



VOLUME 14 ISSUE 4 SEPTEMBER 2017
BIMONTHLY ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER
ISSN (online): 2421-8111

Andrey KORTUNOV

Robert ELLIS

Petros SAVVIDES

Constantinos A. KYRIACOPOULOS

Anna KOUKKIDES-PROCOPIOU

Maria ALEXANDROU

Constantinos CONSTANTINOU

Virginia BALAFOUTA

What Should the Gulf Crises teach us?

The US Standoff with Turkey – The US has struggled to formulate a policy towards Turkey that satisfies all its needs

The Anatolian Giant with Clay Feet

The Cyprus Problem, Time for Realistic Assessments – A Greek Cypriot perspective

Why Women Matter- An Inclusive Approach to the Cyprus Problem

Is there a Greater Significance to the US Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement than Climate?

Selling War in the Twenty-First Century: From West to the (Middle) East Online Arena

From the International Crimes Committed in Cyprus to the Pursuance of a Just and Viable Resolution of the Cyprus Issue



CYPRUS CENTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
University of Nicosia

1993-2017 TWENTY FOUR YEARS OF POLICY FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS

What Should the Gulf Crises teach us?



Andrey Kortunov

Director General, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)

One of the most disturbing trends in international politics today is a rapid deterioration of the security situation in the Gulf area, - a region which remains a critically important part of the global economy, finance and transportation. The foreign military involvement in the civil war in Yemen and the approaching humanitarian disaster in this country, the recent unprecedented pressure on Qatar by a number of neighboring Arab states are just the most graphic illustrations of this dangerous development. The Gulf Cooperation Council is in the state of paralysis and its future remains unclear. Many Gulf countries are getting increasingly vulnerable to domestic social and political unrest. The United Nations Security Council, including its permanent members, shows little appetite for any meaningful action and takes a deplorable position of an idle bystander.

Can the Gulf area be 'fixed'? If not, are we going to observe an even deeper disintegration of the region, an emergence of 'failed states' on its map, violent social and political transformations, regime changes and spillovers of political extremism and international terrorism to other part of the world? What should the Gulf crises teach us?

The unraveling instability and the rise of insecurity in the Gulf demonstrates that traditional models of providing regional security simply do not work in the XXI century. Let us outline two of them.

The first model was centered on a regional hegemonic power that could takes responsibility for stability in its "natural" sphere of influence. In the Gulf case, the role of the regional hegemon is claimed jointly by Saudi Arabia and UAE, with Saudis providing most of the 'hard' power, while Emirati contributing its political ideology and strategic vision. Even if we put aside moral and legal deficiencies of this model, both Yemen and Qatar cases question the mere feasibility of a 'regional uni-polarity': neither Saudi Arabia nor UAE seem to be capable of successfully 'managing' arguably much less powerful regional players. On the contrary, political divisions in the region are getting deeper and prospects for a regional reconciliation are becoming more and more remote.

Another traditional regional security model is based on the leading role of an out-of-area hegemon, which acts as an external security provider and an honest broker in regional disputes. The United States appears to be the perfect candidate to play this role. In fact, the concept of a “Greater Middle East” popular with the J.W. Bush – Junior Administration in the beginning of the century, envisaged building various military and political alliances in Middle East and North Africa under the US security umbrella. This concept, however, turned out to be stillborn – not only because it was incepted by DC based analysts and bureaucrats with questionable knowledge of the region, but also because it implied the idea of division; the intention was to mobilize the Arab world for a joint struggle against US opponents and foes in the region.

It is too early to make any final judgements about the Donald Trump Administration strategy in the Gulf region, but there are grounds to suspect that the United States might repeat its past mistakes. The concept of an “Arab NATO” backed by US and targeted against Iran seems to gain momentum in Washington. The odds are that this concept will be no more successful than the concept of a “Greater Middle East”: the Arab world, including the Gulf region, is very complex and highly diverse, interests and priorities of various Arab states are in no way identical. An attempt to create a defense alliance similar to NATO in the Gulf region does not look realistic or even desirable.

Nevertheless, let us imagine that such a military bloc could indeed emerge in the Gulf region. What security problems would it be in a position to resolve? In the best case scenario, this arrangement would freeze the current conflicts in the Gulf in the format of a regional Cold War. As we know from the European history of the second half of the XX century, this format has many negative strings attached, including mutual mistrust and suspicions, continuous arms race and political tensions, and, most importantly, an inherent risk of the Cold War turning into a real ‘hot’ war.

Where should we look for alternatives to these deficient models? It seems that the only plausible alternative is a collective security model applied to the Gulf region as well as to Middle East at large. This model might look too radical, naïve or detached from the current regional political realities. Nevertheless, the desperate situation in Yemen and the stalemate around Qatar suggest that any half-way, tactical solutions are not good enough to handle basic security problems of the region.

One of the fundamental principles of any international collective security system – its inclusive nature. It goes without saying that leading Arab nations – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE and others – have to play a decisive role in building such a system. However, can one ignore non-Arab states of the region -such as Iran, Turkey and Israel? These states are no less


interested in a stable, predictable, prosperous and vibrant Middle East than their Arab neighbors are. It would be not only unfair, but also highly shortsighted to remove any of these states from the regional arrangement. To exclude just a single major player would make the whole system extremely fragile and unreliable.

The new regional collective security system should be based on universal international law principles, including respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, protection of basic human and minority rights, etc. The United Nations Security Council or special mechanisms launched by the Security Council should provide credible guarantees for the enforcement of the new arrangement. For instance, one can consider an analogue to the P5+1 setting, which turned out to be quite efficient in dealing with the Iranian nuclear portfolio. A system of an efficient international monitoring of the situation in the region should also be considered. One of the options is to create a regional OSCE-type institution.

All these questions, no matter how disputed and controversial they might look, can be successfully dealt with, if one indispensable precondition is met. This precondition is that major regional and non-regional actors should fully understand the real scale of the challenge they have to confront. This understanding should lead to a sense of historic responsibility in restoring the regional stability. Unfortunately, such a sense is in a clear deficit today.

The US Standoff with Turkey

The US has struggled to formulate a policy towards Turkey that satisfies all its needs*



Robert Ellis

Regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press

When it comes to Turkey, the US is faced with a dilemma. Initial enthusiasm for regime change in Syria gradually waned when it was realized that one of the actors in the proxy war, Turkey, was furthering its own agenda with US support. The spectacular failure of the half-a-billion-dollar program to train Syrian rebels was one marker to signal the end of this policy and make way for another objective: the defeat of Islamic State.

This in turn has led to the realization that the only effective boots on the ground are the predominantly Kurdish SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), which with US advisers and materiel is leading the assault on the ISIS stronghold, Raqqa. The bone of contention is that the YPG (People's Protection Units), which makes up the backbone of the SDF, is considered by Turkey to be the Syrian counterpart of Turkey's PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), which both the US and Turkey have designated as a terrorist organization.

