, the University offers to each student the

³ For the concept of ethical citizenship in the philosophy of the British Idealists, see Brooks (2014) and Panagakou (2012b, 2016, 2017).

⁴ “Ethical citizenship involves spirituality, sociality, and rational freedom. It focuses on our membership of a community and connects in a functional unity the ideals of self-realisation and social development” (Panagakou, 2017: 98).

⁵ “The quest for knowledge and truth enables the spiritual expansion of the individual and thus its self-realisation through self-transcendence” (Panagakou, 2012: 198). Literature, philosophy, religion, science, music and the fine arts, are all spheres of knowledge and experience which cultivate the mind and keep the individual in a constant course of development from the cradle to the grave (Haldane, 1915: 3-27).

opportunity “for influencing those around him; in other words, for leadership. Moving his fellow-students individually he moves the University, and so in the end moves the State itself” (Haldane, 1911: 11). Both teachers and graduates can provide paradigms of excellence and inspire the nation with their dedicated life and service to the community.

The idea of ethical citizenship is also present in Haldane’s philosophy of law. “The Higher Nationality: A Study in Law and Ethics” is an address that Haldane delivered to the American and Canadian Bar Association in a meeting at Montreal, September 1, 1913 (Haldane, 1929: 259-262). In this important talk, Haldane traces the common roots of British, Canadian and American jurisprudence and stresses the role of Anglo-Saxon lawyers in cultivating conditions conducive to the realisation of ethical life. These lawyers “are involved in the evolution and expression of the law; they do not act merely as code interpreters” (Panagakou, 2012a: 200). They are trustees of a shared heritage and they have traditionally enjoyed the privilege to participate in the shaping of consciousness of their nations. They can also co-operate for the development of a more international *Sittlichkeit*. According to Haldane, people with common cultural roots have a greater possibility to develop and sustain bonds of collaboration and friendship. In pursuing “the higher nationality,” human beings seek a type of nationality which unites them with spiritual ties beyond national borders. This activity is motivated by a sense of ethical citizenship and, at the same time, it generates values that enrich further the moral synthesis of ethical citizenship and political virtue (Haldane, 2004; Panagakou, 2012a: 196-204).

In the philosophy of R. B. Haldane, the concept of ethical citizenship is the meeting-point of his metaphysical theorising and his moral vision of politics, society and the individual. Ethical citizenship refers to both socio-political development and self-realisation and captures the effort of the members of the social whole to elevate the moral tone of the community and attain the good life.⁶

REFERENCES

Brooks, T. (ed.) (2014), *Ethical Citizenship: British Idealism and the Politics of Recognition* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Haldane, R. B. (1902), *Education and Empire* (London: John Murray).

Haldane, R. B. (1911), *Universities and National Life* (London: John Murray).

Haldane, R. B. (1915), *The Conduct of Life* (London: John Murray).

⁶ I would like to thank Mr. Andrew Jackson, Lay Anglican Chaplain at the University of Sussex Chaplaincy, for his comments on style.

- Haldane, R. B. (1921), *The Reign of Relativity* (London: John Murray).
- Haldane, R. B. (1926), *Human Experience* (London: John Murray).
- Haldane, R. B. (1929), *An Autobiography* (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
- Haldane, R. B. (2004), "Higher Nationality," in D. Boucher (ed.), *The Scottish Idealists: Selected Philosophical Writings* (Exeter: Imprint Academic), pp. 179-201.
- Mander, W. J. (2002), "Haldane, Richard Burdon, 1st Viscount Cloan (1856-1928)," in W. J. Mander and A. P. F. Sell (eds.), *The Dictionary of Nineteenth-Century British Philosophers* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press), Vol. 1, pp. 472-475.
- Mander, W. J. (2011), *British Idealism: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Matthew, H. C. G. (2008), "Haldane, Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane (1856-1928)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, Sept. 2004; online edn, Jan. 2008. Available at: <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33643> (accessed on 22 March 2008).
- Panagakou, S. (2012a), "Scottish Idealist Philosophers," *Collingwood and British Idealism Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 177-210.
- Panagakou, S. (2012b), "The Philosophical Theory of the State: Bernard Bosanquet on Ethical Citizenship and the Idea of the State," *In Depth*, Vol. 9, Issue 1. Available at: http://www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/images/newsletter/volume_9_issue_1/article08.pdf
- Panagakou, S. (2016), "Bernard Bosanquet on the Ethical System of the State," in W. J. Mander and S. Panagakou (eds.), *British Idealism and the Concept of the Self* (London: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 153-177.
- Panagakou, S. (2017), "British Idealism and Ethical Citizenship," *Collingwood and British Idealism Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 97-114.
- Vincent, A. (2007), "German Philosophy and British Public Policy: Richard Burdon Haldane in Theory and Practice," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 157-179.

Editorial Team: Andreas Theophanous (Editor)
 Michalis Kontos
 Yiannos Katsourides
 Christoforos Christoforou
 Styliana Petrou



IN DEPTH
Bimonthly Electronic Newsletter

Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs (CCEIA)
University of Nicosia

Makedonitissis 46, CY-2417, Engomi, Cyprus


P.O. Box 2405, CY-1700 Nicosia, Cyprus

T: +357 22841600 F: +357 22357964

E: cceia@unic.ac.cy

W: <http://cceia.unic.ac.cy> www.emgr.unic.ac.cy

ISSN (online) 2421-8111



9 772421 811107