President Barack Obama gave Turkey carte blanche to reignite its war with the PKK in July 2015 in return for access to Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey. The same day Vice President Joe Biden landed in Ankara last August to make nice with Turkey after the attempted coup, Turkey launched a cross-border operation into Syria to block an attempt to create a contiguous Kurdish zone along Turkey's southern border. Now Turkish forces are stuck west of the Euphrates, but Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatens with a new cross-border operation against the Kurdish canton of Afrin in Syria's northwest corner.

President Obama's decision in October 2014 to airdrop supplies to Kurdish forces besieged by ISIS in Kobane was a thorn in Turkey's eye, whereas Erdogan's meeting with his successor in May was a bitter disappointment. Instead of entering into an alliance with Turkey to defeat ISIS, President Donald Trump approved the Pentagon's plan to supply arms to the Syrian

* This article was firstly published in *The Jerusalem Post*, September 2, 2017.

Kurds. The only concrete outcome of the visit was the passing of an unanimous resolution by the House of Representatives condemning the attack by President Erdogan's security detail on demonstrators outside the Turkish ambassador's residence. The security officials have also been indicted by a grand jury for violence.

A further aggravation was remarks late July by US special envoy Brett McGurk at the Middle East Institute in Washington, where he blamed the flow of weapons and foreign fighters into Syria for the creation of an al-Qaida safe haven at Idlib "right on the border of Turkey."

Turkey considered McGurk's statements provocative, as the US itself supported a terrorist organization (YPG). At his meeting with US Defense Secretary James Mattis in Ankara last week President Erdogan expressed Turkey's unease at continued US support for the YPG, although Mattis assured his host the alliance was temporary and "not a choice but a necessity." If this is the case, the US will once again leave the Kurds in the lurch.

On the other hand, in a telephone conversation in May between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin both expressed a commitment to furthering their strategic partnership, including trade and joint energy projects. Furthermore, they confirmed their cooperation in the Astana process and the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The crunch will come when it comes to determining the future of Syria's Kurds and their demand for regional autonomy.

President Erdogan has warned Turkey will not permit "a terror corridor" in northern Syria and will intervene "whatever the cost."

When in Ankara, Secretary Mattis also met with Turkey's defense minister, Nurettin Canikli, where they discussed the importance of Syria and Iraq's territorial integrity and concern over "Iran's malign influence in the region." A week earlier when Iran's chief of staff General Bagheri visited Turkey, President Erdogan declared that a joint operation with Iran against the PKK in Iraq was on the government's agenda.

Relations between Europe and Turkey are already strained, as an overwhelming majority of the European Parliament in July called for a suspension of accession talks. The EU's enlargement commissioner Johannes Hahn has declared it is time for member states to discuss the strategic implications of Turkey's behavior, as "shrugging alone is not a political strategy." Similarly, in view of the turn events are taking, a review of US policy would be timely.

If the deal is finalized, Turkey's purchase of Russia's S-400 missile system will make nonsense of its NATO membership. The director of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), Dmitry Shugayev, has also said that all decisions regarding delivery of the S-400 missile system to Turkey correspond with Russia's geopolitical and strategic interests.

In addition, the charge by a Turkish court that American pastor Andrew Brunson attempted to destroy constitutional order and overthrow the Turkish parliament is a blatant attempt to pressure the US into handing over the Turkish imam Fethullah Gulen, who is accused by Turkey of masterminding the attempted coup, and dropping charges against Reza Zarrab, an Iranian-Turkish businessman, who is indicted for conspiring to evade sanctions against Iran.

The Anatolian Giant with Clay Feet



Petros Savvides

PhD (Birmingham), MPhil (Glasgow), Lecturer in History and Geopolitics, Department of Politics and Governance, University of Nicosia

The failed military coup of 15 July 2016 in Turkey has undoubtedly raised deep questions that extend beyond the autocratic Islamic rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the last 15 years. How a G-20 and NATO member, negotiating its entrance to the EU, is battling with itself in the second decade of the 21st Century? Why, after two centuries of endless efforts of modernization, reformation and westernization, the former Ottoman 'sick man of Europe' is still struggling with itself and is immersed in oppression and violence?

While the ideals of Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th Centuries – and later the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the introduction of the Bill of Rights (1789) in America and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) in Europe – laid the foundations for the critique of authoritarian rule and for the gradual establishment of social and state structures based on civil liberties and political democracy, Turkey has been unable to introduce real democratic and liberal principles in its state and social institutions. Despite the remarkable transformation of the dying Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish Republic, perhaps in the most critical juncture of Turkish history after the defeat of the First World War, the geographically privileged state that has been considered as 'the bridge between East and West' – named by Frank Weber as an 'evasive neutral' and by Henry Kissinger as an 'indispensable ally' – is characterised today, by western mainstream media and Turkish critics, as an evolving Islamic dictatorship.

Although the Ottoman (1299-1923) and Republican (1923-today) eras are historically quite dissimilar, a closer examination and comparison of their internal dynamics as well as their institutional and social structures, reveal that critical weaknesses, conservative attitudes and insecurities in the 19th Century sultanate of the Osman dynasty were inherited by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's secular democracy in the 20th Century. These invisible catalysts, which appear to be innate, acted in both eras in similar ways, encouraging authoritarianism by the ruling elite and oppression of civil society. Surprisingly, for western political traditions and social culture, more than

two centuries of reform and modernization efforts have not been adequate to establish liberal and democratic institutions. The following interrelated variables seek to interpret the Ottoman/Turkish Question.

Perception of imperial/national superiority. Both eras are characterised by the perception of the ruling elites over the undisputable domination and superiority of Ottoman/Turkish greatness and strength; which consequently led to aggressive behaviours, territorial expansions, arrogant external relations, and ambitious foreign policies. This sense of Ottoman/Turkish superiority had consequently dictated the perception of the ruling elites about their imperial/national role, and defined their dominating relation with their subjects/citizens.

One of the causal factors that led to Ottoman collapse was the exaggeration of the Empire's Islamic importance and strength – despite the identification of its decline and the urgent need of adopting actual modernization and reforms – and the underestimation of the cultural and technological evolution of the 'infidel' Christian Europe, that began defeating the obsolete Ottoman army and spreading its domination in the seas and in global trade. Similarly, the claim of Erdogan in 2014 about the discovery of America by Muslim sailors in 1178, 314 years before Columbus, and his arrogant statements in 2016-17 against the 'crusader' and 'Nazi' Europeans and 'scandalous' Americans, are indicative of the fallacious misconceptions nourished by the Islamic elite in Ankara about Turkish/Ottoman importance in global affairs.

Authoritarianism of the ruling elites. The strong belief of the ruling leadership over their role, and supposed duty, of controlling and dictating the future of the Empire/Republic, encouraged, in both eras, the adoption of authoritarian practises over the masses of people that were derogatorily considered as irrelevant to the future of the Ottoman/Turkish state. The despotic perception of the dominating elites – Ottoman, Kemalist, Islamist – created an asymmetrical relation with the masses, that was vertical rather than a horizontal (equal); imposed rather than liberal. The imposition of this vertical relation – the critical ruling elite and the unimportant masses – encouraged not only the adoption of authoritarianism in governance but also the suppression of the people's voice and role, both in state and social affairs.

Guardians and parallel structures. Both, the Ottoman and Republican ruling elites, tolerated the existence of extra-institutional guardians and parallel structures. The former, considered as protectors of the formal institutions – the Janissaries in the Ottoman years and the Turkish armed forces in the Republican years – intervened violently at different occasions against the state to allegedly restore imperial or constitutional order. The Janissaries in their anti-reformist revolt of 1807 dethroned Sultan Selim III,

killed in 1808 the Grand Vizier Bayraktar Mustafa Pasha, and resisted violently in 1826 the efforts of Sultan Mahmoud II for the reorganization of the Ottoman army. Similarly, the Turkish armed forces undertook unilaterally the role of a Kemalist guardian for the Turkish Republic and intervened militarily by coup (27 May 1960, 12 September 1980, and 15 July 2016) or by memorandum (12 March 1971 and 28 February 1997), when they considered that secularism or Kemalism were threatened. Ironically the two guardians had almost the same fate; the Janissaries were slaughtered in 1826 and ceased to exist as a military formation while the Turkish armed forces were heavily demoralized and weakened after the failed coup attempt of 2016.

The latter, parallel structures, close to the ruling elites, acted complimentary, or sometimes contrary to, the interests of the elites and mostly in favour of their own interests. In the Ottoman Empire, the rebel pashas in the distant districts, the *ulema* clergies and the Dervish order acted in such a parallel role, while in the Republican era the underground Kemalist deep state and the Islamic FETO organisation of Fethullah Gullen played a similar role.

Suppression of civil society. The Ottoman/Turkish masses were heavily underestimated in both eras. During the reign of the Ottoman Empire the illiterate masses were merely considered as subjects that were obliged to be loyal and obedient to the Sultan, since, with the exception of two short periods in 1876-78 and 1908-20, there was no constitutional life in the authoritarian Empire. The Kemalist Republic, while it introduced constitutional and democratic institutions and elections, treated the Turkish masses with authoritarianism, suppressing dissenting Turkish, Kurdish and Islamic voices. Un-coincidentally, beyond the state laws that mostly served the sustainment of the autocratic system rather than the protection of people, the imposition of restrictive rules, the issue of repressive decrees, the military intervention of the army, and lately the authoritarian restrictions of the Islamic regime of Erdogan, have been the means of imposing compliance and order by the ruling elite for the benefit of imperial/national interest. While the modern Turkish society includes important sections of educated, progressive, and liberal elements, the extreme pressure of the system on the people did not permit the development and growth of an effective Turkish civil society.

Fear of disintegration. The major fear of the ruling elites in the late Ottoman and the Republican eras was national heterogeneity, which could potentially lead to fragmentation or disintegration of the Empire/Republic. The efforts for Ottomanization, Islamization and ethnic cleansing (Armenian Genocide 1915, Pontic Genocide) during the last century of the Ottoman era, as well as the Kemalist project of Turcification and suppression of ethnic and religious minorities (Armenian, Greeks, Alevis, Kurds) during the

Republican era, are indicative of the fragile internal condition and the size of the internal 'threat' felt by the ruling elites.

After 15 years of Islamic domination in Turkish political life, Erdogan has not only challenged the Kemalist identity and the western orientation of Turkish Republic, but also succeeded in dividing the Turkish society. Whether the former, or present, 'sick man of Europe' will return soon to the European West or immerse into the Asian East is unknown; besides, it took 80 years to overthrow the Kemalist domination in 2002.

The Cyprus Problem, Time for Realistic Assessments A Greek Cypriot perspective



Constantinos A. Kyriacopoulos
Advocate and Legal Consultant

It is really tragic to cogitate that for 40 years we have been engaged in talks, without ever managing to reach an agreement on a solution, which, even if it had been reached, it could never work!¹

Since 1977 when a reference in principle was made of some sort of Federation of a vague nature, until today when all the details of a sui generis Bi-Communal, Bi-Zonal Federation were proposed and discussed, the gap remains unbridged, despite the invention of the extremely dangerous concept of constructive ambiguity and despite the rise into power simultaneously, of leaders in the 2 communities who, on the part of the G/C side were, and on the part of the T/C side at least claimed they were, openly pro-solution, even if that was going to be unjust and painful for the G/Cs.²

Some of the reasons why the pursued solution in its specific form could not be agreed upon or work, are indicatively:

- Turkey's extremely strategically important policy of seeking to exert full control over the whole of Cyprus and its further expansionist plans.
- Turkey's position of power (politically, militarily, economically).
- Turkey's interests which are in full contrast with the interests of G/Cs and even in considerable contrast with basic interests of T/Cs.
- The complete dependence of T/Cs on Ankara and their unwillingness to distance themselves from its interests and support the interests of Cyprus and its Communities.
- The unwillingness of T/Cs to return to the G/Cs even some of what they unlawfully acquired from them in 1974 and their insistence to behave as the victors of a "war" who feel that they should impose their terms upon the defeated.

¹ The talks between 1968 to 1974 were conducted on another basis.

² Christofias – Talat, Akinci – Anastasiades.

- The lack of trust towards each other and the immaturity of the 2 communities (inability, inter alia, of co-operating on the basis of their mutual interests which do not coincide with the interests of Turkey³).
- The immaturity of the international situation in the sense that the West considers Turkey to be much more important to its interests than Greece and Cyprus.
- The unwillingness of the international community to support a solution based on the principles of the E.U. and international Law and satisfy a minimum of fair and just claims of the G/Cs.
- The inability of Greece to play a significant role in support of the G/C side.
- Greece's position of weakness towards Turkey (politically, militarily, economically).
- The intrinsic unworkability of the B.B.F., which will create daily conflicts and frictions between the G/Cs on the one hand and T/Cs and Turkey itself on the other hand, resulting in the paralysis of federal structures and functions by reason of the use of T/C vetoes. Turkey does not have a reputation of respecting agreements.
- The extremely doubtful economic viability of the B.B.F. No one has calculated the cost of its functioning and the cost (over and above the political one) of its unworkability. E.g. the cost of quite probable disagreements with regard to the exploitation of natural resources.

The cost of the talks is the consolidation of our concessions in the perception of the international community, the loss of the legal advantage which was on our side after the 2nd phase of the Turkish invasion and the consolidation of the fait accompli on the ground in the course of time. The argument that only when there were active negotiations Turkey would not proceed to take unilateral actions, is truly astonishingly naïve. As very recently emphasised by the T/C negotiator⁴, the purpose of the Turkish side's unilateral actions is to force the G/Cs to make further concessions in the talks and accept a solution.

³ E.g. the delineation of the boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus in accordance with international law, even if that is in the interests of Cyprus as a whole but against the interests of Turkey, or the demand for "equal treatment" of Turkish citizens in Cyprus.

⁴ From press reports after the failure of the Geneva Conference, we are informed that "In a statement of the 'presidency' it is stated that Mr Nami said that 'the process did not fail on account of differences on the issue of guarantees or the number of troops, the main reason was the refusal of the G/C side to take a new step'. He stated further that the T/C side has no problem at all with the parameters of the UN and that it functioned within the framework of such parameters, whereas in contrast the G/C side rejected them. **He also added that from now on the aim of the T/C side is to force the G/C side to a solution, with initiatives at an international level**".

The inescapable conclusion from the above is that no solution may be reached by talks, but even if it was it would never work. Maybe in a few decades, when circumstances and the 2 communities are ripe, assuming of course, that by then the problem is not solved by default. The perception that the Cyprus problem may only be solved by talks in the foreseeable near future is unrealistic. Any military option is also unrealistic in the near future.

Until then, the probabilities that it will be solved against the interests of the G/C side are more – consolidation of the fait accompli, reversal of the population ratio, gradual international upgrade of the status of the regime of the occupied areas and eventual recognition of the pseudostate. But there are, albeit considerably lower, probabilities that it will be solved favourably for our side, only in the event that Turkey ceases to be a trustworthy ally of the West or goes through important internal changes (partition) or finds itself in an opposite camp to the Western powers and/or Russia (joining the jihadist Islam). All these are beyond our control and, in the absence of any realistic and feasible alternative, the only choice that Cyprus has is to prepare itself, with a specific strategic plan (our own plan for the retrieval of Cyprus) for any eventual favourable reversal of the current (in)balance of power in the future. Some parameters of such a plan are:

- Furtherance, continuation and reinforcement of strategic alliances and co-operation with other Countries.
- Strong opposition towards any effort by Turkey to strengthen its position vis á vis its relations with the E.U. The opposite policy of support to Turkey's accession course has only brought about negative results.
- Strong opposition by all lawful available means to any effort by T/C's to lift the "embargo", with simultaneous promotion of the position that the only embargoes that need to be lifted in Cyprus are the embargoes imposed against the displaced persons in relation to their properties and the embargo imposed upon the G/C's in relation to the Northern part of Cyprus, under a policy of ethnic cleansing following an illegal invasion and occupation.
- Support of the Kurdish cause and the use of every means available for linking E.U. policy for sanctions on third parties (e.g. against Russia for Crimea and Ukraine) with the adoption of commensurate measures against Turkey.
- The exposure of Turkey's untrustworthiness vis á vis its allies.
- Exploitation and utilisation of natural resources through strategic alliances and co-operations.
- Economic recovery through, inter alia, exploitation of natural resources.
- Improvement of defensive capabilities when circumstances (primarily economic) permit.

- A policy of regaining the moral and legal advantage through the use of all available legal means, including the International Criminal Court. The excuse that the talks will be affected is not valid anymore (assuming of course that it ever was).
- The instillation upon the international community of the perception that Cyprus is important to it (natural resources) and that it should not be left to the control of untrustworthy Turkey.
- The instillation upon the international community of the notion that Cyprus – a member country of the U.N. and the E.U. - has to evolve into a "normal" State. As such it cannot have Political, Constitutional and Administrative structures based upon the legitimisation and recognition of ethnic cleansing, the unlawful colonisation and settlement of non-indigenous population, the restriction of human rights and discriminations on the basis of ethnic origin and religion, nor Guarantor Powers and or rights of intervention by Turkey.⁵

The dilemmas of talks or war and solution or partition are factitious and are raised in highly misleading terms by those who want the G/C's to make unacceptable concessions to the Turkish side. Extremely radical events have occurred without talks and without war and without an agreed "solution", in a much grander scale, such as e.g. the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resulting liberation of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania as well as of the former East European countries, the reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of Indonesian occupation troops from East Timor. If the intended solution is worse than partition itself, it cannot be a solution and whatever negative events may ensue in the course of time, it is preferable that they ensue without our consent, so that the possibility of their reversal remains open, if circumstances allow.

⁵ No precedent of such "normal" state exists anywhere.

WHY WOMEN MATTER- AN INCLUSIVE APPROACH TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM



Anna Koukkides-Procopiou

Researcher with SeeD-Center for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development and a member of the Advisory Board of the Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia

'War is a stern teacher'¹ and yet we have still not learned. Half of all peace agreements signed fail within the first five years², with the rate of relapse increasing every decade since the 1960s³. It almost seems that we are becoming better in achieving 'agreements without peace'⁴- short term deals which remain unsustainable in the long run. So, what have we been doing wrong? And what does 'we' stand for? Definitely, not women! In the last 20 years or so, in 31 peace processes around the world, women made up only 2% of chief mediators, 4% of signatories and 9% of negotiators.⁵ In the 57 years since the inception of the Republic of Cyprus, only 3 Greek Cypriot women have so far had any kind of involvement and decision-making impact in the peace process⁶, with situation being worse as far as the Turkish Cypriot community is concerned, where the corresponding number is a feeble 1.

¹ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book III. Translated by Rex Warner, with an introd. and notes by M. I. Finley, 1972. Penguin Books

² King, Charles 1997. Ending Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies

³ World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. World Bank. © World Bank.

<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4389> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.

⁴ Diaz, Pablo Castillo, Simon Tordjman with Samina Anwar, Hanny Cueva Beteta, Colleen Russo, Ana Lukatela & Stephanie Ziebell 2012. Women's Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence. Available at www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2012/10/wpssourcebook-03a-womenpeacenegotiations-en

⁵ As above

⁶ See Koukkides-Procopiou, Anna, Sept, 2015. The Cyprus Problem: When we all think alike, we don't think very much, in In Depth Journal, Center of European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia. Available at www.cceia.unic.ac.cy/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=470

When examining peace negotiations, failure can be attributed to a timely and complex amalgamation of reasons, possibly featuring among others a newly-established 'tyranny'⁷ of international experts i.e. technocrats who see each new case as yet another project to be managed and thus, fail 'to capture the society at hand'⁸ and fail to comprehend the complex historic and socioeconomic relationships which define a particular conflict on the ground (a feeling which does seem to resonate quite deeply with certain local actors, the media and the general public in the case of Cyprus, especially in the light of most recent developments and accusations thrown against the stance of UN representatives⁹).

Peace is a process and not a deal; ticking off technocratic boxes to hurriedly twist the arm of participants onto a negotiating table, while society is not yet prepared to accept what is being secretly discussed, is not necessarily a good idea. For that matter, politicians stand where they sit: winning elections in the short run will almost certainly prevail over painstakingly building peace against the grain in the long run. If society (voters that is) is not yet ready to accept what is on offer, a peace deal is unlikely to go through and even, if it does go through, it will, in any case, be unlikely to work in the absence of **endogenous resilience**- the ability of society, its citizens, its economy and its institutions to withstand and absorb external and internal shocks.

So, what are we to do? Bearing in mind the analytical and geopolitical complexity of the Eastern Mediterranean region and our inability to shift geostrategic realities regarding the balance of power between Cyprus and Turkey, it could perhaps prove less daunting and more productive, especially at this point in time when negotiations have reached a standstill, providing useful time for reflection, to start focusing on endogenous rather than immovable, exogenous factors of future success to create and prepare such necessary resilience. One such factor, which seems to irrevocably act as game changer, making negotiations and implementation of peace agreements thereafter run a little smoother and last a little longer is the **active engagement of women in peace and security arrangements**.

Putting aside the obvious moral argument of diversity in the name of democracy, justice and equality and the proven decision-making outcomes of higher quality when teams are diverse, it tangibly pays to apply a gender lens onto the case of Cyprus. Extensive qualitative and quantitative

⁷ Kennedy, David 2016. *A World of Struggle: How Power, Law, and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy*. Princeton University Press.

⁸ For such a perspective on peace processes, see Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim 2015. *Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers

⁹ A casual glance by any reader over the Cyprus media can easily illustrate the bashing that each UN Special Representative and his team has had to suffer in turn to this effect throughout the years.

research shows that not only do women positively influence reaching a deal¹⁰, but they can also make it last longer once it is reached. An agreement is 35% more likely to last at least 15 years if women participate in its creation.¹¹ In fact, it is noteworthy that even if there seems to be high resistance among Greek Cypriot women towards the benefits of a solution¹² and their own perceptions of possible future threats accruing from such a solution differ from 'mainstream' (i.e. male) notions¹³, nothing has been done to ameliorate this effect. Female resistance towards a solution of the Cyprus problem in fact remains a sturdy bulwark which needs to be overcome, before any future referendum is put out to the test.

This points to the urgency of introducing a gender perspective **of inclusive security**

(i.e. 'a framework that places social and economic concerns on equal footing with military and political issues...based on the premise that, in order to have real security, you have to have include of all of the stakeholders around the table'¹⁴) to the existing security narrative addressing women's security needs, fears and perceptions. Otherwise, the boat can and will be missed.

The recent Crans Montana debacle has once more illustrated that doing the same thing and still expecting different results remains puzzling as policy to say the least. It seems that we can no longer allow a non-participatory, non-transparent, albeit narcissistic and elitist leader-led process crash and burn time after time. Overcoming the existing ferocity of clutching to the recurrent, widespread, yet failing methodology of non-inclusion, as far as women, peace and security is concerned, seems an obvious choice.

¹⁰ See research from the Broadening Participation Project led by Thania Paffenholz. Also, see O'Reilly, Marie, Andrea O' Suilleabhain & Thania Paffenholz 2015. Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peacemaking. IPI Publications.

¹¹ See statistical analysis by Laurel Stone as featured in O'Reilly, Marie, Andrea O' Suilleabhain & Thania Paffenholz 2015. Reimagining Peacemaking: Women's Roles in Peacemaking. IPI Publications.

¹² Measured through the Seed SCORE reconciliation index, research conducted by the Centre of Sustainable Peace and Development, findings for Cyprus, 2013-2015, available at www.seedsofpeace.eu

¹³ See focus group transcripts for Security Dialogue Project (Dec 2016) (ongoing), research conducted by the Centre of Sustainable Peace and Development. Summary of project available at www.seedsofpeace.eu

¹⁴ For a clear and concise introduction to the concept of inclusive security and how this came about, see Women Waging Peace: Swanee Hunt's Vision for Inclusive Security, Global Giving Matters, Oct-Dec 2008, Synergos. Available at www.synergos.org/globalgivingmatters/features/0812hunt.htm

Is There a Greater Significance to the US Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement than Climate?



Maria Alexandrou
CEO Gametech (Cyprus) Ltd

During a speech in the White House rose garden, a few weeks ago, United States President Donald Trump announced, what millions of people were anticipating and governments around the world were trying to deter: the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Accord signed onto by 195 countries.

Scientific studies show that if the world's carbon emissions continue unchecked, atmospheric temperatures will continue to rise. The planet won't just be hotter, but it will also suffer from rising sea levels, more powerful storms, droughts that lead to food shortages and other extreme conditions. Apart from causing poverty, starvation and disease, food and water shortages will lead to conflict raising security issues in all nations.

The agreement is set out to manage global temperature with the target figure aim being well below 2 degrees centigrade in order to manage the major risks associated with climate change.

The objective is for Greenhouse gas emissions to peak by 2020 and then rapidly reduce to reach a balance in the second half of this century between emissions from human activity and the amount that can be captured by carbon sinks thus moving toward net zero carbon emissions.

In the Accord, it was agreed that from 2020 developed countries must provide USD 100 billion a year to poor nations to help them cut emissions and adapt to the impact of climate change. As shown by OECD analysis fund mobilization is already under way and in 2014 alone USD 63 billion was used towards this aim.

According to the agreement developed countries must continue to take the lead in the reduction of greenhouse gases and developing nations are encouraged to enhance their efforts. At the same time developing countries are invited to share the burden of providing financial resources to help other developing countries. China, Chile and Brazil are already contributing.

President Trump, though, has openly declared that he does not “believe in” climate change which he has repeatedly called a “hoax” and has referred to the accord itself as a humiliating defeat for American workers.

Trump’s stance is based on his belief that there is a tradeoff between environment and economy when in fact the opposite is true. “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris” he declared explaining his decision to withdraw from the accord to which the Mayor of Pittsburgh responded that the city has made a remarkable transition from being Steeltown USA to healthcare, research and education and is moving to 100% renewable energy and remains committed to the Accord.

Similarly the “wearestillin” movement <http://wearestillin.com/> has been created where states, businesses, academics and others declare to the world that they are still committed to the Paris agreement.

What the world and the majority of Americans can see and Trump seems to be missing is that by pulling out of the Agreement he is effectively depriving American businesses of the chance to move ahead with the rest of the world.

The Paris Climate agreement to quote Sir David King¹, the UK’s special representative for climate change, is a “great turning point for humanity” not only because of its environmental significance and its vitality in rescuing the planet, but also because of the scientific and industrial potential clean energy provides, making it, “the biggest and most exciting opportunity we’ve had since the industrial revolution”.

The enormous research and development going on in clean energy production are the beginning of a new economic era. An economic revolution. The electrification of cars, buses and other vehicles is coming fast and India has committed to 100% electric cars by 2030 as this will reduce enormously its costs.

American states and businesses are already heavily invested in clean energy. Even ExxonMobil (the ex CEO of which, Rex Tillerson, is currently State Secretary) is facing enormous pressure from its investors to phase out oil and gas and shifting to green energy.

The financial and economic issues that arise from Trump’s decision are endless and will become even more apparent in the next few years when this decision comes into effect because President Trump has now triggered a rather lengthy procedure.

¹ Emeritus Professor in Physical Chemistry at the University of Cambridge and the UK’s permanent special representative for Climate Change from September 2013 to March 2017.

According to the agreement the United States cannot submit its intention to withdraw until November 2019, after which the process would take a year bringing it to November 2020 when in fact Mr Trump will be campaigning for another term in office, therefore most probably making it a major campaign issue. Whether that was intentional and what he expects to get out of it is another question. What should be pointed out, however, is that despite President Trump's, pre-election and more recent, promises to renegotiate a better deal it is questionable whether that is even a remote possibility since the Paris Climate Accord is a multilateral agreement and no one country can renegotiate individually and unilaterally change the conditions.

The agreement will not, thankfully, be jeopardized by the US withdrawal. The rest of the world is going ahead with reducing emissions and adopting green energy as set out by the agreement. The Trump isolationist policy, however, seems to be creating a vacuum in world leadership. The "America first" policy and the disengagement of the United States from the agreement suggests that America may be stepping out of its role as a world leader with all the destabilizing potential this carries.

Emmanuel Macron was quick to seize the opportunity of Trump's announcement and made a speech that, in direct contrast to Trump's attitude, captured the spirit of a global society. Speaking in English from the Elysee Palace he called for Americans to help "make the planet great again" paraphrasing Trump's famous slogan. Although interpreting this as an attempt to gain a more instrumental role for France may be a little bit of a stretch, the newly elected French President certainly hit a nerve.

Immediately after the US president's announcement France, Germany and Italy issued a joint statement expressing "regret" and rejecting Mr. Trump's assertion that he would renegotiate the deal while Miguel Arias Cañete, the European Union's commissioner for climate, said Mr. Trump's decision had "galvanized us" and promised that "this vacuum will be filled by new broad committed leadership."

China and India committed themselves to going ahead as agreed while it is widely supported that China could assume a leadership role in sustaining the Paris agreement. In truth China may not be quite up to the task but they are certainly showing enough zeal to undertake a serious role. At the end of the recent EU-China summit, just days after Trump's announcement, the two sides reiterated their commitment to the agreement and in fostering cooperation in their energy policies.

Far from just an environmental agreement the Paris accord is more than anything an example of the essence of a global society and the interdependence of states. It represents a global realization that the environment and climatic change are issues all countries share and that a

consistent coordination between them is imperative to the amelioration of the present climate challenges. It is a commitment by nations to work together. In fact, while Climate Action has been an important governmental engagement since the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement has established it as a fundamental component of foreign policy.

The implications of President Trump's decision are, therefore, also social, economic and political as well as moral with a resonance well beyond the United States. The decision is disrespectful to a global system of values and institutions which has been developed gradually since the end of World War II and in which, at least so far, the United States held a leadership role.

When in December 2009 during a UN Convention on climate, in Copenhagen, Barack Obama and then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gatecrashed a closed meeting led by the Chinese delegation with India, Brazil and South Africa their aim was to engage in direct dialogue with China, in particular, since the US and China are the two biggest emitters of carbon gases in the world. To the Obama administration it was clear that climate change was both a national security threat and a test of American leadership and the administration acknowledged the United States moral responsibility to compensate for the decades of industrial head start and consequent decades of excessive emissions.

In Copenhagen there was a shift in mentality from the Kyoto agreement, which distinguished between developed and developing states (allowing China and India to become such massive emitters) and all major states, whether developed or developing, agreed to curb carbon emissions through 2020 while reporting transparently on their efforts.

Although apparently a frustrating experience for the participants and not entirely successful on all levels, the negotiations in Copenhagen asserted American commitment and authority and laid the ground for the 2015 Paris Agreement signed by President Obama.

Now the Trump government is making way for other states to move into leadership positions and alliances leaving the United States isolated. Moral responsibility and global society do not appear on his "Make America great again" agenda and it is hard to overlook the moral obligation to the rest of the world that the United States are abandoning by leaving the accord.

Although China is, today, the largest emitter of carbon gasses, mainly due to its vast population, the United States being an early industrialiser have been burning coal, oil and natural gas far longer, and today the country, with just over 4 percent of the world's population, is responsible for almost a third of the excess carbon dioxide that is heating the planet. China is responsible for less than a sixth while the 28 countries of the European

Union, taken as a group, come in just behind the United States in historical emissions.

The United States' contributions to poorer nations, agreed to by President Obama in the Paris Accord were fair in compensating for America's early start (perhaps not even generous enough when actual figures are examined).

Now the United States will not be making any contribution.

Selling War in the Twenty-First Century: From West to the (Middle) East Online Arena



Constantinos Constantinou

Ph.D. Candidate in Business Administration at the European University Cyprus

Albeit the West (USA/its allies) covers an example whereby the marketing - or selling as used here interchangeably- of war becomes so painfully obvious that it commands further attention, today, one must delve into an even more alarming situation. That is, the terrorist use of social media to sell warfare; specially, in an uncertain and fast changing world.¹ Having said that, it is also imperative to turn the heed towards the (Middle) East to identify the means employed by, say, Russia and Israel to see the wider context wherein the Marketing of War occurs.

If one were to start with the Western milieu, s/he could focus on how the political leadership of the USA/UK had to sell the war locally and globally *a priori* stepping their foot in Iraq, in 2003. To this end, speeches a plenty that adopted rhetorical justifications such as the security narrative, placing emphasis on the alleged Iraqi possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction – WMD–², managed to masquerade any latent motives in view of how their claim relied on false intelligence.³ In point of fact, the Bush 2 administration was accused for having utilized propaganda -i.e., lies/political manipulation- of controversial justification so as to win public support on the Iraqi intervention.⁴ Needless to add, RAND proposed the use of strategic marketing techniques/tactics to condition the civilian population, limit anti-war/opponent preferences while, synchronously, augment friendly or favor force decisions in the battlefield.⁵ All in all, the superficiality and ideological

¹ Gilpin, R. (2001), *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey (358).

² Moses, J., Bahador, B., and Wright, T. (2011), "The Iraq War and the Responsibility to Protect: Uses, Abuses and Consequences for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 5:4, pp. 347-367 (347-348).

³ Kutz, M-S (2013), "Just Wars and Persuasive Communication: Analyzing Public Relations in Military Conflicts," in *Selling War: The Role of the Mass Media in Hostile Conflicts from World War I to the "War on Terror"*, ed. Seethaler, J., Karmasin, M., Melischek, G., and Wöhlert, R., pp. 107-133 (109), Intellect, Bristol; Moses *et al.*, *op. cit.*, 348.

⁴ Kutz, *op. cit.*

⁵ Gouliamos, K. and Kassimeris, C. (2012), "Stratocracy: The Growing Hypertrophy of the LifeWorld Militarization," in *The Marketing of War in the Age of Neo-Militarism*, ed.

exaggerations of George W. Bush, opened Pandora's Box with detrimental consequences since Iraq fell short of being democratized as the American President preached whilst, a broader destabilization occurred.⁶

A parenthesis worth noting here is that, a rather subtle/refined method when marketing war to the unsuspecting (local/international) public in the 21st century may be the hiring of mercenaries; as, it is in the latter's interest to wish to prolong the war (say, the US 16-years stay in Afghanistan) in view of how that would enrich them further.⁷ Subsequently, governments relish less (population) dissent as otherwise the case where the need for conscription would arise before waging a war.

To remain within the Western context, the movie industry in combination with the social media revealed their muscles given the rise of threats contra Muslims in America that became evident in the wake of the screening of the movie "American Sniper"; more specifically, myriads of fierce messages aiming Arab/Muslim US people from social media vehicles like Facebook/Twitter, predominantly by those who watched the aforesaid film, were reported.⁸ However, considering how a reaction is what shall certainly follow an action, the aforementioned backlash culminated with the Islamic State (IS) utilizing partial content from such, of late, popular Hollywood movies (i.e., 'American Sniper' amongst others like 'The Hunger Games') so that to reuse in propagandistic videos.⁹ Indeed, terrorists have been very efficient in utilizing the Internet for the spread of their poison and the creation of networks.¹⁰

Gouliamos, K. and Kassimeris, C., Routledge, New York, pp. 9-22 (16); Gouliamos, K. and Theocharous, L.A. (2008), "Harming Democracy in Mediocracy Societies: Decoding the Marketing of War and Animosity through Photo Images," *Journal of Political Marketing*, 7:3-4, pp. 338-362 (342).

⁶ Theophanous, A. (2016), *E Diakyvernisi kai e Politiki Economia mias Omospondis Kyprou* [The Governance and Political Economy of a Federal Cyprus], I.Sideris, Athens (162).

⁷ Ben-Meir, A. (20 July 2017), "Afghanistan: A Morally Corrupting War", *Alon Ben-Meir: Professor*, <http://alonben-meir.com/writing/afghanistan-morally-corrupting-war/> (accessed 23 July 2017).

⁸ BBC News (25 January 2015), "American Sniper film 'behind rise in anti-Muslim threats'", *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-30972690> (accessed 25 May 2016). For further details, see also: Constantinou, M.C. (22 August 2016), "The Marketing of War in the Middle East: The Revenge of History", *Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note*, No. 9, pp. 1-5 (4), CCEIA/UNIC, http://www.emgr.unic.ac.cy/wp-content/uploads/EMPN_9.pdf (accessed 28 August 2017).

⁹ Shepherd, K. (31 May 2017), "ISIS using Hollywood movie scenes in propaganda films: Report", *The Washington Times*, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/31/isis-using-hollywood-movie-scenes-propaganda-films/> (accessed 14 August 2017).

¹⁰ Jarvis, J. (2011), *What Would Google Do?*, translated in Greek by Manolis Andriotakis, Metaixmio, Athens (388-389).

Moving away from the West, in regards to the terrorist utilization of social media channels to market their wars, the propaganda used by Da'ish, for instance, encouraged "lone wolf" terrorists to commit atrocities in nations beyond the Middle East and Central/South Asia.¹¹ To be sure, cyber technology is all about adapting quickly and, terrorist groups alongside organizations do exactly that: without spending anything, they are able to recruit/radicalize new members with merely the use of social media. Western investments such as that of the EU amounting to \$20 million into backing counter-radicalization,¹² reveals how the said groups happen to be way ahead of the West in this particular playing field. Not to mention, the momentousness of information operations -or, the multidimensional communications strategy- campaign of the IS led by its dominant media units that comprises of communiqués performing as proselytization/terror apparatuses.¹³

Moreover, when ISIS's fighters from abroad (say, Britain) post on social media, they often refer to Syria's "Five-Star jihad" while uploading selfies across Instagram or Facebook/Twitter for recruitment-related purposes.¹⁴ Further, selling/supply presupposes buyers/demand wishing to consume the specific product on sale; in this case, buying into the (non-existent) fairy tale thanks to the various misleading photographs and/or professional videos that circulate over the internet. Nonetheless, one must note here that, the price for one to pay is extremely high: their own life!

On the negative side, IS and other extremist groups like Boko Haram of Nigeria exhibit online efficiency through, say, social media sites; admittedly, the internet facilitates their own marketing to the point of bolstering recruitment as, many youngsters from America have already joined IS – thereby, US (e.g., Homeland Security) officials carry out an homeopathic treatment to cure this particular thorn by using the very (young) individuals that terrorist groups strive to entice.¹⁵

On the positive side, however, there is a group of volunteers who zealously tracks down and reports IS(IS/-IL)'s salient recruiters and propagandists in an effort to impede the spread of the latter's propaganda; notably, this kind

¹¹ Kerigan-Kyrou, A.D. (20 August 2015), "The Terrorist Use of Social Media: A successful cyber strategy combines hard and soft power", *Unipath*, <http://unipath-magazine.com/the-terrorist-use-of-social-media/> (accessed 3 March 2017).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ingram, J.H. (2015), "The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69:6, pp. 729-52 (729-30).

¹⁴ Roussinos, A. (5 December 2013), "Jihad Selfies: These British Extremists in Syria Love Social Media", *Vice News*, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gq8g5b/syrian-jihadist-selfies-tell-us-a-lot-about-their-war (accessed 14 August 2017).

¹⁵ Nixon, R. (18 July 2017), "Students Are the Newest U.S. Weapon Against Terrorist Recruitment", *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/18/us/politics/students-are-the-newest-us-weapon-against-terrorist-recruitment.html> (accessed 26 August 2017).

of hunting was instigated in 2014, when hacktivist collective Anonymous declared 'war' against IS with the #OpIris campaign.¹⁶

Furthermore, it is noteworthy stating how Israel markets itself as 'the only democracy in the Middle East' while placing the Palestinian fight under the 'terroristic' umbrella; also, Israel has managed to convert tactics of control - with their related weapons of surveillance systems- into marketable products - the Security (or police) State that is being promoted whereby, the people are effortlessly manipulated by a mania vis-à-vis security may be here to stay, if not, set a model for others to emulate in the future.¹⁷ Or, how Russia appears to use the cyberspace in order to achieve its ends (e.g., via hacking); its use of covert 'propaganda factories' to subvert democracy in addition to the overflowing of Twitter/Facebook with a multitude of computer-generated bots posting under made-up names (other than its undetected conflict on LinkedIn against its American antagonists) are indicative.¹⁸

To conclude, the diachronic value of classic writings such as, George Orwell's "1984" piece become ever more evident given how 'War is Peace'; in other words, the proclivity of governments/leaders to secure their power is made manifest via the control of language and hence, thought/behavior.¹⁹ Therefore, it is the duty of any critical thinker to be aware of the language of terror/war and, in turn, how that may be adopted so as to sell war.

¹⁶ Solon, O. (21 July 2017), "Global network of 'hunters' aim to take down terrorists on the internet", *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/21/global-network-hunters-against-terrorists-on-the-internet> (accessed 28 August 2017).

¹⁷ Halper, J. (20 August 2017), "Europe Must Not Buy What Israel Is Selling to Combat Terror", *Haaretz.com*, <http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.807941> (accessed 26 August 2017).

¹⁸ Stein, J. (3 August 2017), "HOW RUSSIA IS USING LINKEDIN AS A TOOL OF WAR AGAINST ITS U.S. ENEMIES", *Newsweek*, <http://www.newsweek.com/russia-putin-bots-linkedin-facebook-trump-clinton-kremlin-critics-poison-war-645696> (accessed 14 August 2017).

¹⁹ Charles, R. (25 January 2017), "Why Orwell's '1984' matters so much now", *The Washington Post*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/why-orwells-1984-matters-so-much-now/2017/01/25/3cf81964-e313-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.35f77d2be31e (accessed 27 August 2017).

FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED IN CYPRUS TO THE PURSUANCE OF A JUST AND VIABLE RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE



Virginia Balafouta

*Lawyer, PhD in International Law and Regional Studies,
Teaching Staff at National and Kapodistrian University of
Athens*

The settlement and resolution of the Cyprus issue can only be done in the framework of International Law, and in accordance with the principles, rules, procedures and axes of International Law. Undoubtedly, its settlement contains political aspects and dimensions, but the regulation and resolution of such crucial issues affecting state and territorial sovereignty poses serious risks if it does not faithfully follow the basic principles of International Law. It is indisputable that the Republic of Cyprus itself, as a national sovereign state, in the exercise of its state sovereignty, shall decide on its model of governance, on the basis of an agreement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, in formulating and establishing this model, the application of fundamental rules of International Law is another guarantee of a just and viable resolution of the Cyprus issue.

Initially, it should be noted that numerous and particularly serious and heinous international crimes¹ have been committed in Cyprus, which are attributed to Turkey in accordance with the European Court of Human Rights.²

In particular, in 1974, with the double invasion of Turkish military forces in Cyprus and the occupation of the northern part of the Island, Turkey committed the international crime of aggression and the international crime of military occupation.

In addition, Turkish military forces in the armed conflict have committed wilful killings, enforced disappearance of persons, torture, rape, extensive destruction of public and private property not justified by military necessity, as well as extensive destruction of cultural and religious monuments which

¹ According to the actus reus and the mens rea of the international crimes, as these have been crystallized and enshrined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf

² - Cyprus v. Turkey (Cases no. 6780/74, 6950/75, 8007/77, 25781/94)
- Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (1995, 1996).

were not military objectives. The above-mentioned crimes constitute war crimes while committed under armed conflict or prolonged military occupation.

At the same time, homicides, enforced disappearance of persons, torture and rape constitute crimes against humanity, regardless of whether they are committed during wartime, or under military occupation, or in time of peace.

Furthermore, the Turkish forces committed the crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer of population, ethnic cleansing, having as ultimate political and strategic objective the geographical separation of the Island. Aiming at strengthening this strategy, Turkey has also extensively transferred a number of its own civilian population into the occupied territory. The international crimes committed by Turkey were directed against Greek Cypriots and against Turkish Cypriots.

It should be mentioned that concerning the applicable law, International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law are applied; at the same time, International Humanitarian Law is applied not only during the period of the armed conflict in Cyprus, but also until now due to the imposition of military occupation.

It is obvious that the above-mentioned international crimes constitute a serious violation and disruption of the international legal order. Indeed, it is considered that international crimes, due to their particular gravity and their extremely hideous character, offend the humanity as a whole and the "global collective conscience".

In case of violation of the legal order, law requires the restoration of things to the former state (*restitutio in integrum*), if and to the extent that this is possible. By studying historically the evolution of the Cyprus issue, as well as the assumptions that have been accepted by the Greek side and are the basis of the negotiations between the two sides over the years, it would be difficult to argue that today there is a question of a complete restoration of things to the former state.

It is concluded that any arrangement or settlement which differs from the status quo in Cyprus before the Turkish invasion is, more or less, a concession that the Greek side makes, which should be seen as such by the two negotiating sides but also by the whole international community. This will be proven in practice by not requiring further concessions from the Greek side.

Thus, the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, which constitutes the basis of the negotiations between the two sides, should be treated as a grant by the Greek side, in case that it will be implemented at the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

As I have pointed out in the past, the arrangement of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation and two other arrangements -which they will be referred to, further down- are legal fictions. The legal tool of legal fiction (*fictio juris*) is embedded in this arrangement, as it seeks to assimilate dissimilar situations, that is, a totally legitimate and nationally sovereign state -the Republic of Cyprus- with an illegal situation -the pseudo-state-.

In close connection with the bi-zonal and bi-communal federation model is the provision, included in the Annan Plan for Cyprus, concerning the transfer of all structures of the Republic of Cyprus into the Greek Cypriot State and of all "structures"(?) of the pseudo-state in the Turkish Cypriot State. Such an arrangement -whether it will be referred explicitly or not- will be in fact inevitable in case of the establishment of a loose bi-zonal and bi-communal federation with characteristics of a confederation.

This arrangement constitutes also a *fictio juris*, the fiction and contradiction of which lies in the fact that it attempts to legitimize post hoc a totally illegal situation and to equalize it with a legal situation, the state of the Republic of Cyprus, which degrades to Community level.

It is obvious that, in resolving the Cyprus issue, the continuation of the state of the Republic of Cyprus should be adopted, and injustices and inconsistencies should be limited to the extent possible.

The scenario -which has been formulated at times- of the momentary cessation of the Republic of Cyprus and its replacement by the new model of governance would be a profound insult and an extremely negative - historical, political and moral- symbolism for the state of the Republic of Cyprus. This also constitutes a *fictio juris*, by which is sought the legal treatment of the inconceivable attempt to instantly extinguish a state from the real and the legal world.

This arrangement would also be a particularly negative precedent for International Law, a reversal of the basic principle "uti possidetis", and a heavy insult to the fundamental principle of state sovereignty and to the concept and status of state.

In conclusion, the resolution of the Cyprus issue should be done in complete compliance and implementation of International Law, in combination with the principle of national sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Every provision or arrangement should be compatible with the operation of a

nationally sovereign state, with which do not conform obsolete third-party guarantee and intervening rights. The reference to the legal fictions has been made to show that while deepening into the legal nature of specific arrangements, fiction, contradiction, ambiguity and dubious functionality and viability of these arrangements arise. In contrary, at the resolution of the Cyprus issue, International Law, human rights, the rule of law, and the most adequate administration of justice for the unprescribed committed international crimes must prevail.

Editorial Team: Andreas Theophanous (Editor)
 Michalis Kontos
 Petros Savvides
 Christoforos Christoforou
 Styliana Petrou



IN DEPTH
Bimonthly Electronic Newsletter

Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs (CCEIA)
University of Nicosia

Makedonitissis 46, CY-2417 Egkomi, Cyprus
P.O. Box 2405, CY-1700 Nicosia, Cyprus
T: +357 22841600 F: +357 22357964
E: cceia@unic.ac.cy
W: www.cceia.unic.ac.cy www.emgr.unic.ac.cy

ISSN (online) 2421-8111



9 772421 811107
